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Board interlocks are pervasive: 68.20% of firms on average from 1991-2011 have at least one
interlock. Since a firm's decisions are partly based on the board's information set, interlocked
firms may show synchronized movements in their outputs. At the aggregate level, the structure
of the board network will determine the information allocation across firms, which will have non-
trivial effects on output in the economy. In this study, I theoretically examine the asset-pricing
implications of firms’ connections across sectors through the board network. I show that changes
in the network structure affects aggregate output, and thereby, consumption. Specifically, two
attributes of network topology matter for asset prices - diversity and sparsity. In particular,
I derive them from a production-based asset-pricing model in which firms act based on their
information set, which is determined by the topology of board network. I then empirically
compute the two factors using board network data. Consistent with the model's predictions, I
find return spreads of -0.8582% and 0.9024% per month on diversity and sparsity beta-sorted
portfolios, respectively.
A board interlock occurs if the boards of two firms share a common director. These types
of board connections are widely observed amongst U.S. firms.1 Board interlocks provide a
conduit for information exchange, enabling organizational knowledge to be shared between
boards through common directors. Specifically, information disclosed to members of one firm’s
board may influence decisions made by the boards of other firms that share these directors,
thereby leading to the adoption of similar practices and policies (Bouwman, 2011; Kini et al.,
2017).2,3 A firm’s collective resource of practices and policies, often termed as “organizational
capital” or “management capital”, is an important factor of production that is unique to the
firm (Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi, 1997; Lev and Radhakrishnan, 2005). Thus, by having
similar management capital, interlocked firms may exhibit comovement in input and output
decisions.4,5 The board network in the economy is a collection of firms, and any given link in
this network represents a board interlock. In the board network, idiosyncratic changes in the
management capital of one firm affect the management capital of its connected firms (direct
and indirect connections) and thereby, affecting aggregate management capital. Hence, in the
aggregate, the structure of the board network will have a non-trivial influence on aggregate
output, and thus, on consumption and asset prices.
The goal of this paper is to theoretically and empirically examine the implications of changes
in the board network on asset prices. I derive an equilibrium model in which management capital
is a function of the board network and influences a firm’s production. The model’s main insight
is that two board network factors, which I call diversity and sparsity, play an important role in
asset pricing. I show that changes in these two factors are sources of systematic risk that are
priced in equilibrium.
1At the end of fiscal year 2015, 27 of 30 firms on the Dow Jones Industrial Average were interlocked with
other index members.
2Although the policies of connected firms may be public knowledge, directors may play an important role in
communicating the nuances of the policy and enable management to better assess the suitability of the policy
for the firm.
3Similarity in practices and policies does not depend solely on information exchange between connected firms.
Similarity can also arise because the connected firms are using the human capital of the connected director, which
can be related to the director’s experience and expertise, or because of the director’s relational capital associated
with social ties to other firms’ directors.
4Ichniowski et al. (1997) show that a key correlate of plant-level productivity is the adoption of management
practices.
5Section 4 of the Clayton Act prohibits board interlocks between competitors and hence, board interlocks are
more likely to form between firms belonging to different sectors. For instance, at the end of the fiscal year 2015,
Ronald Williams was on the board of Boeing, Johnson & Johnson, and American Express. Exxon Mobil had
two connections to American Express, and single connections to JP Morgan, Walmart, Merck, Caterpillar, and
Traveler’s Insurance.
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Apart from serving as a source of management capital, the board network has four key
features. First, firms take advantage of their board’s management capital through the board’s
advisory roles. For example, in Demb and Neubauer’s (1992) survey of board members, nom-
inating committee members, executive search consultants, etc., 80% of respondents agree that
the board’s main role is to guide firm strategy.6 Second, the governance literature cites moni-
toring as an important function. Boards monitor CEOs and design incentive contracts to induce
managers to exert an optimal amount of effort (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Adams, Herma-
lin, and Weisbach, 2010).7 However, these two roles are not substitutes but rather complement
each other. Dass et al. (2013) argue that with better quality information, the board can serve
both roles better. Third, practices and policies, and therefore management capital, disseminates
across firms through board connections. For example, Bouwman (2011) finds that firms with
interconnected boards have similar corporate governance policies; Kini et al. (2017) report that
they have similar stakeholder orientation; and Fracassi (2016) shows they have similar financial
policies.8 Finally, Section 8 of the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914 prohibits board interlocks
between direct competitors. Thus, board linkages are more likely to form across sectors.9
These board network properties give us two key takeaways. First, management capital
attributed to the board is likely to have a positive impact on firm value through higher output
levels. Second, management capital disseminates through board connections. The two impli-
cations together suggest that a firm will produce more if it has a higher level of management
capital. Moreover, all its connected firms will also have access to this higher management cap-
ital and will also increase production. Hence, aggregate output increases, and this effect will
be driven by the topology of the board network. Since board connections form between firms
in different sectors, the output across connected sectors will exhibit similar and synchronized
movements. Summing up the sectoral fluctuations yields common component(s) of fluctuations,
and all sector-specific effects cancel out. Thus, the structure of the board network in the econ-
omy determines aggregate output and sectoral co-movements. Hence, changes to the board
6Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2008) suggest that the board’s advisory role is more valuable when the firm is
more complex.
7Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001) find that CEO dismissal probabilities have been trending upwards and
conclude that boards have become more active in recent years.
8Haunschild and Beckman (1998) provide evidence that the board network may be a mechanism of information
transmission through which value-improving business innovations can spread.
9Section 8 of the Clayton Act does not allow firms to interlock with the competitors. The Clayton Act also
authorizes private parties to sue for triple damages when they have been harmed by conduct that violates either
the Sherman or Clayton Act and to obtain a court order prohibiting the anticompetitive practice in the future.
(https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws).
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network have implications for the aggregate output and sectoral co-movements.
In the board network, changes in management capital of one board affects other boards
through direct or indirect connections. More “important” or “relevant” boards in the network
give rise to larger network effects. To explain the concept of importance or relevance more
concretely, consider Figure (1) that shows two simulated networks or two different economies.
In the two networks, nodes represent firms while the edge represents that the two firms are
connected through common board members. In the symmetric network structure depicted in
Figure 1(a) each firm relies equally on all other firms for their management capital. Thus, each
firm is equally important or relevant for generating management capital in the network, and
hence, all the nodes are similar in size. On the other hand, in the asymmetric network structure
in Figure 1(b) majority of the firms (“peripheral” firms) rely on the firm in the center for their
management capital. Thus, the firm in the center is more important or relevant for generating
management capital in the network, and hence, has the largest node size.
In the model, I exploit the board network features to derive asset pricing implications.
The board network determines aggregate management capital. Hence, changes in the network
structure changes the aggregate level management capital in the economy, which in turn changes
aggregate output. Shocks to the network structure are the sole driver of shocks to aggregate
output. The effect of the network is completely specified as a function of three factors: two
related to the topography of the network matrix- (diversity and sparsity) and the third related
to the residual total factor productivity (TFP). Changes in these factors change aggregate
output, which changes the consumption expenditure of the representative agent.
Residual TFP is similar in spirit to the standard network channel analyzed in the static
network, as in Acemoglu et. al. (2012) and captures the aggregate effects of idiosyncratic board
productivity. Changes in residual TFP measures the effect of changes to management capital of
one board on other boards in the network. These changes arise either because of idiosyncratic
board shocks or because of shocks that changes the “importance” or “relevance” of the board in
the network. Idiosyncratic shocks to more “important” or “relevant” boards propagate strongly
in the network, generating significant aggregate fluctuations. Positive innovations in residual
TFP makes board (and hence the firms) more productive, on average, which positively affects
output growth and consumption growth.
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Diversity arises because of board network topology and captures the heterogeneity (or
concentration) in management capital across firms. Changes in diversity arises because of
changes in the network structure and measures whether the importance or the relevance of
the boards has changed in the network. The importance or relevance of the board measures
how much other boards’, in the network, rely on the focal board to produce their management
capital. If a firm’s management capital is widely used by other firms, then it will have more
connections than other firms.10,11 Therefore, I use the number of connections to measure a
firm’s management capital. Diversity is a function of heterogeneity or dispersion in connections
in the economy.
Similar to diversity, sparsity also arises because of board network topology and captures
the aggregate effects of idiosyncratic management capital quality or specialization. Changes in
sparsity measures the effect of changes to management capital of one board on other boards
in the network. These changes arise either because of idiosyncratic changes in quality or spe-
cialization of information or because of shocks that changes the importance or relevance of the
board in the network. Similar to residual TFP, changes in quality or specialization to more
important or relevant boards propagate strongly in the network. In the board network, links
captures the information flow and the weight of the links capture their importance. Any given
firm may give more weight to information coming from relatively larger boards and therefore,
I use relative board size to measure link weight.12 Sparsity represents how thinly scattered or
distributed the links are in the network.
In an economy with high diversity, some boards are more important, than others, to pro-
duce management capital. Thus, in the aggregate, few boards are putting a higher level of effort
than other boards in the network. Since effort or input to management capital production has
decreasing returns to scale, boards with higher levels of management capital will have lower pro-
ductivity.13 In the aggregate, high diversity results in decreased productivity and, thus, output
10Field, Lowry, and Mkrtchyan (2013) find that directors with more interlocks are of particularly high quality.
11Mizruchi (1996) and Dass, et al. (2013) among others, argue that better-connected boards have better
information about industry trends, market conditions, and/or potential regulatory changes.
12Advising services are inherently more valuable for entities with less in-house knowledge and one way to gain
better advising information it is to connect with firms with relatively larger boards. Coles, Naveen, and Daniel
(2006) find that for firms with greater advising requirements, (such as large and diversified firms) firm value
increases in board size. They find that for the advisory role, larger boards are beneficial. Larger boards, also
have more number of connections on an average. Field, Lowry, and Mkrtchyan (2013) show that new IPO firms
are in need of more advising and gain higher value by appointing directors who sit on a large number of boards.
13Bloom, Eifert, Mahajan, McKenzie, and Roberts (2013) estimates the output elasticity of management capital
to be 0.1.
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falls. Since aggregate output is equal to aggregate consumption in equilibrium, diversity will
also determine the dynamics of consumption. Increases in network diversity decrease agents’
consumption, thereby decreasing their utility and increasing their marginal utility. Diversity
risk, therefore, carries a negative price of risk. Assets that have high returns when diversity
increases; that is, assets with high diversity betas are hedges against drops in aggregate con-
sumption and should have lower expected returns.14 Therefore, a portfolio that goes long in
high diversity-beta assets and short in low diversity-beta assets should have negative average
returns.
In an economy with high sparsity, firms, on average, are using higher quality or specialized
inputs. A higher quality or more specialized information input or link increases the management
capital and hence, has higher marginal productivity. In the aggregate, high sparsity results in
higher productivity and, thus, output and consumption increase. Increases in network sparsity
increase agents’ consumption, thereby increasing their utility and decreasing their marginal
utility. Sparsity risk, therefore, carries a positive price of risk. Assets that have high returns
when sparsity increases; that is, assets with high sparsity betas make consumption more volatile
and should have higher expected returns. Therefore, a portfolio that goes long in high sparsity-
beta assets and short in low sparsity-beta assets should have positive average returns.
To test the predictions of the model, I construct the empirical proxies for diversity and
sparsity factors using a unique and comprehensive dataset on boards of directors from 1991-
2011 that is also used in Kini, Lee, and Shen (2017).15 I then test the cross-sectional relation
between an asset’s future returns and its exposure to innovations (betas) in these factors. I
find that both betas have strong relations with future returns in the theoretically predicted
direction. The top diversity (sparsity) beta decile earns average returns of 0.8582% (0.9024%)
per month lower (higher) than the bottom decile. The pattern in returns is not explained by the
traditional asset pricing risk factors using the CAPM, Fama-French (FF3) (1993) three-factor
model, Carhart (FFC) (1997) four-factor model, Fama-French (FF5) (2015) five-factor model,
and Hou, Xue, and Zhang (HXZ) (2015) four-factor models. Furthermore, adding diversity
14I calculate diversity and sparsity betas by regressing asset returns on the innovations in these two network
factors.
15I thank Omesh Kini for making this data available to me. The data from 1991-2005 is from Compact
Disclosure also used in Dass, Kini, Nanda, Onal, and Wang (2013). The database is further augmented with
board information obtained from SEC Edgar proxy statements for the period 2006-2011 by using a Python script
and double checking this information using BoardEx director identifiers, names, job titles, and ages.
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and sparsity factor-mimicking portfolios to the standard CAPM model explains the diversity
(sparsity)-beta return spread and also helps to explain the differences in asset returns along
different dimensions of risk such as size, book-to-market ratio, profitability, investment, among
others.
The main contribution of this paper is that it theoretically and empirically demonstrates
that changes in board networks affect asset prices. Although the pair-wise effect of board
connections on firms’ practices and policies is extensively studied in the governance literature,
to the best of my knowledge, this is the first study that examines the asset pricing implications
of board networks in a rational risk-based framework.
This paper relates to several strands of literature. Horton, Millo, and Serafeim (2012) and
Larcker, So, and Wang (2013) examine the asset pricing implications of board connections.
In particular, they show that firms occupying a more central position in a board network
earn superior risk-adjusted returns and have better firm performance. However, my study is
fundamentally different from these studies in several key dimensions. First, Larcker et al.’s
measure is a firm characteristic that does not account for aggregate network topology, whereas
the diversity and sparsity factors examined here reflect the dynamics of the entire network.
Second, Larcker, So, and Wang (2013) attribute the relation between firm centrality and average
returns to investors’ under-reaction, whereas, I present a rational risk-based explanation for the
effect of board networks on asset prices. Empirically, controlling for centrality does not explain
the relation between asset’s network factor betas and expected returns, indicating that network
factor pricing effects documented here are distinct from the effect of firm centrality.
Additionally, I build on the work of Acemoglu, Carvalho, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi
(2012) who study static multi-sector input-output networks. They show that idiosyncratic
sectoral shocks can generate aggregate fluctuations when the network is asymmetric. The
network in my model, however, changes over time, while theirs is static. Therefore, their
analysis does not include the effect of innovations in network diversity and sparsity factors. In
addition, they focus on the origins of aggregate fluctuations, while I am interested in identifying
systematic pricing effects related to the network structure. Using input-output data, Herskovic
(2018) derives two network factors from sectoral linkages however, I use board networks (firm-
level cross-sectoral linkages) and thus show an additional source of sectoral co-movement and
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aggregate risk. Although both types of networks generate comovement, some authors dispute
the power of input-output linkages. Christiano and Fitzgerald (1999) find considerable variation
in linkages among sectors that display strong business-cycle comovement. Dupor (1999) argues
that input-output matrices are too sparse to constitute a major source of comovement. Thus,
network factors arising from board linkages can be related to or complement the network factors
arising from the input-output linkages.
Board interlocks are formed, mainly, between firms belonging to different sectors, hence,
one of the prediction of the model relates to sectoral comovement in the economy. My paper,
thus, is also closely tied to the extensive literature on the importance of sectoral shocks for
economic aggregates. Long and Plosser (1983) develop a model that generates sectoral comove-
ments because each sector relies on the output of other sectors as inputs. On the other hand,
Veldkamp and Wolfers (2007) attribute commonality in information as the source of sectoral
comovements. Further, Herskovic, Kelly, Lustig, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2016) document a
common factor structure in idiosyncratic firm-level return volatility and show that the common
idiosyncratic volatility factor is priced. In my study, firms in different sectors share management
capital, thus leading to input and output comovement, and hence non-trivial sectoral comove-
ments. Changes in the board network over time will therefore change sectoral comovements
and aggregate output.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 presents the board network model and
describes the network factors. Section 2 examines the effect of network factors on asset prices.
Section 3 concludes.
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I. Network Model
In this section I derive the effect of board network effects on asset prices.
A. Model Setup
Time is discrete and indexed by t = 1, 2, .... There are four sectors in the economy- manage-
ment capital sector, intermediate goods sector, industry goods sector, and final or consumption
goods sector. Board is represented as a management capital producer in the model. Man-
agement capital sector consists of n distinct management capital producers. Each of them is
uniquely associated with a ‘base firm’ in the intermediate goods sector. Firms in the interme-
diate goods sector buy management capital, an intangible input, from the management capital
producer and use it along with labor and tangible capital to produce the intermediate good.
In addition, each producer in the intermediate goods sector and, thus, its uniquely linked man-
agement capital producer, belongs to a particular industry. Firms in the industry goods sector
transforms the intermediate goods into an industry good. All the different industry goods
produced by different industries is further transformed into the final output that is used for
consumption in the economy. The representative agent in the economy has Epstein-Zin (1991)
preferences and consumes the output of the final goods sector.
A.1. Management Capital Sector
Consider a management capital producer i. It is connected with other producers in the
economy belonging to different sectors than that of i. Thus, there are inter-sectoral network
linkages. Through these linkages, i invests in buying management capital from other producers.
In the process, it also supplies to other producers; thus, it’s a two-way network. The producer is
a buyer and seller of management capital simultaneously. i's input from producer j at time t is
denoted as xij,t. Both i and j belong to different sectors, but the sector indexes are suppressed
for notational simplicity. All the inputs acquired from other producers, in addition to i’s own
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management capital, are combined into a single effort variable given as:16
Si,t =
[
n∑
j=1
wij,tx
1−1/ρ
ij,t
] 1
1−1/ρ
(1)
The above function captures the dependence of board i on other boards in the economy while,
ρ captures the elasticity of substitution between management capital from different producers.
wij,t captures the extent of interaction between producers i and j and represents the link weight.
In particular, a higher wij,t means that producer j is more important for management capital
of i and hence, has a higher impact on producer i. wij,t = 0 implies that producer j does not
have a direct impact on producer i. The weights are non-negative and sum to one;
wij,t ≥ 0 and
n∑
j=1
wij,t = 1
The effort variable Si,t in Equation (1) is used as an input and transformed into the output of
producer i given as:
Xi,t = ξi,tS
η
i,t (2)
where η ∈ (0, 1) captures decreasing returns to effort.17 All management capital goods are
produced at time t and are used at time t as well. 18 ξi,t is the productivity level of producer i and
shocks to ξi,t are idiosyncratic in nature. For example, information technology implementation
can be one such shock as it can lead to timely and efficient monitoring of certain practices. I
start with describing the optimization problem of the management capital producers.
The optimization problem of producer i is time-separable and hence, it is sufficient to
maximize per-period profits. Given the network weights, producer i chooses quantity of inputs
to acquire xij,t and the total level of effort Si,t to maximize profits, taking both spot prices and
16Effort can be interpreted as time spent on synthesizing, analyzing and making management capital or prac-
tices or information more relevant to the given producer.
17Given the bundle of information there are only so many insights that the producer can generate, and hence,
increase in the effort level leads to an increase in management capital, but at a decreasing rate. If effort is
interpreted as an information signal with some noise then having more and more signals will decrease the variance.
However, the rate of decline in noise keeps falling with each additional signal.
18This approach is similar to that used in Acemoglu, Carvalho, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2012). In other
words, the model assumes a depreciation rate of 100% for the management capital. This can be justified using
the notion that new information or practices may have more impact than the old information or practices.
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input prices as given. This gives the following profit function for producer i at time t.
max
xij,t, Si,t
ΠIi,t = pi,tξi,tS
η
i,t −
n∑
j=1
pj,txij,t
subject to Si,t =
[
n∑
j=1
wij,tx
1−1/ρ
ij,t
] 1
1−1/ρ
(3)
where pi,t is the price of the management capital good i.
A.2. Intermediate Goods Producers
Each management capital producer i sells xi,t level of its management capital for its ‘base’
firm in the intermediate good sector at price pi,t. The ‘base’ firm combines the management
capital xi,t with labor Li,t and capital Ii,t to produce an intermediate good.
19 The intermediate
good is then sold to the industry goods sector at price Pi,t. The output yi,t function for any
intermediate good producer i is given as:
yi,t = I
ϑ
i,tL
ς
i,tx
ϕ
i,t
where ϑ ∈ (0, 1), ς ∈ (0, 1), and ϕ ∈ (0, 1) captures decreasing returns to investment, labor and
management capital good respectively and ϑ + ς + ϕ ≤ 1. The optimization function for the
intermediate good producer i is given as:
max
Ii,t,Li,t,xi,t
ΠDt = Pi,tI
ϑ
i,tL
ς
i,tx
ϕ
i,t − rtIi,t − htLi,t − pi,txi,t (4)
where rt (return on investment) and ht (wage) are the factor prices for the investment and labor
inputs respectively.
A.3. Industry Goods Sector
The industry goods sector transforms the goods produced by the intermediate firms, within
the industry, to produce the industry good Yt. The output function for the industry goods sector
19All capital goods are produced and used at time t itself.
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Yt is given as:
Yt =
n∏
i=1
yαii,t (5)
where αi represents the elasticity or share of the intermediate good i in the industry goods
sector; αi > 0 and
∑n
i=1 αi = 1. The industry good is sold to the final goods sector at price
Pt. The profit function for the industry goods sector is then given as:
max
yi,t
ΠInt = PtYt −
n∑
i=1
Pi,tyi,t = Pt
n∏
i=1
yαii,t −
n∑
i=1
Pi,tyi,t
The industry goods sector maximizes this profit function by choosing the quantity of interme-
diate goods yi,t. Differentiating the above profit function w.r.t yi,t, we have,
∂ΠInt
∂yi,t
= 0 ⇒ Ptαiy−1i,t
n∏
i=1
yαii,t − Pi,t = 0
PtYt = Pi,tyi,t
αi
(6)
A.4. Final Goods Sector
The final goods sector transforms the industry goods produced by the industry goods sector
to the final output Yt or the consumption good. The output function for the final goods sector
Yt is given as:
Yt =
l∏
m=1
Yβmm,t (7)
where m indexes for different industries and there are l industries in the economy. βm represents
the elasticity or share of the industry good m in the final goods sector; βm > 0 and
∑l
m=1 βm =
1. The final output is sold to the consumers at price Pt. The profit function for the final goods
sector is then given as:
ΠFt = PtYt−
l∑
m=1
Pm,tYm,t = Pt
l∏
m=1
Yβmm,t −
l∑
m=1
Pm,tYm,t
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The final goods producer maximizes this profit function by choosing the quantity of industry
goods Ym,t. Differentiating the above profit function w.r.t Ym,t, we have,
∂ΠFt
∂Ym,t = 0 ⇒ Pt βmY
−1
m,t
l∏
m=1
Yβmm,t − Pm,t = 0
PtYt =
Pm,tYm,t
βm
(8)
A.5. Representative Agent
There is a representative agent in the economy who has Epstein-Zin preferences. Let U(Ct)
denote the utility derived from consuming Ct. The recursive value function for the agent then
becomes:
Ut(Ct) =
[
(1− ζ)C
1−γ
θ
t + ζ(EtU
1−γ
t+1 )
1
θ
] θ
1−γ
(9)
where,
ζ = time discount factor; 0 < ζ < 1
γ = risk aversion parameter; γ ≥ 0
ψ = intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES); ψ ≥ 0
θ =
1− γ
1− 1ψ
when ψ > 1 and γ > 1 then θ < 0 and the agent prefers early resolution of uncertainty. The
agent supplies capital and labor to the intermediate goods producers and consumes the output
of the final goods sector. The budget constraint for the agent is:
Pt Ct + (Qt −Dt)Zt+1 = rtIt + htLt +QtZt
where Qt is the aggregate cum-dividend value of all firms in the economy at time t, Zt is the
position or the ownership in the aggregate stock market at time t, and Dt is the aggregate
level dividends in the economy at time t. In the budget constraint, total expenditure on the
consumption goods and aggregate value of firms net dividends (left-hand side) must be equal to
the sum of gross return earned on capital, total wages earned, and the aggregate stock market
value (right-hand side).
In each period, the agent choses how much to consume Ct and next period ownership in the
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stock market Zt+1, in order to maximize the sum of all her future discounted utility. The agent
cannot store consumption goods from one period to next and therefore cannot save. There is
a risk-free asset in zero net supply and in equilibrium the household has a zero net position to
satisfy clearing conditions.
B. Market clearing
There are three sets of market clearing conditions in the economy. First, the consumption
good market clears:
Ct = Yt, ∀ t (10)
which states that the total amount of goods consumed (left-hand side) is equal to the total
amount of the goods supplied by the final goods sector (right-hand side).
Second all asset markets clear;
Zt = 1, ∀ t (11)
which states that the representative agent owns all firms. Hence, the agent is the representative
shareholder as well.
Finally, all management capital goods clear. Thus, for any management capital good
producer i:
Xi,t = xi,t +
n∑
j=1
xji,t (12)
where xji,t is the management capital good belonging to firm i that is sold to or used by firm
j. To interpret it, consider a case where both management capital good and intermediate good
is produced by the same firm. Since, the firm acts as a profit maximizer, it will choose to focus
only on those management capital goods that maximizes its profits. The board provides these
goods and hence, in equilibrium board will only supply that set or level of management capital
goods. Hence, boards will act for the optimal benefits of the firm, which is also board’s fiduciary
duty. In other words, firms will only use that information from the board relevant for its profit
13
maximizing behavior.
C. Equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium is defined as follows:
DEFINITION: A competitive market equilibrium consists of spot market prices (p1,t, ..., pn,t),
consumption (Ct), ownership in shares (Zt), and inputs bundles (xij,t)ij such that, for every
period t, (i) household and firms optimize taking the network weights and spot prices as given,
and (ii) market clearing conditions through Equations (11)-(13) hold.
In order to solve for the competitive equilibrium, we have to define the firms’ optimality
conditions. Starting from the management capital goods sector (for ρ = 1), we have,
λi,t =
∏n
j=1 p
wij,t
j,t∏n
j=1w
wij,t
ij,t
xij,t =
λi,twij,tSi,t
pj,t
Si,t =
n∏
j=1
x
wij,t
ij,t
yi,t =
( ϑ
ϕrt
)ϑ( ς
ϕht
)ς(
pi,t
)1−ϕ
xi,t
pim,txim,t = Pm,tYm,tϕαim m subscripts for industry
Pm,tYm,t = PtYt βm
(13)
λi,t is the Lagrangian multiplier on the Si,t constraint (Equation (1)) and hence, is the shadow
price of the total input of management capital producer i. Equation for xij,t specifies the
optimal input allocation for a given Si,t. yi,t specifies the optimal amount of the intermediate
goods produced, whereas, the next two equations specifies the first order conditions for the
industry goods sector and the final goods sector. Therefore, the competitive equilibrium is fully
specified by the optimality conditions specified in Equation (14) along with the market clearing
conditions from Equation (11)-(13).
The aggregate price index in the economy is given as:
Pt =
1
ϕ
n∏
i=1
pi,t
αiβi
αiβi
(14)
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where βi is the elasticity or share of the industry good in the final good sector to which firm i
belongs. Prices are normalized such that the aggregate price index is set to 1 in each period t.
Thus, we have,
n∏
i=1
pi,t
αiβi = ϕ
n∏
i=1
(αiβi)
αiβi (15)
This makes the consumption of the agent equal to the consumption expenditure itself and, as
shown later, also simplifies the pricing kernel of the assets.
D. Model Solution
In this section, I derive the closed-form expressions for management capital shares and the
consumption growth.
D.1. Management Capital Shares
The solution to the system of equations specified by the market clearing condition in (13)
gives the management capital good shares in equilibrium. The management capital share of
firm i in industry m is:
δi,t =
pi,tXi,t∑
i=1 pi,tXi,t
where pi,t and Xi,t are the price and the total quantity of management capital good i, respec-
tively. The denominator sums the value of all management capital goods in the industry. pi,t
and Xi,t are endogenous, and in equilibrium, are completely determined by the network and
the firm’s output elasticity in the industry good output function. Furthermore,
δt = (1− η)α′ [I − ηW ′t ]−1 = (1− η)α
′
[I + ηW
′
t + η
2W
′2
t + η
3W
′3
t + ...]
where δt = nx1 is the matrix of management capital good shares, α = nx1 is the matrix
of input elasticities or shares of intermediate goods in the industry goods sector, and η is the
returns to scale parameter and captures the decaying rate of the feedback effects. δt is exactly
equal to the network centrality developed by Katz (1953). Thus, producers that take more
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“important” or “relevant” positions in the network representation of the economy play a more
important role in determining aggregate management capital. This observation is consistent
with the intuition that idiosyncratic changes to a board with “relatively” more connections
should have more significant aggregate effects.
To gain more intuition on δt consider the matrix L = [I − ηW ′t ]−1 which is similar to
the Leontief inverse matrix for the input-output economy. The (j, i) element of this matrix,
captures the direct effect of producer i on producer j as well as all the indirect effects between
the two. To see this, lj,i,t, at time t, can be written as: Furthermore,
lj,i,t = 1 + ηwj,i,t + η
2
k=n∑
k=1
wj,k,twk,i,t + η
3
k=n∑
k=1
s=n∑
s=1
wj,k,twk,s,tws,i,t + ...
The first term of the network component captures the direct effect of producer i on producer
j; first degree effect. The second term captures the indirect effect of producer i on producer j
through some other producer k; second degree effect. The third term captures the indirect effect
of producer i on producer j through producer s which affects producer k ultimately affecting
producer j; third degree effect. The network effect of producer i on producer j decays by a
factor of η < 1 whenever the length of the indirect interaction chain between the producers
is increased by one. As the input of the management capital producer increases, the marginal
product of the input decreases and the importance of the management capital to its connections
has a decaying effect.
D.2. Consumption Growth
Changes in the log consumption aggregator are identical to the changes in the log aggregate
output which in turn are equal to the changes in the log aggregate value of management capital:
log
( Ct
Ct−1
)
= log
( PtYt
Pt−1Yt−1
)
= log
( It
It−1
)
The above equality holds as the aggregate price index, in each period t, is normalized to 1. To
solve the model for the aggregate management capital, we have to solve firms’ optimality condi-
tions in the management capital sector. The first order condition for firms in the management
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capital sector can be simplified to:
(δi,tβiIt)1−η = λ−ηi,t pi,tξi,tηη
where δi,t is equilibrium information shares of firm i in its industry, βi is the elasticity or share of
the industry good in the final output sector, and It is the aggregate value of management capital.
The above equation along with price normalization is sufficient to determine the equilibrium
spot market prices and management capital good. This gives us a system of n+1 equations and
n+ 1 unknowns (It, p1,t, p2,t, ..., pn,t) for every period t that fully characterizes the equilibrium
solution of the model. The following theorem describes the solution:
THEOREM: The equilibrium consumption expenditure growth is given by
logωt − logωt−1 = 1
(1− η)
[
− (1− η)∆DNt + η∆SNt + ∆et
]
(16)
where,
∆DNt = DNt −DNt−1, ∆SNt = SNt − SNt−1, and ∆et = et − et−1,
DNt =
n∑
i=1
βiδi,t log δi,t,
SNt =
n∑
i=1
βiδi,t
n∑
j=1
wij,t logwij,t,
and, et =
n∑
i=1
βiδi,tξi,t.
This is the main result of the equilibrium model. Equation (17) shows that the consumption
expenditure (ωt) growth rate, and hence the consumption (Ct) growth rate, can be decomposed
into three distinct factors: innovations in network diversity (∆DNt ), innovations in network
sparsity (∆SNt ), and residual total factor productivity (∆et). According to Equation (17),
changes in network diversity decreases the consumption and the output growth while changes
in network sparsity and residual TFP have the opposite effect.
The log stochastic discount factor is given by:
mt+1 = θ log ζ − γ 1
(1− η)
[
− (1− η)∆DNt + η∆SNt + ∆et
]
(17)
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which means that the diversity carries a negative price of risk, while sparsity carries a positive
price of risk.
E. Network Factors
In this section, I describe in detail the three factors (TFP, network diversity, and network
sparsity) that affect consumption growth rate and output.
E.1. Residual TFP
Idiosyncratic productivity of management capital producers is combined into a single ag-
gregate variable as:
et =
n∑
i=1
βiδi,tξi,t
Residual TFP et is TFP net of network factors. Positive innovations in residual TFP, ∆et,
makes management capital producers more productive on average. This increases the aggregate
management capital in the economy and positively affects output growth and consumption
growth.
This factor or channel is similar in spirit to the static network channel analyzed in Acemoglu
et. al. (2012). Consider, for instance, a static network where the network structure does not
change over time. In this case, the innovations in residual TFP is given by:
∆et =
n∑
i=1
βiδi
(
ξi,t − ξi,t−1
)
The term in parentheses
(
ξi,t−ξi,t−1
)
represents idiosyncratic shocks to the management capital
producer i. Thus, ∆et represents a weighted average of the idiosyncratic shocks where the
network dependent weights are given by δi. In a symmetric network, where each producer relies
equally on management capital of all other producers, δi's are equal. In such a symmetric
economy, the aggregate output growth and the consumption growth, is a symmetric function
of shocks to each producer, such that the diversification argument holds and the idiosyncratic
shocks cancel each other.
18
However, in an asymmetric network the diversification argument would not be valid as
shown in Acemoglu et. al. (2012). In this case, firms are relying on select, few firms for the
management capital. For those few firms δi will be high and idiosyncratic shocks to such firms
may not die out. Rather idiosyncratic shocks to high δi firms may propagate strongly to the
rest of the network, thereby, generating significant aggregate fluctuations.
Changes in producer productivity is not the only mechanism through which innovations
in residual TFP. These innovations can even arise when the importance or the relevance of the
firms change in the network. Consider for instance the innovations in residual TFP ∆et when
there are no idiosyncratic productivity shocks but there is a time-varying network. In this case,
∆et is given as:
∆et =
n∑
i=1
βiξi
(
δi,t − δi,t−1
)
The term in parentheses
(
δi,t− δi,t−1
)
represents the change in the importance or the relevance
of producer i in the network. Thus, residual TFP captures how idiosyncratic board productivity
affects other boards in the network.
E.2. Diversity
The diversity factor is:
DNt =
n∑
i=1
βiδi,t log δi,t =
l∑
m=1
βm
∑
i=1
δim,t log δim,t
where the third equality uses industry notation; firm i belongs to industry m. First, within
an industry, I calculate the average of the log of firms’ management capital share weighted
by its own management capital share. Then, I take the average values across all industries
using the elasticities or share of the industries’ goods in the final goods sector. Within a
given industry
∑
i=1 δim,t log δim,t is exactly equal to the negative Shanon’s (1948) entropy
and captures diversity or dispersion in management capital across firms. In equilibrium, the
management capital shares depend on the board network and, thus only the dynamics of the
board network determine the dynamics of diversity. δi,t for a firm captures the importance or
relevance of the firm in the board network and is equal to the Katz’s network centrality. Hence,
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the diversity factor measures the dispersion of the nodes’ centrality.
From Equation (17), changes in diversity negatively affect consumption expenditure, and
hence the consumption growth rate, given that η < 1. When diversity is high in the economy,
there are some producers that are very important or relevant for the management capital pro-
duction. These producers or boards have to put a higher level to effort to produce higher level of
management capital. Since these producers face lower returns on their inputs due to decreasing
returns to scale, their productivity falls down. Their lower productivity affects other producers
in the economy, and consequently reduces aggregate management capital. Since management
capital is an input in the production process, lower aggregate management capital lowers the
aggregate output, and hence consumption. Thus, high diversity leads to lower aggregate con-
sumption.
E.3. Sparsity
The sparsity factor is:
SNt =
n∑
i=1
βiδi,t
n∑
j=1
wij,t logwij,t =
l∑
m=1
βm
∑
i=1
δim,t
n∑
j=1
wim,jk,t logwim,jk,t
where the third equality uses industry notation; firm i belongs to industry m and firm j belongs
to industry k. Sparsity represents the distribution of the links in the network. The term
SNim,t =
∑n
j=1wim,jk,t logwim,jk,t captures the dispersion in the weights of the links. Hence,
SNim,t measures firm i's input specialization, which is high when some network weights wim,jk,t
are close to zero, and a few others have values that are relatively large or close to one. Sparsity
is the weighted average of SNim,t using firms'management capital share in the industry as the
weights, which I then average across industries using the industry's goods elasticity or share in
the final output.
High sparsity implies that management capital producers are giving more weights to some
of their inputs than others. High weight on a link implies that it is more valuable and informative
and hence, the producer is putting more weight on that link. Thus, when wij logwij is high,
producer is doing input specialization and its management capital is higher. Since the weights
represent the marginal productivity of the inputs, these producers substitute inputs to create
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a more productive input allocation and earn input specialization gains from more dispersion in
the network link weights. With an increase in specialization, the management capital producer's
output increases. To understand the mechanism, consider a producer i who has been endowed
with Ni,t units of the numeraire good to purchase inputs for production. The optimal input
allocation by i to the input from j is given as:
xij,t =
wij,tNi,t
pj,t
From the above equation, i will buy more inputs from j if it's more important or productive
given by wij,t and/or it's price pj,t is lower. Given this input allocation i's output is given as:
Xi,t = ξi,t
(
n∏
j=1
x
wij,t
ij,t
)η
= ξi,t
(
n∏
j=1
w
wij,t
ij,t
p
wij,t
j,t
)η
N ηi,t (18)
When producer i gives has differential link weights or give more weights to some inputs than
others, the term wij,t
wij,t increases having a positive effect on it's output Xi,t. At the same time
pj,t
wij,t increases, increasing the producer's marginal cost and having a negative effect on the
output. Therefore, the aggregate effect of an increase in sparsity, depends on the producer’s
specialization gain combined with changes in its marginal cost. To get the intuition of the
overall effect of sparsity consider changes in log aggregate management capital given as:
log(It+1) = log(It) +
∑
j=1
βj
1∑n
i=1 pij,tXij,t
n∑
k=1
pkj,tXkj,t
[
log(pkj,t+1Xkj,t+1)− log(pkj,tXkj,t)
]
∴ log(It+1)− log(It) =
∑
j=1
βj
n∑
k=1
pkj,tXkj,t∑n
i=1 pij,tXij,t
[
log(pkj,t+1Xkj,t+1)− log(pkj,tXkj,t)
]
=
∑
j=1
βj
n∑
k=1
δkj,t
[
log(pkj,t+1Xkj,t+1)− log(pkj,tXkj,t)
]
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Substituting Xi,t in industry j from Eqn. (18) we see that,
∑
j=1
βj
n∑
i=1
δij,t log(pkj,tXij,t) =
∑
j=1
βj
n∑
i=1
δij,t log(pkj,t) +
∑
j=1
βj
n∑
i=1
δij,t log(ξi,t)
+ η
∑
j=1
βj
n∑
i=1
δij,t
n∑
k=1
wijk,t log(wijk,t)− η
∑
j=1
βj
n∑
i=1
δij,t
n∑
k=1
wijk,t log(pjk,t) + η
∑
j=1
βj
n∑
i=1
δij,t log(Nij,t)
=
∑
j=1
βj
n∑
i=1
δij,t log(pkj,t) +
∑
j=1
βj
n∑
i=1
δij,t log(ξi,t) + η
∑
j=1
βj
n∑
i=1
δij,t
n∑
k=1
wijk,t log(wijk,t)
− η
∑
j=1
βj
n∑
i=1
δij,t
n∑
k=1
wijk,t log(pjk,t) + η
∑
j=1
βj
n∑
i=1
δij,t
[
log(η) + log(δij,t) + log(Ij,t)
]
The first and fourth terms equal sum up to a constant that is derived using the price normal-
ization condition. The second term is the residual TFP factor. The third term is the aggregate
sparsity factor. The last term is aggregate diversity factor. Keeping the residual TFP and
diversity factor constant, only changes to network sparsity affects the aggregate management
capital from t to t+ 1 given as:
log(It+1)− log(It) ≈ η(SNt+1 − SNt )
Sparsity factor SNt is similar to residual TFP, because input specializations operate in one
way like idiosyncratic shocks. To understand this, consider an economy with multiple firms,
keeping δi,t constant, positive innovation in sparsity ∆SNt is given as:
∆SNt =
n∑
j=1
βj
n∑
i=1
δi
n∑
k=1
[
wijk,t logwijk,t − wijk,t−1 logwijk,t−1
]
When producer i experiences an input specialization, its management capital increases. Other
producers, through direct or indirect connections, gets the specialization benefits and their man-
agement capital also increases. Thus, it doesn’t matter whether firm i's increase in management
capital is due to increase in productivity or input specialization, the effect on the connected
firms will be the same. As a result, the input specialization in firm i affects it's first connections,
it's second connections, and so on and so forth. These feedback effects increase management
capital among all producers but with a decaying effect (1 − η). This increases the aggregate
amount of management capital. Since management capital is an input for production, an in-
crease in aggregate management capital increases aggregate output, and hence consumption.
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Thus, high sparsity leads to higher aggregate output and consumption.
E.4. Network Data
I use the same data on directors from 1991-2011 as in Kini, Lee, and Shen (2017). There are
219,720 unique pair interlocks between firms in the CRSP + COMPUSTAT universe, which
provides a network of firms connected through boards for each year. Figure (2) provides the
network representation of the boardroom links for fiscal year 2011. The figure contains all firms
belonging to CRSP+COMPUSTAT universe in year 2011. Approximately 76.11% of the total
firms are connected to at least one other firm through board interlocks. Similarly Figure (3)
plots the proportion of firms in the CRSP +COMPUSTAT universe connected to at least one
other firm through board interlocks for 1991-2011. On an average, 68.20% of firms have at least
one connection to another firm. From Figure (3), we can see that the proportion of connected
firms has been trending upwards over time, and has slightly tapered off in the most recent years.
Figure (4) plots the proportion of firms with at least one-connection, two-connections, and so
on. I calculate the proportions as the average of the annual numbers. On an average, 68.20% of
firms have at least one connection, 55.85% of firms have at least two connections, and 32.41%
of firms have at-least five connections.
Section 8 of the Clayton Act does not allow firms to interlock with their competitors. In
short, rival firms cannot form connections, which protects the market from collusion between
rivals. Thus, most likely the connections are between firms in different sectors. Figure (5)
plots the proportion of connections between two firms in the same industry. Using four-digit
SIC as the industry definition, I find that 4.45% of total connections are between firms in the
same industry.20 The proportion of connections between in the same industry increases as the
industry definition becomes coarser. Still, a large number of connections exist between firms in
different sectors. For example, using the 30 Fama-French industry definition, I find that only
17.52% of total connections are between firms in the same industry.
20Such industries have a high degree of product differentiation and, are thus not true competitors. For instance,
Oracle Corp. was interlocked with Cadence Design Systems Inc. from fiscal years 1991-2011 and both firms have
the same four-digit SIC code (7372). Oracle specializes in developing and marketing database software and
technology, cloud engineered systems and enterprise software products — particularly its own brands of database
management systems. Cadence Design Systems, on the other hand, produces software, hardware and silicon
structures for designing integrated circuits, systems on chips (SoCs) and printed circuit boards. These two firms
make completely different products targeting different customers.
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E.5. What Changes Board Network?
In this section, I explore what can be the potential drivers of board network shocks or
board network changes. Although exploring the board network determinants is an interesting
topic, this is not the focus of my paper. Hence, I present some suggestive evidence which builds
on the intuition and findings that have been presented in the governance literature so far.
Boards possess a wealth of information on industry trends, market conditions, regulatory
changes, and other key market data, which can flow across the boardroom network. Well-
connected boards may have better access to this information and a comparative advantage in
making strategic decisions (Mizruchi, 1990; Mol, 2001). Useem (1984) proposed that inter-
locks enable managers to achieve an optimal “business scan” of the latest business practices
and overall business environment. This helps the firm overcome information challenges, such
as anticipating economic uncertainty, thereby facilitating better management of its factors of
production and protecting it against economic shocks. As the uncertainty changes over time,
firms’ requirement for management capital changes, thereby affecting the board network. Fur-
thermore, firms having different set of characteristics may have different levels of management
capital depending on their needs and availability of directors. Two such firm characteristics
that I examine in this section are firm size and firm age.
Figure 6 Panel A plots the average number of direct connections (or board interlocks) for
firms falling on the 25th (small firms) and 75th (large firms) percentiles along the size dimension.
Firms are classified into different percentiles within each industry which ensures that no one
industry is dominating the analysis and I am not simply picking industry effects.21 In addition,
I also plot the Financial Uncertainty on the figure to proxy for economy wide uncertainty.
The number of direct connections for small firms and financial uncertainty have a positive
correlation of 0.65 which can also be seen from the figure. As the uncertainty increases from
1995 to 2000, the number of direct connections for small firms increases from 2.27 to 4.03, an
increase of almost 77%. Similarly, as the uncertainty decreases from 2000 to 2006, the number
of direct connections for the small firms decreased from 4.03 to 2.59, a drop of almost -36%.
The corresponding numbers for the large firms are: from 1995 to 2000 the direct connections
increased from 3.78 to 6.35 (increase of 70%), while from 2000 to 2006 the direct connections
21The industry classification is based on 4-digit SIC codes
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increased from 6.36 to 7.56 (increase of 19%). This suggests that direct connections for large
firms are not highly sensitive to the financial uncertainty which is also evident by the correlation
of 0.30 between them. As small firms are more likely to have high distress risk, they are more
sensitive to financial uncertainty which also affects their number and the type of board interlocks.
Guner, Malmendier, and Tate (2008) find evidence suggesting that adding commercial bankers
to boards increases a firm’s ability to access debt markets. Hence, small firms are more likely to
increase their interlocks with banks in the periods of high financial uncertainty. Figure 6 Panel
B plots the average number of direct connections (where the interlocked firm is a bank or lending
entity) for small and large firms.22 We can see that the average number of bank connections for
small firms has a substantial correlation with financial uncertainty. When the uncertainty goes
up, small firms are more likely to be in distress and hence, more willing to get interlocked with
the bank for easing some of the distress pressure or getting some well-needed financial advice.
The correlation of the financial uncertainty with the no. of bank connections for small firms is
0.61. On similar lines, Figure 6 Panel C plots the average number of direct connections for firms
falling on the 25th (young firms) and 75th (old firms) percentiles along the age dimension. As
young firms are more susceptible to uncertainty, the changes in direct connections for younger
firms are more sensitive to the changes in financial uncertainty. The correlation between the
number of direct connections for younger firms and financial uncertain1ty is 0.68 while that
for the older firms and the financial uncertainty is 0.27. Panel D plots the number of bank
connections for young and old firms leading to similar findings as in smaller firms.
Till now we have seen some suggestive evidence which indicates that changes or shocks to
the board network are linked with changes or shocks to the economy wide uncertainty. However,
uncertainty shocks are not the sole drivers of the network shocks. Shocks to board networks
can also arise because of shocks or changes to governance regulations. One such regulation
change was raising the independent director representation on the board of the publicly traded
firms. In the wake of major corporate scandals involving high-profile firms in 2001, such as
Enron, Worldcom, and Tyco International, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in
July 2002. Shortly thereafter, the NYSE and NASDAQ proposed new exchange listing rules
to strengthen the internal governance of listed firms. With minor modifications, the proposals
were approved by the SEC in late 2003 and they went into effect in 2004 and 2005. One of
22Following Fama-French 49-industries definition, I define firms with FF-industry code of 45 as Banks.
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the main provisions of the new exchange listing rules require the board of each publicly listed
company to have a majority of independent directors. And one of the possible ways to increase
the independent directors on the board is to form a board interlock with another firm. Following
this reasoning, Figure 7 plots the average number of direct connections for firms falling on the
25th (less independent) and 75th (more independent) percentiles along the board independence
dimension. The number of direct connections for less independent firms increases from 2.86
in 1999 to 3.71 in 2006, a jump of 30%. The less independent firms were more likely to be
non-compliant firms and in the wake of the regulation, increased the number of their board
interlocks to increase the independent director representation on their boards. Overall, the
evidence in this section suggests that shocks to the board network may arise because of the
shocks to the economy in terms of, but not limited to, uncertainty shocks, regulation shocks,
among other things.
E.6. Factor Construction
In this subsection, I demonstrate how to construct the two network factors- diversity and
sparsity- using different network topographies. Figure (8) presents three different network
structures for an economy. In the economy, there are two industries- A and B- each containing
two firms 1 and 2, and 3 and 4 respectively.
Network I: Firm 1 is connected with firms 3 and 4 thus using some part of their manage-
ment capital, and vice versa; while firm 2 is connected with firm 3 and vice versa. In addition,
each firm is connected to itself since, it also uses the management capital of its own board.
Thus, the number of connections that firms 1, 2, 3, and 4 have are 3, 2, 3, and 2 respec-
tively. The paper uses number of direct connections to measure the management capital.23
The management capital share for firms 1 and 2 in industry A is δ1 = (3/(3 + 2)) = 0.6 and
δ2 = (2/(3 + 2)) = 0.4 respectively. Similarly, the management capital share for firms 3 and 4
in industry B is δ3 = (3/(3 + 2)) = 0.6 and δ4 = (2/(3 + 2)) = 0.4 respectively. Assuming that
the share of each industry good in the final output sector is 0.7 and 0.3 for industries A and B
23Valente, Coronges, Lakon, and Costenbader (2008) show that different centrality measures are correlated;
direct centrality and Eigen centrality have a correlation of 0.92.
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respectively, the network diversity in the economy is given as:
DNt = 0.70
(
δ1 ∗ ln δ1 + δ2 ∗ ln δ2
)
+ 0.30
(
δ3 ∗ ln δ3 + δ4 ∗ ln δ4
)
= 0.70
(
0.6 ∗ ln 0.6 + 0.4 ∗ ln 0.4
)
+ 0.30
(
0.6 ∗ ln 0.6 + 0.4 ∗ ln 0.4
)
= −0.6730
To calculate the importance of each link or link weights, I use board size. Specifically, for a link
(i, j) between firms i and j we have, wij = ln(1 +
bsizej
bsizei
) where bsize denotes the board size of
the respective firm. The weights are then normalized so that for any firm i,
∑
j=1wij = 1. For
Network I the board sizes of firms 1, 2, 3, and 4 are 15, 5, 20, and 10 respectively. From the
perspective of firm 1, the weights are: w11 = ln(1 +
15
15) = 0.6931, w13 = ln(1 +
20
15) = 0.8473,
and w14 = ln(1 +
10
15) = 0.5108. This gives the normalized weights as: w11 = 0.34, w13 = 0.41,
and w14 = 0.25. The weights on other links are calculated following along lines. The network
sparsity is then given as:
SNt = 0.70
(
δ1
∑
j=1
w1j lnw1j + δ2 ∗
∑
j=1
w2j lnw2j
)
+ 0.30
(
δ3 ∗
∑
j=1
w3j lnw3j + δ4 ∗
∑
j=1
w4j lnw4j
)
= −0.8875
Network II: Network II is similar to Network I except that the board sizes of all four
firms are all equal to 15. Since, the connections have not changed the network diversity is
still the same, i.e., −0.6730. The change in boards sizes affects the link weights and hence the
network sparsity. The new weights are shown along the edges. The network sparsity in this
case is −0.9364 which when compared to sparsity in Network I is lower. Therefore, Network I
and Network II have the same diversity factor of −0.6730 and Network I has more input
specialization with a higher sparsity of −0.8875.
Network III: Network III is similar to Network I except that firm 2 is now connected
to firm 4. This changes the management capital shares for all firms: δ1 = (3/(3 + 3)) = 0.50,
δ2 = (3/(3 + 3)) = 0.50, δ3 = (3/(3 + 3)) = 0.50, and δ4 = (3/(3 + 3)) = 0.50. Thus,
the diversity factor becomes −0.6932 which represents a decrease in diversity as compared to
NetworkI. On the other hand, the network sparsity is −1.0506 which represents a decrease in
input specialization as compared to Network I.
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E.7. Empirical Evidence
I define industry at the four-digit SIC level since firms at this level tend to be similar. In
line with the model, I take the weighted average of the aggregate-level innovations in diversity
and sparsity across industries. The weights are the constant elasticities or shares of industry
goods in the final output sector. I first calculate the innovations in diversity and sparsity at
the four-digit SIC level and then take the first component of the Principal Component Analysis
(PCA) as the aggregate level factor for each factor separately.24 I compute the innovations in
the factors as the difference from one year to another.
Since the Clayton Act prohibits board connections across competing firms, connections are
more likely to form between firms in different sectors. Hence, we should see positive correlations
between innovations in diversity and sparsity across industries. To provide visual evidence,
Figure (9) plots the innovations in the two network factors for the five Fama-French industries.
The figure shows a substantial commonality in the innovations of these factors across the five
industries. The average pair-wise correlation between the diversity and sparsity innovations
are 0.65 and 0.63, respectively.25
Figure (10) plots the aggregate-level innovations for diversity and sparsity. The correlation
between the innovations is 0.19 (p− value = 0.5253), suggesting no correlation between them,
and that innovations in sparsity and diversity represent two distinct sources of risk.26 Table 1
reports the mean, standard deviation, and the first three autocorrelations for the innovations
in the network factors. The mean value is close to 0 and the t-stats are insignificant. There is
a strong evidence that sparsity innovations are not auto-correlated, while the evidence suggests
weak auto-correlation in diversity innovations.
Next I test whether the innovations in the two network factors are related to the macroeco-
nomic aggregate variables as predicted by the model. Equation (16) (Theorem1) specifies not
only the consumption expenditure growth, but also the growth rate for the aggregate dividend.
24For innovations in diversity, the first PCA factor explains 24.68% of the total variation and the second factor
explains 6.13%, with the higher-order factors declining to below 3% variation. For innovations in sparsity, the first
PCA factor explains 21.56% of the total variation and the second factor explains 5.07%, with the higher-order
factors declining to below 4% variation.
25The innovations in diversity and sparsity calculated using equal-weighted method have correlations of 0.95
and 0.97 respectively with the innovations calculated by the PCA methodology.
26A simple visual inspection of the figure implies that the correlation between the innovations is higher post
1996. Looking at the data post 1996, the correlation between the innovations of the two network factors is 0.29
(p− value = 0.2268).
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Hence, aggregate dividend should be negatively related to changes in diversity and positively
related to changes in sparsity. Therefore, I test whether the innovations in network factors are
related to changes in the aggregate dividend. I construct a time series for aggregate dividend
growth using two approaches. In the first approach, I calculate the dividend growth rate using
ex- and cum-dividend return data of the market portfolio. In the second approach, I use data
from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) table 1.10 to construct a time series for
aggregate dividend growth. I then regress the dividend growth on changes in diversity and spar-
sity. Table 2 presents the results for the regressions. Column (1) uses CRSP market portfolio to
calculate the aggregate dividend growth while Column (2) uses data from the NIPA tables. In
Column (1) we see that the regression coefficient on diversity is −4.3221 (t− statistic = −2.77)
and on sparsity it is 1.8017 (t− statistic = 0.66), which is consistent with the model prediction
of a negative coefficient for diversity innovations and a positive one for sparsity innovations.
Column (2) uses NIPA tables to calculate the aggregate dividend growth. In this case the re-
gression coefficients are −0.6478 (t − statistic = −3.34) and 0.1400 (t − statistic = 0.36) on
diversity and sparsity, respectively.
Then I test whether innovations in the two network factors are related to the consump-
tion growth. Cross-sectionally, the covariance of assets’ returns with the consumption growth
rate determines the variation in average returns. Since the two network factors also capture
the cross-sectional variation on average assets’ returns, the two factors should be related with
the consumption growth rate. Malloy, Moskowitz, and Vissing-Jørgensen (2009) show that
long-run stockholder consumption risk better captures cross-sectional variation in average asset
returns than aggregate or nonstockholder consumption risk. Following Malloy, Moskowitz, and
Vissing-Jørgensen (2009), I use the shareholder consumption growth and the top shareholder
consumption growth data to test the relationship between consumption growth and network
factors.27 Specifically, I regress 1-quarter ahead consumption growth on the innovations in the
two network factors. Columns (3) and (4) of Table (2) report results of the regressions for
stockholders’ and top stockholders’ consumption growth, respectively. For stockholders’ con-
sumption growth, the regression coefficient on diversity is −0.0589 (t− statistic = −1.47) and
on sparsity it is 0.2978 (t − statistic = 3.27), which is consistent with the model prediction
of a negative coefficient for diversity innovations and a positive one for sparsity innovations.
27The shareholder consumption data from Annette Vissing-Jørgensen’s website
(http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/vissing/)
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For top-stockholders’ consumption growth, the regression coefficient on diversity is −0.3285
(t − statistic = −3.64) and on sparsity it is 0.4185 (t − statistic = 1.80). Finally, Column (5)
uses the aggregate consumption growth. In this case, the regression coefficients are −0.0087
(t − statistic = −0.73) and −0.0038 (t − statistic = −0.15) on diversity and sparsity, respec-
tively.
II. Network Factors and Asset Returns
According to the network model, the consumption growth rate depends negatively on diver-
sity and positively on sparsity. A positive shock to diversity is associated with lower consumption
and hence with higher marginal utility. On the other hand, a positive shock to sparsity is as-
sociated with higher consumption and hence with lower marginal utility. Therefore, the model
has a clear-cut prediction of how innovations in the network factors are priced: innovations in
diversity carry a negative price of risk, while innovations in sparsity carry a positive price of
risk.
In this section, I verify the model’s asset pricing prediction. I start by sorting portfolios
based on a stocks’ exposure to innovations in the network factors, and I show that investors are
compensated for such exposure. Then, I estimate the prices of risk for these factors. Finally,
I conclude with the evidence on the relation between the network and asset pricing factors in
the literature.
A. Returns Data
I use both industry- and firm-level portfolios for the asset pricing tests. For returns, I
consider all stocks from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database with share
codes 10, 11, and 12 and listed on the AMEX, NASDAQ, or NYSE indices. I remove firms
with stock price less than $1 and account for delisting returns.28 Due to the trailing window, I
28I define the excess stock return in month t + 1 is as the delisting-adjusted (Shumway (1997)) stock return
minus the return of the one-month U.S. Treasury bill in month t+ 1, recorded in percent. If the stock is delisted
in month t + 1 or the CRSP provides a delisting return, we take the month t + 1 return of the stock to be the
delisting return. If no delisting return is available, then we determine the stock’s return based on the delisting
code in CRSP. If the delisting code is 500 (reason unavailable), 520 (went to OTC), 551-573 or 580 (various
reasons), 574 (bankruptcy), or 584 (does not meet exchange financial guidelines), we take the stock’s return
during the delisting month to be −30%. If the delisting code has a value other than the previously mentioned
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consider stocks with 60 months of return data.
B. Sorted Portfolio and Returns
The analysis uses value-weighted industry portfolios to mitigate the effect of small, illiquid
stocks in the industry portfolios. To verify the negative price of risk for diversity innovations
and the positive price of risk for sparsity innovations, I sort industries based on their exposure
to these innovations and form portfolios by deciles on a trailing window. For every industry i,
I regress its excess return on a constant and on innovations in network factors. The regression
specification is:
Ri,t = αi + βD∆DNt + βS∆SNt + i,t
where coefficients (β’s) measure the exposure of industry i to the factors’ innovations. If
diversity carries a negative price of risk, then industries with a high diversity beta, that is, high
βD, should have lower expected returns. Similarly, high sparsity beta (βS) industries should
have higher expected returns.
Starting from July (1997) for every month t, I compute an industry's exposure to innova-
tions in the network factors using the above regression over a 60-month window from t−59 to t.
Then, I sort the industries separately based on their beta (one-way sort). Given that industries
are properly sorted, equal-weighted portfolios are formed and are held for the next 12-months.
This procedure repeats as a trailing window each month, until the last year of the sample (June
2013).
I use the calendar time strategy in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) to form portfolios. Specifi-
cally, in any given month t, the strategy holds a series of portfolios selected in the current month
and in the previous K − 1 months, where K is the holding period. At the end of each month t,
industries are sorted in the ascending order of the network betas calculated using a 60-month
return window. Based on these rankings, ten decile portfolios are formed that equally weight
the industries in each portfolio. Each portfolio is then held for the next K months, and the
strategy is repeated every month. In addition, the strategy closes out the portfolios formed
values and there is no delisting return, we take the stock’s return during the delisting month to be −100%.
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in month t − K. Thus, I revise the weights on 1/K of the securities in the entire portfolio
and carry over the rest from the previous month. The profits of the above strategies are then
calculated for a series of buy-and-hold portfolios and a series of portfolios that were rebalanced
monthly. Since the returns of the two strategies were very similar, I present the results using
the monthly re-balancing strategy throughout the paper. The calendar-time strategy serves
three purposes. First, this strategy increases the power of the tests, which is beneficial, since
I consider a relatively smaller time period compared to contemporaneous asset pricing liter-
ature. Second, if the relationship between network betas and the future return does indeed
reflect a risk-based phenomenon, the pricing effect should exist beyond the one-month horizon.
Thus, having a holding period greater than 1-month sets a high bar. Finally, the persistence of
the cross-sectional relationship is important for large institutional investors, who may require
extended periods after calculating the beta to accumulate large positions.
Since, the independent variable (innovations in network factors) in the regression equation
to estimate beta is updated annually while the dependent variable (asset returns) is updated
monthly, the possibility of spurious estimates is a potential concern. Ferson, Sarkissian, and
Simin (2003) show that when the independent variable is persistent and the dependent variable
is not (spurious regressions), the slope coefficient estimates are very close to the true values.
Thus, the slope coefficients are well-behaved, and the bias comes from the standard errors.
Table 3 presents the average slope estimates, βD and βS , for the network-sorted decile portfolios.
Columns (1) and (2) represents the βD and βS estimates for the ten diversity-sorted portfolios,
while columns (3) and (4) report the respective slope estimates for the ten sparsity-sorted
portfolios. Despite the annual updates of the network factors in the regression, the diversity
sorted portfolios show a fair amount of dispersion in the βD. βD increases monotonically from
decile 1 to decile 10 and the 10− 1 difference is 2.4242 (t− statistic = 6.74). However, the βS
do not show much variation and the 10− 1 difference in βS is −0.1303 (t− statistic = −0.65).
Similarly, for the sparsity sorted portfolios, the βS increases monotonically from decile 1 to
decile 10 with a 10 − 1 difference of 4.8528 (t − statistic = 4.04). On the other hand, βD is
largely negative across all deciles and the 10− 1 difference is 0.3584 (t− statistic = 0.63).
I next examine the monthly average excess returns. Panel A of Table 4 shows that the
average excess returns are nearly monotonically decreasing across βD deciles. The βD decile 1
portfolio generates an average excess return of 0.9849% per month and that of the 10th decile
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portfolio is 0.1267% per month, consistent with a negative price of risk for diversity innovations.
The βD 10 − 1 portfolio has an average return of −0.8582% per month which is economically
large and highly statistically significant with an NW t-statistic of −2.65. To examine whether
the pattern in the excess returns on the diversity beta-sorted portfolios is indicates exposure to
the previously identified risk factors, I calculate the abnormal returns of the decile portfolios
relative to the CAPM, FF3, FFC, FF5, and HXZ factor models. The results demonstrate that
the standard risk factors do not explain the relationship between the diversity beta and average
returns since the alphas exhibit a similar monotonically decreasing pattern across diversity
beta deciles, and the alpha of the βD 10− 1 portfolio relative to each factor model is negative
and statistically significant. The βD 10 − 1 portfolio generates monthly alphas of −0.9441%
(t − statistic = −2.96), −0.7797% (t − statistic = −3.28), −0.7422% (t − statistic = −2.98),
−0.4604% (t−statistic = −1.88), and −0.5234% (t−statistic = −2.38) relative to the CAPM,
FF3, FFC, FF5, and HXZ factor models, respectively.
Panel B of Table 4 shows that the average excess returns are nearly monotonically increasing
across βS deciles. The βS decile 1 portfolio generates an average excess return of −0.0052% per
month and the average excess return of the 10th decile portfolio is 0.8972% per month consistent
with a positive price of risk for sparsity innovations. The βS 10 − 1 portfolio has an average
return of 0.9024% per month which is economically large and highly statistically significant
with an NW t-statistic of 3.79. The βS 10 − 1 portfolio generates monthly alpha of 0.9223%
(t − statistic = 3.73), 0.8568% (t − statistic = 3.94), 0.7889% (t − statistic = 3.36), 0.6046%
(t−statistic = 2.36), and 0.5163% (t−statistic = 2.02) relative to the CAPM, FF3, FFC, FF5
and HXZ factor models, respectively. This shows that innovations in network factors represent
a source of risk that is not captured by the CAPM, FF3, FFC, FF5 and HXZ factors. Overall,
the evidence suggests that the two network factors represent distinct sources of risk.
Next, I analyze the beta loadings for network-sorted portfolios using the 5-factor Fama-
French (2015) model. Table 5 presents the intercept and the coefficients for the regression of
portfolio returns on the five factors. Looking at the deciles for the diversity sorted portfolios
in Panel A, the market return (MKTRF ) beta for each decile is similar and the MKTRF
beta for the 10 − 1 is 0.0220, but insignificant (t − statistic = 0.33). This suggests that
even though different deciles have different exposures to network diversity, they load equally
on the systematic factor. The loading on the size (SMB) and investment (CMA) factors
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decreases monotonically and the 10−1 difference is −0.3491 (t−statistic = −5.48) and −0.1903
(t− statistic = −1.49), respectively.29 This result implies that industries with higher exposure
to diversity factor are larger industries and make greater levels of investment. Finally, the
10 − 1 portfolio loading on the profitability factor is negative (−0.5254) and significant (t −
statistic = −5.08), implying that higher diversity industries have lower profitability. Similarly,
the 10 − 1 portfolio in the sparsity sorted portfolios have a positive (0.1069) and insignificant
(t − statistic = 0.97) MKTRF beta, positive (0.1728) and insignificant (t − statistic = 1.26)
SMB beta, negative (−0.0200) and insignificant (t − statistic = −0.11) value factor (HML)
beta, positive (0.4366) and significant (t − statistic = 2.39) profitability factor (RMW ) beta,
and positive (0.1306) and insignificant (t − statistic = 0.55) CMA beta. This implies that
the differences in exposure to sparsity do not lead to differences in market beta, size, book-to-
market, and investment, and that higher sparsity industries are more profitable.
Altogether, there is compelling evidence that innovations in diversity and sparsity factors
constitute priced sources of risk. Moreover, the two factors represent distinct sources of risk
that cannot be explained by standard asset pricing models such as the CAPM, FF3, FFC, FF5,
and HXZ factor models.
C. Robustness
In this section I present robustness results for the cross-sectional relationship between net-
work factors and expected average returns. Since, the base-line results use value-weighted indus-
try (4-SIC) portfolios, I show robustness with value-weighted firm-level portfolios to demonstrate
that a specific industry definition or a few select industries do not drive the results.
Table 6 presents the results for single-sorted βD and βS firm-level value-weighted portfolios.
Panel A of Table 6 shows that the average excess returns are nearly monotonically decreasing
across βD deciles. The βD decile 1 portfolio generates an average excess return of 0.9635% per
month and the average excess return of the 10th decile portfolio is 0.1403% per month consistent
with a negative price of risk for diversity innovations. The βD 10 − 1 portfolio has an average
return of −0.8232% per month which is economically large and statistically significant with
29Using the HXZ model, I obtain a negative (−0.3667) and significant (t − statistic = −2.05) loading on the
investment factor for the 10− 1 portfolio.
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an NW t-statistic of −2.20. The βD 10 − 1 portfolio generates monthly alphas of −0.8736%
(t − statistic = −2.17), −0.7518% (t − statistic = −2.35), −0.7243% (t − statistic = −2.25),
−0.7197% (t−statistic = −2.12), and −0.7013% (t−statistic = −2.09) relative to the CAPM,
FF3, FFC, FF5, and HXZ factor models, respectively. Panel B of Table 6 shows that the
average excess returns are nearly monotonically increasing across βS deciles. The βS decile
1 portfolio generates an average excess return of 0.2878% per month and the average excess
return of the 10th decile portfolio is 0.8322% per month consistent with a positive price of
risk for sparsity innovations. The βS 10 − 1 portfolio has an average return of 0.5444% per
month which is economically large and statistically significant with an NW t-statistic of 2.00.
The βS 10 − 1 portfolio generates monthly alpha of 0.6251% (t − statistic = 2.42), 0.6064%
(t − statistic = 2.40), 0.4656% (t − statistic = 1.98), 0.5673% (t − statistic = 2.09), and
0.4179% (t− statistic = 1.78) relative to the CAPM, FF3, FFC, FF5, and HXZ factor models,
respectively.
To demonstrate that small firms do not explain the firm-level results I repeat the firm-level
portfolio analysis by excluding micro-cap stocks. Each month I remove all stocks with a market
capitalization below the than 20th percentile of NYSE stocks. I report the results in additional
tables in the Appendix.
Next, I demonstrate robustness with equal-weighted industry portfolios. Table 7, Panels A
and B, present results for diversity- and sparsity-beta portfolios using equal-weighted industry
portfolios, respectively. The βD 10 − 1 portfolio generates monthly alphas of −0.8400% (t −
statistic = −3.13), −0.6904% (t − statistic = −3.21), −0.6284% (t − statistic = −2.79),
−0.3445% (t−statistic = −1.72), and −0.3991% (t−statistic = −2.04) relative to the CAPM,
FF3, FFC, FF5 and HXZ factor models, respectively. The βS 10−1 portfolio generates monthly
alpha of 0.8649% per month (t − statistic = 2.88), 0.8047% per month (t − statistic = 3.10),
0.7082% per month (t−statistic = 2.65), 0.5235% per month (t−statistic = 1.94), and 0.4339%
per month (t−statistic = 1.73) relative to the CAPM, FF3, FFC, FF5 and HXZ factor models,
respectively. The evidence suggests that the results are similar to the value-weighted industry
portfolios.
I next report the results for different holding periods using the calendar time approach. I
show robustness for 1-, 3-, 6-, and 9-month holding periods. Table 8, Panels A and B, present
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results for diversity- and sparsity-beta portfolios, respectively, using value-weighted industry
portfolios. For brevity, I report alphas only for the 10 − 1 portfolios. The patterns of average
excess returns and alphas for both diversity- and sparsity-sorted portfolios for different holding
periods are similar to the base-line results. With an increase in the holding period there is
a small increase in the magnitude but a noticeable increase in statistical significance, across
both diversity- and sparsity-sorted portfolios. Overall, the results are robust to a change in the
holding period.
Having demonstrated a strong cross-sectional relationship between network factors and
expected stock returns that the standard risk factors do not explain, I next investigate the
possibility that risk variables with a plausible relationship to network factors may explain this
relationship. I use these risk variables as controls and test the robustness of the univariate
diversity (sparsity)-beta portfolio results by constructing bivariate portfolios that are neutral to
a control variable while having variation in the diversity (sparsity)-beta portfolio. Specifically,
at the end of month t, I first sort all stocks into two groups by the ascending values of the
control variable. Within each control variable group, I then sort stocks into decile (or quintile)
portfolios by the ascending order of diversity (sparsity)-beta. I then follow the previous calendar-
time approach and hold each resulting portfolio for the next 12 months. Next, I compute the
average monthly t+ 1 excess return across the control variable portfolios within each diversity
(sparsity)-beta decile and refer to this as the bivariate diversity (sparsity)-beta decile portfolio
excess return. Finally, I calculate the difference in t+ 1 returns between the bivariate diversity
(sparsity)-beta decile 10 and decile 1 portfolios. Since the bivariate diversity (sparsity)-beta
decile portfolios have similar values for the control variable, the control variable is unlikely to
determine any return pattern across the bivariate diversity (sparsity)-beta decile portfolios.
For the double-sorted industry portfolios, I cannot form too many portfolios because some
portfolios will have too few industries. At the same time, it has to be ensured that maximum
dispersion is achieved in the network betas. There is always a trade-off between these two.
Therefore, I form 2x10 double-sorted portfolios, where I first sort the sample into 2 groups
according to the control variable, and then I sort each control group into 10 groups according
to the network beta. First, I build double-sorted portfolios based on both network factors and
verify whether the results are robust to double-sorting. Table 9, Panels A and B, present the
results for diversity (sparsity)-beta sorted portfolios after controlling for sparsity (diversity)-
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beta. For diversity-beta sorted portfolios, the 10 − 1 portfolio that is neutral to sparsity-beta
generates monthly alphas of −0.9180% (t−statistic = −2.87), −0.7670% (t−statistic = −3.09),
−0.7099% (t − statistic = −2.84), −0.4016% (t − statistic = −1.69), and −0.5015% (t −
statistic = −2.22) relative to the CAPM, FF3, FFC, FF5, and HXZ factor models, respectively.
On the other hand, in the sparsity beta-sorted portfolios, the 10 − 1 portfolio that is neutral
to the diversity generates monthly alphas of 0.8721% (t − statistic = 3.57), 0.8385% (t −
statistic = 3.47), 0.7221% (t−statistic = 2.87), 0.6528% (t−statistic = 2.20), and 0.5587% (t−
statistic = 1.97) relative to the CAPM, FF3, FFC, FF5, and HXZ factor models, respectively.
I then do 5x5 double sorts using firm-level value-weighted portfolios, and report the results
in the Appendix. The results are similar to what we have using industry-level value-weighted
portfolios. This shows that controlling for βS (βD) does not appear to explain the negative
(positive) relation between βD (βS) and expected returns and provide additional support that
these are two separate risk factors.
D. Network Factors and Centrality
Larcker, So, Wang (2013) show that firms with central boards earn superior risk-adjusted
returns. To show that my results are not driven by firm centrality, I construct double sorted
portfolios on βD (βS) after controlling for firm centrality.
30 Following Larcker, So, Wang (2013)
I create a rank-based centrality measure.31 Specifically, at the end of June each year I sort all
stocks into quintiles using market capitalization. Within each quintile (conditional sort) I again
sort stocks into quintiles based on firm centrality. The intersection of size and centrality gives
us (5x5 =) 25 portfolios. Rank centrality is simply an integer, 1 to 5, indicating the quintile of
centrality that the stock falls into in the double sort on size and centrality. Resulting portfolio
that goes long in high rank centrality and short in low rank centrality earns an average return of
0.2768% per month (t− statistic = 2.27) within my sample period, i.e. from July 1997 to June
2013.32 This result validates the findings of Larcker, So, Wang (2013). Since rank centrality
30Firm centrality is measured as the total number of firms with which the firm is connected to through a
common director.
31Larcker, So, and Wang (2013) show that larger firms tend to more number of connections (also true in my
dataset) and hence, to separate the effects of size and connectedness they create ranked versions of the centrality
measure.
32Forming single-sorted quintiles on firm centrality, instead of using rank centrality measure, gives a high− low
return of −0.0425% per month (t − statistic = −0.16). Forming deciles on firm centrality gives a high − low
return of −0.3355% per month (t− statistic = −1.80).
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is a firm-level measure, I form firm-level value-weighted portfolios for this test. Specifically, I
form 5x5 double-sorted portfolios where I first sort into 5 groups based on rank centrality and
then within each centrality group I sort into 5 groups of βD (βS). Table 10 presents double
sort results for βD and βS , respectively, after controlling for rank centrality measure. For
diversity-sorted portfolios, the 5 − 1 portfolio that is neutral to the rank centrality generates
monthly alpha of −0.6659% (t−statistic = −2.01), −0.5628% (t−statistic = −2.34), −0.5822%
(t−statistic = −2.21), −0.5573% (t−statistic = −2.30), and −0.5580% (t−statistic = −2.01)
relative to the CAPM, FF3, FFC, FF5, and HXZ factor models, respectively. On the other hand
in sparsity-sorted portfolios, the 5− 1 portfolio that is neutral to the rank centrality generates
monthly alpha of 0.4394% (t − statistic = 2.55), 0.4975% (t − statistic = 2.93), 0.3822%
(t− statistic = 2.58), 0.4236% (t− statistic = 2.50), and 0.3248% (t− statistic = 2.28) relative
to the CAPM, FF3, FFC, FF5, and HXZ factor models, respectively. Therefore, controlling for
rank centrality measure beta does not appear to explain the negative (positive) relation between
βD (βS) and expected returns.
After showing that the rank centrality measure cannot explain the relation between ex-
pected returns and network betas, I test whether the network betas can explain the relation
between rank centrality and expected returns. Specifically, I first sort stocks into quintiles based
on βD (βS) and then within each βD (βS) portfolio I further sort stocks into 5 portfolios based on
rank centrality measure. In unreported results, I find that, after controlling for βD, the return
spread on 5−1 rank centrality sorted portfolios is −0.1294% per month (t−statistic = −1.21).
Similarly, after controlling for βS , the return spread on 5− 1 rank centrality sorted portfolios is
−0.1071% per month (t− statistic = −1.14). This shows that the rank centrality measure may
be a proxy for the network risk factors. However, we must interpret these results cautiously
for two reasons. First, the sample period in Larcker, So, Wang (2013) is from 2000 to 2007
while in my case it is from July 1997 to June 2013. Second, they use both publicly traded
and private firms to form their rank centrality measure. On the other hand, since I have data
only on publicly traded firms, I only use publicly traded firms to form the centrality measure.
Overall, it appears that the network based risk factors are robust to network based firm-level
centrality characteristic.
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E. Price of Risk
To confirm the model’s prediction about risk factors, I estimate the linear regression in the
SDF Equation (18). I construct the diversity (sparsity)-mimicking portfolio from the double
sort that controls for sparsity (diversity) as shown in Table 9. The diversity (sparsity) goes
long on the high diversity (sparsity) beta portfolio and short on the low diversity (sparsity)
beta portfolio. I use these factor-mimicking portfolios as asset pricing factors and run Fama
and MacBeth regressions at a monthly frequency to verify whether the diversity and sparsity
factors are priced in different assets. The single-sorted portfolios on diversity and sparsity have a
negative correlation (−0.2244, p−value = 0.0018). The double-sorting methodology minimizes
the correlation between them.33
Next, I test for the price of risk for the two network factors. For a given set of test assets
and a given set of asset pricing factors, I first regress the time series excess returns on the factors
considered; that is, I run a univariate time-series regression for each asset. In the second stage,
I run a cross-sectional regression in which I regress the excess returns on the estimated betas.
The regression estimates the risk premium associated with each factor.
If the risk premium is significantly different from zero, the factor is priced. A high R-squared
indicates that the spread in the betas of the test assets on the common factors explains the
spread in average returns. Because the error terms may be cross-sectionally correlated, I report
the coefficients and t-statistics using Fama and MacBeth (1973). The coefficients of the second
stage are the prices of the risk of the asset pricing factors which are reported in Table 12. Panel
A reports the results for the two network factors along with the MKTRF factor.34 I can do
this exercise for any set of portfolios to verify whether innovations in diversity and sparsity are
priced. Following Lewellen, Nagel, and Shanken (2010), I use a comprehensive set of portfolios
from Kenneth French’s website to identify risk prices. I first start by estimating the prices of
risk among 10 diversity-sorted and 10-sparsity sorted (20 in total) portfolios. Column (1) of
Table 12 presents the estimation results. Network diversity is priced among the 20 network
portfolios with a negative price of risk, while network sparsity has a positive price of risk,
which is consistent with the theoretical model and earlier cross-sectional results. The market
33The results are similar when using the single-sorted portfolios.
34I include MKTRF as a factor, since, Barillas and Shanken (2018) argue that the market portfolio represents
the aggregate supply of securities and therefore holds a unique place in portfolio analysis and the equilibrium
pricing of assets, for example, the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM and the Merton (1973) intertemporal CAPM.
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factor is positive and significant, indicating that high beta assets have higher expected returns,
which is consistent with CAPM. In Column (2), I add 25 portfolios double-sorted by size and
book-to-market values (25 Fama and French portfolios). The network factors and MKTRF
remain significant. In column (3), I add 10 short-term reversal, 10 long-term reversal, and
10 momentum portfolios, and the network factors remain significant. In column (4), I add 10
operating profitability and 10 investment-sorted portfolios, while column (5) adds 10 accrual, 10
cash flow, 10 dividend yield, 10 earnings-price ratio, and 10 net issuance sorted portfolios. As
I include more portfolios to the set of test assets from Columns (1) to (5), diversity (sparsity)
remains statistically significant with a negative (positive) price of risk amongst all five sets
of test assets. MKTRF remains statistically insignificant, except for the first two sets of
test assets. From Columns (1) to (5), the price of risk for diversity varies from −0.5584%
(t− statistic = −2.25) to −0.9719% (t− statistic = −3.91) per month. For sparsity the price
of risk varies from 0.7785% (t− statistic = 7.11) to 1.0241% (t− statistic = 6.00) per month.
The estimates of the price of risk are in range with the earlier cross-sectional results. Finally, in
Column (6) I start with the test assets similar to Column (5) and remove the 10 diversity-sorted
and 10-sparsity sorted (20 in total) portfolios. The results are similar to that in Column (5)
suggesting that the factor premiums and the significance on diversity and sparsity factors, from
Columns (1) to (5), are not driven by network-sorted portfolios alone.
Next, I show robustness with respect to the input-output network. Dass et. al. (2014)
shows that directors from related industries (DRIs), executives and/or directors of firms in one
of the related upstream or downstream industries, can bring potentially valuable knowledge
about their own industries as well as facilitate the firm’s access to contacts in those industries.
This knowledge helps the firm overcome information challenges, such as anticipating industry
conditions and trends, thereby facilitating better management of its factors of production and
protecting it against demand or supply shocks. If only the management capital of the board
and the connected DRI matters for the firm’s production then, the board network factors are
proxying for the equivalent factors constructed using the input-output network data. To test
this, I construct the two network factors diversityCS and sparsityCS from the time-varying
input-output network and add them as controls in the price of risk test. The input-output
network factors are constructed following Herskovic (2018).35 The factor mimicking portfolios,
35Following Herskovic (2018) I use COMPUSTAT customer-supplier data and define the industry at the 2-digit
NAICS level. I run the baseline regression specified in Herskovic (2018) to estimate the betas related to the two
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diversityCS and sparsityCS , has an average return of −0.6392% (t − statistic = −2.19) and
0.3513% (t − statistic = 1.91), respectively, from July 1997 to June 2013 which validates the
findings in Herskovic (2018).
The results for the price of risk test, with the input-output network based factors as addi-
tional controls, are presented in Table 12 Panel B. From Columns (1) to (6), the price of risk
for diversity varies −0.8447% (t − statistic = −3.74) to −1.0887% (t − statistic = −3.49) per
month. For sparsity the price of risk varies from 0.7374% (t − statistic = 9.40) to 1.1599%
(t − statistic = 2.52) per month. The estimates of the price of risk are in range with the
earlier results presented in Panel A. The findings suggest that the board network factors may
not be proxying for the input-output network factors. However, we must interpret these results
cautiously for two reasons. First, the sample period in Herskovic (2018) is from January 1995
to December 2013 while in my case it is from July 1997 to June 2013. Second, our samples
might be different because of different methodologies to identify the CRSP permno links for
the COMPUSTAT customer-supplier dataset. Herskovic (2018) uses the Cohen and Frazzini
(2008) dataset to locate the CRSP PERMNO until the year of 2009 and then manually updates
the PERMNOs up to 2013. On the other hand, I use the WRDS “Supply Chain with IDs”
dataset to identify the CRSP Permno. This dataset uses Cohen and Frazzini (2008) and Cen
et. al. (2017) to locate the CRSP Permno. Overall, it appears that the board network based
risk factors are robust to the input-output network based risk factors.
As a robustness exercise, I calculate the prices of risk after controlling for the factors in
Fama and French (2015) and Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2014) models. Panel C reports the results
when controlling for the five factors in the Fama and French 5-factor model, namely MKTRF ,
SMB, HML, RMW , and CMA. While Panel D reports results when controlling for the four
factors from the HXZ 4-factor model, namely MKTRF , SIZE (size), ROE (profitability), and
INV (investment). The results are similar to Panel A, even after controlling for the existing
asset pricing factors.
The Fama and MacBeth analysis suggests that diversity and sparsity are priced in the
cross-section of stock returns. As I increase the dimensionality of risk and included different
test assets to the analysis, both network diversity and sparsity are significantly priced in the
network factors. I form five (quintiles) value-weighted single-sorted portfolios using the betas (or factor loadings)
on diversityCS (sparsityCS) to construct the factor mimicking portfolios.
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cross-section (Columns 4 and 5). This analysis, in addition to the network-beta sorted portfolio
results, provides solid evidence that both network factors are priced sources of systematic risk.
F. Relation to Existing Factors
Since I show that existing asset pricing factors do not cover the network factors, I now
examine how much the diversity and sparsity network factors explain the existing asset pricing
factors. In Table 13, I report the time-series regressions of existing asset pricing factors on
diversity and sparsity.
First, I regress returns from several factor-mimicking portfolios on the diversity and sparsity
premiums. The results appear in Panel A of Table 13. I use the 5 Fama-French factors and the
HXZ factors as the dependent variable and the network factors as the independent variables.
The first row represents the constant or the intercept of the regression and the next two rows
represents the loadings of the asset pricing factors on the network factors. The first column
examines the excess market return. The unconditional mean of the excess market return is
41.43 basis points per month and is statistically insignificant. However, this increases to a
statistically significant 79.74 basis points when I account for co-movement with the network
factors. Interestingly, controlling for diversity and sparsity premiums actually strengthens the
excess market factor. MKTRF loads positively and significantly on diversity, and negatively
and insignificantly on sparsity. Both SMB and SIZE factors from the Fama-French and
HXZ models load insignificantly on diversity and sparsity and their conditional means are
insignificant. The unconditional means of SMB and SIZE are 34.95 (t − stats = 1.49) and
41.74 (t− stats = 1.66) basis points, respectively. The conditional means for SMB and SIZE
are insignificant at 21.85 and 22.69 basis points, respectively.
On the other hand, the remaining Fama-French 5-factor model factors (HML, RMW , and
CMA), and the remaining factors of the HXZ model (ROE, and INV ) all have insignificant
conditional means. All factors load negatively and significantly on the diversity factor and
insignificantly on the sparsity factor. This suggests that the value, profitability, and investment
premiums might be attributable to network factors. I next run the regression in reverse, that
is, with diversity or sparsity as the dependent variable and the asset pricing factors as the
independent variables. The results are presented in Panel B of Table 13. The first 2 rows report
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the results of the univariate regressions of diversity on the asset pricing factors and the last 2 rows
report the results using the sparsity variable. While diversity loads significantly on MKTRF ,
HML, RMW , CMA, ROE, and INV , none can explain the diversity premium completely
since the conditional mean of diversity is still significant. On the other hand, sparsity loads
insignificantly on all factors.
III. Conclusion
The paper develops a network model that captures board connections among firms in differ-
ent industries. Further, I demonstrate that changes in the board network topology are related
to changes in the aggregate level of consumption. Specifically, changes in the network topology
change the allocation of management capital across firms, which affect aggregate output. I show
that two key factors, diversity and sparsity, can capture the network effect. Changes in these
two factors constitute an aggregate source of risk that is priced in equilibrium.
Increases in diversity (sparsity) lead to a decrease (increase) in aggregate consumption
and are thus, associated with high marginal utility for the representative investor. An asset
whose returns rise (fall) with diversity (sparsity) hedges against a fall in consumption (are
riskier) and thus earns low (high) average returns. Using return data, I find consistent evidence
that innovations in the network factors are priced. By sorting industries (or firms) on their
exposure to network factor innovations and forming portfolios by deciles, I find significant gap
in returns that the standard asset pricing models such as the CAPM, Fama-French three-factor,
Fama-French-Carhart four-factor, Fama-French five-factor or the HXZ four-factor models do not
explain. Specifically, diversity beta-sorted portfolios have a return spread of -0.8582% per month
and sparsity beta-sorted portfolios have a return spread of 0.9024% per month.
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(a) Symmetric Network (b) Asymmetric Network
Figure 1 Different network structures This figure shows two simulated networks with
twelve firms in the economy. Panel (a) presents a symmetric network where each firm relies
equally on all other firms for management capital. Panel (b) presents a asymmetric network
where firms in the periphery rely primarily on the firm in the center.
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Figure 2 Board network at the firm level This picture contains a network representation
of the boardroom connections for 2011 at the firm level. Nodes (circles) represent firm and the
edges (lines) represents that any given two firms are connected.
49
Figure 3 Proportion of connected firms This graph represents the proportion of firms in
the CRSP+COMPUSTAT universe from fiscal years 1991-2011 that is connected to at-least 1
other firm through board interlock.
50
Figure 4 Proportion of firms with k connections This graph represents the proportion of
firms in the CRSP+COMPUSTAT universe that are connected to at-least k other firms. The
proportions represent average values where the average is calculated from fiscal years 1991-2011.
51
Figure 5 Connections within industry This graph represents the proportion of connections
between two firms belonging to the same industry. Different industry definitions are used; 4-digit
SIC, 3-digit SIC, 2-digit SIC, 49 Fama-French industries, and 30 Fama-French industries.
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(a) No. of direct connections for size per-
centiles
(b) No. of bank connections for size percentiles
(c) No. of direct connections for age percentiles (d) No. of bank connections for age percentiles
Figure 6 Network changes This figure plots average network connections for firms falling
on 25th and 75th percentiles of firm size (Panels A and B) and firm age (Panels C and D). Every
year, within each industry (4-SIC) firms are sorted into different percentiles based on size or
age. Panel A presents the average number of direct connections for firms along 25th and 75th
percentiles along size. Panel B presents the number of bank connections (where the interlocked
firm is a bank) for firms along 25th and 75th percentiles along size. Panels C and D presents
corresponding similar plots when the firms are sorted along age.
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Figure 7 Regulation Shocks This figure plots the average number of direct connections for
firms falling on 25th and 75th percentiles of board independence. The percentiles are calculated
every year within each industry.
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(c) Network III
Figure 8 This picture contains the representations of three different networks that are used
to demonstrate the calculation of the two network factors. Each node (circle) is a firm in
the economy, and the node size represents the management share. The numbers along the
connections represents the weight or the value of the connection.
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(a) Innovations in diversity
(b) Innovations in sparsity
Figure 9 Network factor innovations for 5 Fama-French industries This graph plots
the innovations in the two network factors- diversity and sparsity- for the 5 Fama-French in-
dustries. Panel (a) presents the plot for innovations in diversity. Panel (b) presents the plots
for innovations in sparsity. The innovations are computed form fiscal years 1992-2011.
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Figure 10 Network factor innovations This graph plots the innovations in the two aggre-
gate level network factors- diversity and sparsity. The innovations are computed form fiscal
years 1992-2011.
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Table 1: Network factors statistics
This table reports statistics for the innovations in the two aggregate network factors- diversity and
sparsity. The sample period is from 1992 to 2012. AC(j) stands for the jth auto correlation.
Diversity Sparsity
Innovation Innovation
Mean -0.0050 0.01362
Std. dev. 0.06184 0.04320
AC(1) 0.3300 0.0027
(0.1156) (0.9908)
AC(2) 0.2927 -0.0217
(0.1429) (0.9296)
AC(3) 0.0029 -0.1475
(0.3915) (0.4221)
Table 2: Network Factors and Aggregate Growth
This table reports results for regressions of the aggregate growth on the innovations (changes) in network
factors (diversity and sparsity) and a constant. The last row reports the R-squared. The first column
uses dividend implied from cum- and ex-dividend returns from CRSP market return. The second column
uses dividend growth rate from the National Income Account (NIPA) Table 1.10. Third column uses
1-quarter ahead aggregate consumption growth rate. Fourth column uses 1-quarter ahead stockholders’
consumption growth rate. And, fifth columns uses 1-quarter ahead top stockholders’ consumption growth
rate. All consumption data is from Malloy, Moskowitz, and Vissing-Jørgensen (2009) and available till
year 2004. All other data is on an annual basis from 1992-2011. Newey-West adjusted t− statistics are
reported in parentheses.
Aggregate Aggregate Stockholders Top− stockholders Aggregate
Div. (CRSP ) Div. (NIPA) Consumption Consumption Consumption
Constant 2.0671 0.0838 0.0003 0.0042 0.00433
(12.03) (5.19) (0.04) (0.42) (4.80)
DIV ERSITY -4.3221 -0.6478 -0.0589 -0.3285 -0.0087
(-2.77) (-3.34) (-1.47) (-3.64) (-0.73)
SPARSITY 1.8017 0.1400 0.2978 0.4185 -0.0038
(0.66) (0.36) (3.27) (1.80) (-0.15)
R2 28.05 10.14 23.88 19.32 1.20
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Table 3: Network factors’ betas for one-way sorted industry portfolios
This table presents monthly average network factor loadings in each portfolio, for diversity beta-sorted
(Panel A) portfolios and sparsity beta-sorted (Panel B) industry level portfolios. Diversity and sparsity
betas are estimated using past 60-months returns data. Ten portfolios are formed using the diversity-
beta. For each portfolio, the averages of diversity-beta and sparsity-beta are calculated. These value
are reported in the first two columns of the Table. The process is repeated for the sparsity-beta sorted
portfolios, and the values are reported in the last two columns. The sample period for portfolio formation
is from July 1997 to June 2013. I report the associated t− statistics in parentheses. The t-statistics are
calculated using Newey-West standard errors with 60 lags.
Diversity sorted Sparsity sorted
βD βS βD βS
Decile 1 -1.1295 0.5433 -0.0953 -1.9087
Decile 2 -0.4631 0.4196 0.0068 -0.3239
Decile 3 -0.3027 0.4490 -0.0539 -0.0240
Decile 4 -0.2027 0.4302 -0.0912 0.1662
Decile 5 -0.1166 0.2927 -0.0909 0.3415
Decile 6 -0.0348 0.3500 -0.1083 0.5158
Decile 7 0.0669 0.4058 -0.1053 0.5398
Decile 8 0.1555 0.4067 -0.1409 0.6601
Decile 9 0.2966 0.2359 -0.1342 0.9130
Decile 10 1.2947 0.4130 0.2631 2.9441
10− 1 2.4242 -0.1303 0.3584 4.8528
(6.74) (-0.65) (0.63) (4.04)
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Table 4: One-way sorted industry portfolios
This table presents monthly average excess returns alphas for diversity beta-sorted (Panel A) portfolios
and sparsity beta-sorted (Panel B) industry level portfolios. Diversity and sparsity betas are estimated
using past 60-months returns data. Industry level returns are value-weighted returns using the market
capitalization of firms within the industry. For industry portfolios, at the start of every month we sort
industries into deciles based on their diversity (or sparsity) betas and hold the portfolios for the next 12-
months. Each month, within each decile, portfolios are formed by equally weighting all industry returns
in that decile. In addition to excess returns, the table also reports CAPM, FF3, FF-C, FF5 and HXZ
alphas on these portfolios. All return and alpha values are monthly and in percentages. The sample
period for portfolio formation is from July 1997 to June 2013. I report the associated t − statistics in
parentheses. The t-statistics are calculated using Newey-West standard errors with 12 lags.
Panel A: Industry Portfolios- Diversity beta-sorted portfolios
Returns CAPM FF3 FF − C FF5 HXZ
Decile 1 0.9849 0.5185 0.2004 0.2915 0.0403 0.1429
(2.22) (1.93) (0.94) (1.63) (0.22) (0.52)
Decile 2 0.8276 0.3953 0.1202 0.1903 -0.1078 0.0291
(2.12) (1.78) (0.83) (1.56) (-1.07) (0.16)
Decile 3 0.7721 0.3541 0.1021 0.1619 -0.1234 0.0005
(1.97) (1.66) (0.85) (1.66) (-1.42) (0.01)
Decile 4 0.5977 0.1703 -0.0711 0.0042 -0.2828 -0.1565
(1.44) (0.92) (-0.43) (0.03) (-2.26) (-0.76)
Decile 5 0.5570 0.1386 -0.0972 -0.0291 -0.2653 -0.1660
(1.29) (0.78) (-0.46) (-0.16) (-1.54) (-0.70)
Decile 6 0.4677 0.0397 -0.1893 -0.1214 -0.2642 -0.1909
(0.92) (0.12) (-0.78) (-0.53) (-1.09) (-0.72)
Decile 7 0.0115 -0.4225 -0.5983 -0.5455 -0.5921 -0.5512
(0.02) (-1.78) (-2.04) (-1.96) (-2.22) (-2.00)
Decile 8 0.2840 -0.1416 -0.3332 -0.2849 -0.3831 -0.3442
(0.63) (-0.95) (-1.78) (-1.67) (-2.25) (-1.98)
Decile 9 0.3503 -0.1062 -0.3000 -0.2196 -0.3584 -0.2886
(0.77) (-0.72) (-1.71) (-1.71) (-2.08) (-1.61)
Decile 10 0.1267 -0.4256 -0.5793 -0.4507 -0.4201 -0.3805
(0.23) (-1.75) (-2.97) (-2.77) (-1.77) (-1.77)
10− 1 -0.8582 -0.9441 -0.7797 -0.7422 -0.4604 -0.5234
(-2.65) (-2.96) (-3.28) (-2.98) (-1.88) (-2.38)
Continued on next page
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Table 4 – continued from previous page
Panel B: Industry Portfolios- Sparsity beta-sorted portfolios
Returns CAPM FF3 FF − C FF5 HXZ
Decile 1 -0.0052 -0.5139 -0.7074 -0.5645 -0.5365 -0.4253
(-0.01) (-1.96) (-2.76) (-2.89) (-2.12) (-1.75)
Decile 2 0.5881 0.1072 -0.1049 -0.0010 -0.1346 0.0214
(1.32) (0.77) (-0.90) (-0.11) (-0.99) (0.20)
Decile 3 0.5917 0.1612 -0.0696 0.0195 -0.1788 -0.0700
(1.45) (0.87) (-0.42) (0.14) (-1.19) (-0.31)
Decile 4 0.7229 0.3127 0.0927 0.1729 -0.0867 0.0225
(1.81) (1.46) (0.66) (1.43) (-0.71) (0.13)
Decile 5 0.5686 0.1691 -0.0343 0.0307 -0.1582 -0.0636
(1.59) (0.85) (-0.23) (0.24) (-1.28) (-0.38)
Decile 6 0.2561 -0.1862 -0.3833 -0.3290 -0.4690 -0.3932
(0.61) (-1.18) (-1.81) (-1.73) (-2.24) (-1.72)
Decile 7 0.5972 0.1740 -0.0577 -0.0087 -0.2612 -0.1779
(1.72) (0.98) (-0.45) (-0.07) (-2.49) (-1.04)
Decile 8 0.6689 0.2425 0.0149 0.0625 -0.2012 -0.1126
(1.84) (1.20) (0.08) (0.48) (-1.75) (-0.57)
Decile 9 0.6415 0.1808 -0.0832 -0.0103 -0.2520 -0.2079
(1.72) (0.95) (-0.53) (-0.07) (-2.22) (-0.98)
Decile 10 0.8972 0.4084 0.1494 0.2244 0.0681 0.0910
(1.90) (1.73) (0.56) (0.94) (0.27) (0.29)
10− 1 0.9024 0.9223 0.8568 0.7889 0.6046 0.5163
(3.79) (3.73) (3.94) (3.36) (2.36) (2.02)
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Table 5: Factor loadings for one-way sorted industry portfolios
This table presents monthly average excess returns alphas and factor loadings of the regression on 5
Fama-French factors, for diversity beta-sorted (Panel A) portfolios and sparsity beta-sorted (Panel B)
industry level portfolios. Diversity and sparsity betas are estimated using past 60-months returns data.
Industry level returns are value-weighted returns using the market capitalization of firms within the
industry. For industry portfolios, at the start of every month we sort industries into deciles based on
their diversity (or sparsity) betas and hold the portfolios for the next 12-months. Each month, within
each decile, portfolios are formed by equally weighting all industry returns in that decile. The average
excess returns of each portfolio is then regressed on the 5 Fama-French factors. The sample period for
portfolio formation is from July 1997 to June 2013. I report the associated t− statistics in parentheses.
The t-statistics are calculated using Newey-West standard errors with 12 lags.
Panel A: Industry Portfolios- Diversity beta-sorted portfolios
Intercept MKTRF SMB HML RMW CMA
Decile 1 0.0403 1.1542 0.7893 0.3531 0.3207 -0.0256
(0.22) (25.73) (11.02) (2.48) (3.49) (-0.19)
Decile 2 -0.1078 1.1348 0.6369 0.2897 0.3921 0.0886
(-1.07) (33.52) (13.34) (3.28) (5.99) (1.05)
Decile 3 -0.1234 1.1159 0.5337 0.2963 0.3847 0.1006
(-1.42) (25.94) (11.87) (4.12) (6.62) (1.74)
Decile 4 -0.2828 1.1279 0.5521 0.2817 0.4014 0.0285
(-2.26) (22.66) (9.07) (2.93) (5.53) (0.44)
Decile 5 -0.2653 1.0680 0.5885 0.2598 0.3420 -0.0236
(-1.54) (26.61) (7.27) (3.04) (4.68) (-0.25)
Decile 6 -0.2642 1.0173 0.5986 0.2327 0.1570 -0.0323
(-1.09) (24.94) (9.27) (3.41) (2.03) (-0.33)
Decile 7 -0.5921 0.9792 0.5097 0.1487 0.0127 -0.0598
(-2.22) (14.22) (9.44) (2.03) (0.13) (-0.45)
Decile 8 -0.3831 1.0095 0.4983 0.2154 0.1305 -0.0656
(-2.25) (22.55) (11.26) (3.16) (1.76) (-0.73)
Decile 9 -0.3584 1.0968 0.4549 0.2439 0.1233 -0.0266
(-2.08) (28.47) (7.45) (2.98) (1.37) (-0.29)
Decile 10 -0.4201 1.1762 0.4402 0.2262 -0.2047 -0.2159
(-1.77) (22.41) (5.28) (2.58) (-1.69) (-1.31)
10− 1 -0.4604 0.0220 -0.3491 -0.1269 -0.5254 -0.1903
(-1.88) (0.33) (-5.48) (-1.23) (-5.08) (-1.49)
Continued on next page
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Table 5 – continued from previous page
Panel B: Industry Portfolios- Sparsity beta-sorted portfolios
Intercept MKTRF SMB HML RMW CMA
Decile 1 -0.5365 1.0636 0.4774 0.3355 -0.2402 -0.2120
(-2.12) (15.30) (4.57) (2.82) (-1.46) (-0.93)
Decile 2 -0.1346 1.1107 0.5650 0.1944 0.0469 -0.0039
(-0.99) (18.32) (9.23) (3.02) (0.40) (-0.03)
Decile 3 -0.1788 1.0730 0.5047 0.3250 0.2297 -0.0332
(-1.19) (19.12) (9.86) (4.90) (3.77) (-0.33)
Decile 4 -0.0867 1.0628 0.4877 0.2367 0.2883 0.1013
(-0.71) (20.60) (8.83) (3.44) (4.92) (1.53)
Decile 5 -0.1582 0.9963 0.5113 0.2163 0.2445 -0.0095
(-1.28) (20.31) (10.62) (4.03) (4.42) (-0.17)
Decile 6 -0.4690 1.0611 0.6065 0.1828 0.2579 -0.1572
(-2.24) (26.07) (10.28) (2.30) (3.41) (-1.95)
Decile 7 -0.2612 1.1034 0.5331 0.2199 0.3284 0.1190
(-2.49) (31.44) (10.00) (2.59) (6.80) (1.90)
Decile 8 -0.2012 1.1242 0.5272 0.2285 0.3743 0.0871
(-1.75) (31.93) (8.80) (2.00) (5.76) (0.84)
Decile 9 -0.2520 1.1880 0.5608 0.3865 0.3513 -0.0365
(-2.22) (30.96) (6.73) (3.64) (3.70) (-0.38)
Decile 10 0.0681 1.1705 0.6502 0.3155 0.1964 -0.0814
(0.27) (14.64) (5.91) (1.82) (1.27) (-0.48)
10− 1 0.6046 0.1069 0.1728 -0.0200 0.4366 0.1306
(2.36) (0.97) (1.26) (-0.11) (2.39) (0.55)
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Table 6: One-way sorted firm portfolios
This table presents monthly average excess returns alphas for diversity beta-sorted (Panel A) portfolios
and sparsity beta-sorted (Panel B) firm level portfolios. Diversity and sparsity betas are estimated using
past 60-months returns data. For each firm, at the start of every month I sort firms into deciles based on
their diversity (or sparsity) betas and hold the portfolios for the next 12-months. Each month, within
each decile, value-weighted portfolios are formed using the market capitalization of all firms in that
decile. In addition to excess returns, the table also reports CAPM, FF3, FF-C, FF5 and HXZ alphas
on these portfolios. All return and alpha values are monthly and in percentages. The sample period for
portfolio formation is from July 1997 to June 2013. I report the associated t− statistics in parentheses.
The t-statistics are calculated using Newey-West standard errors with 12 lags.
Panel A: Firm Portfolios- Diversity beta-sorted portfolios
Returns CAPM FF3 FF − C FF5 HXZ
Decile 1 0.9635 0.4374 0.3433 0.3791 0.4988 0.4852
(1.87) (1.41) (1.17) (1.26) (1.88) (1.68)
Decile 2 0.7782 0.3647 0.2765 0.3125 0.2166 0.2388
(1.96) (1.67) (1.91) (1.83) (1.53) (1.28)
Decile 3 0.6753 0.2975 0.2216 0.2501 0.1446 0.1557
(1.88) (1.73) (2.12) (2.22) (1.41) (1.30)
Decile 4 0.5667 0.2251 0.1623 0.1701 0.0156 0.0092
(1.79) (1.48) (1.92) (1.99) (0.23) (0.09)
Decile 5 0.5286 0.1924 0.1532 0.1650 -0.0233 0.0019
(1.66) (1.53) (2.16) (2.34) (-0.52) (0.22)
Decile 6 0.5270 0.1921 0.1543 0.1449 -0.0041 0.0288
(1.63) (1.53) (2.18) (2.09) (-0.07) (0.36)
Decile 7 0.4484 0.1142 0.1118 0.1103 -0.0066 0.0021
(1.43) (1.12) (1.31) (1.25) (-0.10) (0.02)
Decile 8 0.2952 -0.0735 -0.0806 -0.1018 -0.2241 -0.2194
(0.80) (-0.76) (-1.27) (-1.47) (-3.06) (-2.69)
Decile 9 0.2022 -0.2211 -0.2456 -0.2274 -0.3375 -0.3112
(0.50) (-2.44) (-2.52) (-2.49) (-3.77) (-3.10)
Decile 10 0.1403 -0.4362 -0.4085 -0.3452 -0.2209 -0.2161
(0.25) (-1.87) (-2.54) (-2.16) (-1.22) (-1.08)
10− 1 -0.8232 -0.8736 -0.7518 -0.7243 -0.7197 -0.7013
(-2.20) (-2.17) (-2.35) (-2.25) (-2.12) (-2.09)
Continued on next page
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Table 6 – continued from previous page
Panel B: Firm Portfolios- Sparsity beta-sorted portfolios
Returns CAPM FF3 FF − C FF5 HXZ
Decile 1 0.2878 -0.2886 -0.2371 -0.1398 0.0140 0.0547
(0.50) (-1.19) (-1.13) (-0.69) (0.07) (0.23)
Decile 2 0.2798 -0.1460 -0.2013 -0.1428 -0.2507 -0.2014
(0.68) (-0.99) (-1.80) (-1.34) (-2.26) (-1.75)
Decile 3 0.4456 0.0389 -0.0067 0.0384 -0.0295 0.0111
(1.07) (0.34) (0.07) (0.40) (-0.29) (0.11)
Decile 4 0.4515 0.0800 0.0427 0.0651 -0.0464 -0.0393
(1.18) (0.66) (0.56) (0.86) (-0.55) (-0.33)
Decile 5 0.4621 0.1094 0.0237 0.0493 -0.1326 -0.1329
(1.27) (0.62) (0.26) (0.50) (-1.69) (-0.96)
Decile 6 0.5609 0.2274 0.1891 0.1651 0.0107 0.0002
(1.75) (1.57) (1.82) (1.50) (0.12) (0.01)
Decile 7 0.4964 0.1694 0.1156 0.0948 -0.0788 -0.0740
(1.62) (1.18) (1.30) (1.00) (-1.20) (-0.64)
Decile 8 0.6157 0.2668 0.2268 0.2011 0.0748 0.0802
(2.02) (2.29) (2.86) (2.46) (1.41) (0.92)
Decile 9 0.5945 0.1908 0.1801 0.1509 0.1389 0.1100
(1.64) (1.67) (1.77) (1.68) (1.76) (1.29)
Decile 10 0.8322 0.3365 0.3693 0.3258 0.5813 0.4726
(1.71) (1.75) (1.81) (1.69) (2.71) (2.14)
10− 1 0.5444 0.6251 0.6064 0.4656 0.5673 0.4179
(2.00) (2.42) (2.40) (1.98) (2.09) (1.78)
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Table 7: One-way sorted industry (equal weighted) portfolios
This table presents monthly average excess returns alphas for diversity beta-sorted (Panel A) portfolios
and sparsity beta-sorted (Panel B) industry level portfolios. Diversity and sparsity betas are estimated
using past 60-months returns data. Industry level returns are equal-weighted returns of firms within the
industry. For industry portfolios, at the start of every month we sort industries into deciles based on
their diversity (or sparsity) betas and hold the portfolios for the next 12-months. Each month, within
each decile, portfolios are formed by equally weighting all industry returns in that decile. In addition to
excess returns, the table also reports CAPM, FF3, FF-C, FF5 and HXZ alphas on these portfolios. All
return and alpha values are monthly and in percentages. The sample period for portfolio formation is
from July 1997 to June 2013. I report the associated t − statistics in parentheses. The t-statistics are
calculated using Newey-West standard errors with 12 lags.
Panel A: Industry Portfolios- Diversity beta-sorted portfolios
Returns CAPM FF3 FF − C FF5 HXZ
Decile 1 1.0917 0.5938 0.2393 0.3527 0.1138 0.2535
(2.17) (1.67) (1.25) (2.02) (0.77) (0.87)
Decile 2 1.0089 0.5389 0.2049 0.3000 0.0948 0.2388
(2.23) (1.89) (1.74) (2.81) (0.96) (1.24)
Decile 3 0.8947 0.4469 0.1414 0.2331 0.0331 0.1652
(2.06) (1.71) (1.24) (2.36) (0.58) (0.91)
Decile 4 0.8117 0.3502 0.0583 0.1645 -0.0536 0.1028
(1.89) (1.29) (0.54) (1.42) (-0.56) (0.46)
Decile 5 0.7648 0.3035 0.0252 0.1265 -0.0413 0.0703
(1.72) (1.09) (0.22) (0.95) (-0.53) (0.29)
Decile 6 0.6242 0.1578 -0.1060 -0.0855 -0.1278 -0.0316
(1.36) (0.64) (-0.63) (-0.04) (-0.71) (-0.12)
Decile 7 0.1463 -0.3285 -0.5464 -0.4625 -0.5266 -0.4683
(0.55) (-1.27) (-2.02) (-1.73) (-2.01) (-1.65)
Decile 8 0.3831 -0.0787 -0.3217 -0.2458 -0.3141 -0.2583
(0.96) (-0.50) (-1.84) (-1.50) (-1.88) (-1.25)
Decile 9 0.4977 0.0059 -0.2375 -0.1091 -0.1895 -0.0865
(1.16) (0.02) (-1.48) (-0.92) (-1.15) (-0.38)
Decile 10 0.3406 -0.2462 -0.4511 -0.2757 -0.2311 -0.1459
(0.57) (-1.01) (-2.19) (-1.60) (-1.03) (-0.51)
10− 1 -0.7511 -0.8400 -0.6904 -0.6284 -0.3445 -0.3991
(-2.72) (-3.13) (-3.21) (-2.79) (-1.72) (-2.04)
Continued on next page
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Table 7 – continued from previous page
Panel B: Industry Portfolios- Sparsity beta-sorted portfolios
Returns CAPM FF3 FF − C FF5 HXZ
Decile 1 0.1979 -0.3632 -0.6111 -0.4221 -0.4027 -0.2566
(0.34) (-0.91) (-1.93) (-1.58) (-1.33) (-0.96)
Decile 2 0.7930 0.2652 -0.0009 0.1479 0.0905 0.2499
(1.54) (0.93) (-0.01) (1.17) (0.52) (1.62)
Decile 3 0.7718 0.3004 0.0145 0.1586 0.0288 0.1839
(1.60) (0.99) (0.09) (1.22) (0.47) (1.00)
Decile 4 0.8774 0.4297 0.1585 0.2816 0.1043 0.2491
(1.89) (1.44) (1.07) (2.15) (0.98) (1.42)
Decile 5 0.6518 0.2104 -0.0302 0.0561 -0.0524 0.0551
(1.69) (0.73) (-0.18) (0.38) (-0.66) (0.49)
Decile 6 0.4422 -0.0422 -0.2944 -0.2144 -0.3264 -0.2546
(0.88) (-0.17) (-1.33) (-1.10) (-1.89) (-1.28)
Decile 7 0.7570 0.2884 0.0001 0.0834 -0.1076 -0.0048
(1.61) (0.97) (0.01) (0.63) (-1.18) (-0.02)
Decile 8 0.8422 0.3849 0.1039 0.1889 -0.0095 0.0989
(1.89) (1.29) (0.64) (1.45) (-0.06) (0.64)
Decile 9 0.8113 0.3318 0.0176 0.1079 -0.0723 -0.0203
(1.80) (0.97) (0.09) (0.67) (-0.70) (-0.28)
Decile 10 1.0142 0.5017 0.1937 0.2861 0.1208 0.1772
(1.92) (1.22) (0.67) (1.15) (0.75) (0.74)
10− 1 0.8164 0.8649 0.8047 0.7082 0.5235 0.4339
(2.76) (2.88) (3.10) (2.65) (1.94) (1.73)
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Table 8: One-way sorted industry portfolios (for different horizons)
This table presents monthly average excess returns alphas for diversity beta-sorted (Panel A) portfolios and sparsity beta-sorted (Panel B) industry level portfolios
for different horizons. Diversity and sparsity betas are estimated using past 60-months returns data. Industry level returns are equal-weighted returns of firms
within the industry. For industry portfolios, at the start of every month we sort industries into deciles based on their diversity (or sparsity) betas and hold the
portfolios for the next 3-, 6-, or 9-months. Each month, within each decile, portfolios are formed by equally weighting all industry returns in that decile. In
addition to excess returns, the table also reports CAPM, FF3, FF-C, FF5 and HXZ alphas on 10− 1 portfolios. All return and alpha values are monthly and in
percentages. The sample period for portfolio formation is from July 1997 to June 2013. I report the associated t− statistics in parentheses. The t-statistics are
calculated using Newey-West standard errors with 12 lags.
Panel A: Industry Portfolios- Diversity beta-sorted
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 10− 1 CAPM FF − 3 FFC FF5 HXZ
1−month 0.8430 0.7392 0.7994 0.5319 0.6458 0.5291 -0.1834 0.3688 0.6391 0.1145 -0.7286 -0.8152 -0.6589 -0.6880 -0.4089 -0.4568
(1.79) (1.77) (1.90) (1.32) (1.43) (0.95) (-0.32) (0.86) (1.39) (0.20) (-2.79) (-3.35) (-3.03) (-3.02) (-1.65) (-2.13)
3−months 0.8859 0.7977 0.7861 0.5748 0.6649 0.4967 -0.1609 0.2754 0.5432 0.0831 -0.8029 -0.8965 -0.7194 -0.7320 -0.4364 -0.4772
(1.92) (1.94) (2.01) (1.38) (1.44) (0.95) (-0.28) (0.61) (1.20) (0.15) (-2.77) (-3.26) (-3.10) (-2.98) (-1.69) (-2.11)
6−months 0.9081 0.8131 0.7824 0.6189 0.6412 0.5563 -0.0700 0.1745 0.4120 0.1548 -0.7534 -0.8465 -0.6628 -0.6557 -0.3592 -0.4178
(1.99) (2.05) (1.98) (1.50) (1.45) (1.06) (-0.12) (0.38) (0.90) (0.28) (-2.47) (-2.85) (-2.99) (-2.75) (-1.63) (-1.97)
9−months 0.9497 0.8138 0.7854 0.6158 0.5626 0.5008 -0.0798 0.2666 0.3642 0.1441 -0.8057 -0.8946 -0.7173 -0.6938 -0.3988 -0.4657
(2.10) (2.07) (2.00) (1.49) (1.29) (0.97) (-0.15) (0.59) (0.80) (0.26) (-2.52) (-2.85) (-3.18) (-2.88) (-1.75) (-2.20)
Panel B: Industry Portfolios- Sparsity beta-sorted
1−month -0.0478 0.5169 0.5277 0.7948 0.0686 0.1023 0.6748 0.6596 0.7369 0.9002 0.9481 0.9859 0.8869 0.7232 0.4054 0.3389
(-0.059) (1.13) (1.22) (1.82) (0.14) (0.17) (1.61) (1.65) (1.56) (1.66) (2.79) (2.82) (2.97) (2.28) (1.34) (1.16)
3−months 0.0063 0.5691 0.4859 0.7505 0.3067 0.1846 0.5770 0.6861 0.6852 0.9278 0.9215 0.9613 0.8660 0.7378 0.4759 0.4061
(0.01) (1.25) (1.14) (1.75) (0.67) (0.38) (1.38) (1.65) (1.54) (1.71) (3.31) (3.29) (3.39) (2.64) (1.61) (1.56)
6−months 0.0300 0.5802 0.5128 0.7278 0.4114 0.1457 0.5907 0.7048 0.6662 0.9187 0.8886 0.9171 0.8307 0.7288 0.4963 0.4301
(0.06) (1.30) (1.19) (1.71) (0.98) (0.29) (1.44) (1.67) (1.52) (1.69) (3.43) (3.42) (3.59) (2.87) (1.82) (1.68)
9−months -0.0001 0.5824 0.5473 0.7003 0.4989 0.2322 0.5708 0.7128 0.6464 0.9101 0.9102 0.9322 0.8584 0.7739 0.5722 0.4916
(-0.01) (1.30) (1.25) (1.68) (1.25) (0.48) (1.40) (1.71) (1.47) (1.65) (3.59) (3.59) (3.80) (3.15) (2.18) (1.90)
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Table 9: Double sorted industry portfolios
This table presents monthly average excess returns alphas for double sorted diversity beta-sorted (Panel
A) portfolios and sparsity beta-sorted (Panel B) industry level portfolios. Diversity and sparsity betas
are estimated using past 60-months returns data. Industry level returns are value-weighted returns of
firms within the industry. At the start of every month I sort industries into two groups based on their
sparsity (diversity) betas. Then within each sparsity (diversity) portfolio I sort the industries into ten
diversity (sparsity) sorted portfolios and hold the portfolios for the next 12-months. Each month, within
each decile, portfolios are formed by equally weighting all industry returns in that decile. Then, to get
the diversity (sparsity) sorted portfolios I collapse the portfolios along the sparsity (diversity) dimension.
In addition to excess returns, the table also reports CAPM, FF3, FF-C, FF5 and HXZ alphas on these
portfolios. All return and alpha values are monthly and in percentages. The sample period for portfolio
formation is from July 1997 to June 2013. I report the associated t − statistics in parentheses. The
t-statistics are calculated using Newey-West standard errors with 12 lags.
Panel A: Diversity beta-sorted portfolios- controlling for sparsity beta
Returns CAPM FF3 FF − C FF5 HXZ
Decile 1 0.97750 0.5178 0.2136 0.2952 0.0213 0.1440
(2.29) (1.78) (1.74) (1.81) (0.12) (0.56)
Decile 2 0.8882 0.4672 0.1881 0.2336 -0.0374 0.0729
(2.33) (1.58) (2.06) (1.97) (-0.43) (0.46)
Decile 3 0.9306 0.5050 0.2658 0.3350 0.0125 0.1722
(2.11) (1.89) (2.33) (2.02) (0.07) (0.76)
Decile 4 0.8076 0.3701 0.1372 0.2189 -0.0745 0.0371
(1.75) (0.96) (0.78) (1.46) (-0.45) (0.18)
Decile 5 0.2939 -0.1292 -0.3493 -0.3018 -0.5484 -0.4534
(0.68) (-0.40) (-1.58) (-1.44) (-2.46) (-1.92)
Decile 6 0.2755 -0.1420 -0.3482 -0.2984 -0.4088 -0.3523
(0.66) (-0.59) (-1.95) (-1.81) (-2.39) (-1.95)
Decile 7 0.2563 -0.1705 -0.3556 -0.3111 -0.3384 -0.3103
(0.54) (-0.71) (-1.59) (-1.42) (-1.69) (-1.68)
Decile 8 0.5618 0.1448 -0.0537 0.0087 -0.2397 -0.1469
(1.36) (0.57) (-0.38) (0.07) (-2.08) (-0.81)
Decile 9 0.3786 -0.0689 -0.2639 -0.1662 -0.3054 -0.2275
(0.83) (-0.27) (-1.46) (-1.16) (-1.77) (-1.01)
Decile 10 0.1461 -0.4002 -0.5534 -0.4147 -0.3803 -0.3574
(0.26) (-1.63) (-2.77) (-2.30) (-1.76) (-1.95)
10− 1 -0.8314 -0.9180 -0.7670 -0.7099 -0.4016 -0.5015
(-2.54) (-2.87) (-3.09) (-2.84) (-1.69) (-2.22)
Continued on next page
62
Table 9 – continued from previous page
Panel B: Sparsity beta-sorted portfolios- controlling for diversity beta
Returns CAPM FF3 FF − C FF5 HXZ
Decile 1 -0.0179 -0.5134 -0.7458 -0.5874 -0.6041 -0.4811
(-0.04) (-1.66) (-3.13) (-2.97) (-2.10) (-1.71)
Decile 2 0.4649 -0.0157 -0.2031 -0.1009 -0.1651 -0.0315
(1.36) (-0.07) (-1.30) (-0.74) (-0.96) (-0.17)
Decile 3 0.7043 0.2515 0.0359 0.1448 -0.0579 0.0544
(1.77) (0.85) (0.18) (0.84) (-0.28) (0.22)
Decile 4 0.6605 0.2403 0.0221 0.0954 -0.1337 -0.0327
(1.68) (0.98) (0.16) (0.80) (-1.15) (-0.18)
Decile 5 0.4680 0.0516 -0.1359 -0.0744 -0.1807 -0.1274
(1.48) (0.26) (-0.90) (-0.55) (-1.37) (-0.83)
Decile 6 0.3123 -0.1191 -0.3224 -0.2404 -0.4544 -0.3366
(1.12) (-0.46) (-1.53) (-1.36) (-2.18) (-1.48)
Decile 7 0.6646 0.2289 0.0153 0.0914 -0.1584 -0.0587
(1.80) (0.82) (0.09) (0.59) (-0.89) (-0.28)
Decile 8 0.6154 0.1845 -0.0338 0.0246 -0.2226 -0.1280
(1.53) (0.70) (-0.20) (0.18) (-1.65) (-0.60)
Decile 9 0.6642 0.2055 -0.0480 0.0256 -0.2051 -0.1683
(1.57) (0.74) (-0.29) (0.18) (-1.98) (-0.84)
Decile 10 0.8417 0.3588 0.0927 0.1347 0.0487 0.0776
(1.72) (1.22) (0.36) (0.56) (0.20) (0.28)
10− 1 0.8595 0.8721 0.8385 0.7221 0.6528 0.5587
(3.64) (3.57) (3.47) (2.87) (2.20) (1.97)
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Table 10: Double sorted firm portfolios (controlling for centrality)
This table presents monthly average excess returns alphas for double-sort on centrality and network
factors beta-sorted portfolios; diversity beta-sorted (Panel A) portfolios and sparsity beta-sorted (Panel
B) firm level portfolios. Diversity and sparsity betas are estimated using past 60-months returns data.
Following Larcker, So and Wang (2013) I create 5 rank based measures of direct centrality using double
sorts on market capitalization and direct centrality. Then at the start of every month I sort firms into
five groups based on their rank centrality measures. Then within each rank centrality portfolio I sort
the firms into five diversity (sparsity) sorted portfolios and hold the portfolios for the next 12-months.
Each month, within each quintile, value-weighted portfolios are formed using the market capitalization
of all firms in that quintile. Then, to get the diversity (sparsity) sorted portfolios I collapse the portfolios
along the rank centrality dimension. In addition to excess returns, the table also reports CAPM, FF3,
FF-C, FF5 and HXZ alphas on these portfolios. The sample period for portfolio formation is from July
1997 to June 2013. I report the associated t − statistics in parentheses. The t-statistics are calculated
using Newey-West standard errors with 12 lags.
Panel A: Firm Portfolios- Diversity beta-sorted portfolios
Returns CAPM FF3 FF − C FF5 HXZ
Quintile 1 0.7985 0.3400 0.2416 0.2962 0.2844 0.2842
(1.85) (1.43) (1.33) (1.42) (1.61) (1.54)
Quintile 2 0.6309 0.2751 0.2020 0.2247 0.0877 0.0928
(1.90) (1.78) (2.41) (2.50) (1.20) (0.91)
Quintile 3 0.5303 0.1925 0.1484 0.1529 -0.0255 0.0166
(1.66) (1.54) (2.13) (2.15) (-0.53) (0.19)
Quintile 4 0.3772 0.0262 0.0169 -0.0408 -0.1185 -0.1134
(1.12) (0.29) (0.28) (0.07) (-2.29) (-1.65)
Quintile 5 0.1687 -0.3259 -0.3213 -0.2861 -0.2729 -0.2739
(0.37) (-2.35) (-2.87) (-2.66) (-2.21) (-2.16)
5− 1 -0.6298 -0.6659 -0.5628 -0.5822 -0.5573 -0.5580
(-2.08) (-2.01) (-2.34) (-2.21) (-2.30) (-2.01)
Continued on next page
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Table 10 – continued from previous page
Panel B: Firm Portfolios- Sparsity beta-sorted portfolios
Returns CAPM FF3 FF − C FF5 HXZ
Quintile 1 0.2583 -0.2405 -0.2571 -0.1707 -0.1451 -0.1069
(0.55) (-2.23) (-2.50) (-1.79) (-1.27) (-1.00)
Quintile 2 0.4489 0.0603 0.0151 0.0403 -0.0482 -0.0328
(1.14) (0.60) (0.22) (0.60) (-0.66) (-0.35)
Quintile 3 0.5011 0.1565 0.0889 0.0945 -0.0786 -0.0775
(1.49) (1.05) (1.13) (1.108) (-1.24) (-0.72)
Quintile 4 0.5651 0.2235 0.1745 0.1568 0.0197 0.0226
(1.85) (1.75) (2.11) (1.82) (0.38) (0.21)
Quintile 5 0.6868 0.2535 0.2404 0.2115 0.2786 0.2178
(1.70) (1.89) (2.07) (1.93) (2.49) (1.99)
5− 1 0.4284 0.4394 0.4975 0.3822 0.4236 0.3248
(2.10) (2.55) (2.93) (2.58) (2.50) (2.28)
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Table 11: Summary statistics for factors
This table presents summary statistics, means (Panel A) and correlations (Panel B), for different asset pricing factors. DIV E., SPAR., and SIZE are the
network factors. In addition to these, I report the 5-factors associated with Fama, and French (2015) namely, MKTRF , SMB, HML, RMW , and CMA and the
additional 3-factors related to Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2014) namely, SIZE, ROE, and INV . The sample period is from July 1997 to June 2013 (i.e. 192 months).
The means are monthly values and reported in percentages. I report associated t − statistics in parentheses. The t-statistics are calculated using Newey-West
standard errors with 12 lags. p− values are reported for the correlations.
Panel A: Means
DIV ER. SPAR. MKTRF SMB HML RMW CMA SIZE ROE INV
Means -0.8314 0.8595 0.4143 0.3495 0.2614 0.3377 0.3907 0.4174 0.2889 0.3496
(-2.54) (3.64) (1.07) (1.49) (0.83) (1.11) (1.87) (1.66) (1.22) (1.93)
Panel B: Correlations
DIV ER. 1 -0.0871 0.3133 -0.1178 -0.3525 -0.3802 -0.4767 -0.1558 -0.3249 -0.4036
(0.2297) (< 0.0001) (0.1037) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (0.0310) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001)
SPAR. 1 -0.0328 0.1207 -0.0414 0.0155 0.0570 0.1617 0.1983 0.0017
(0.6508) (0.0955) (0.5686) (0.8306) (0.4323) (0.0251) (0.0058) (0.9817)
MKTRF 1 0.2146 -0.1397 -0.5274 -0.3530 0.2252 -0.5527 -0.3096
(0.0028) (0.0532) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (0.0017) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001)
SMB 1 -0.1344 -0.5074 0.0049 0.9731 -0.4681 -0.1328
(0.0630) (< 0.0001) (0.9457) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001)
HML 1 0.4934 0.6188 -0.0566 0.2480 0.6696
(< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (0.4359) (0.0005) (< 0.0001)
RMW 1 0.3097 -0.4818 0.7645 0.4108
(< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001)
CMA 1 0.0523 0.2324 0.9072
(0.4709) (0.0012) (< 0.0001)
SIZE 1 -0.3880 -0.0922
(< 0.0001) (0.2033)
ROE 1 0.2746
(0.0001)
INV 1
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Table 12: Fama and MacBeth tests for network factors
This table reports the estimated prices of risk for the two network-based factors: diversity
(DIV ERSITY ) and sparsity (SPARSITY ) along with the market factor MKTRF . Following
Lewellen, Nagel, and Shanken (2010), I consider six different test assets. Column (1) uses 20 port-
folios sorted on our two network factors: (DIV ERSITY ) and (SPARSITY ). Column (2) adds 25
double sorted size and book-to-market portfolios. Column (3) adds 10 short-term reversal, 10 long-term
reversal and 10 momentum sorted portfolios. Column (4) adds 10 operating profitability and 10 invest-
ment sorted portfolios. Column (5) adds 10 accruals, 10 cash flow, 10 dividend yield, 10 earnings-price
ratio, 10 net issuance, and 10 residual variance sorted portfolios. Column (6) contains all test assets as
in Column (5) excluding 20 portfolios sorted on the two network factors. All the portfolio data, except
for network sorted and industry portfolios, are from Kenneth Frenchs website. Panel B repeats all the
tests with controlling for customer-supplier network factors. Panel C consists of the two network factors
with five Fama-French (2015) factors. Panel D consists of the two network factors with four Hou, Xue,
and Zhang (2014) factors. The sample period is from July 1997 to June 2013 at a monthly frequency.
All average excess returns and factors, hence the coefficients, are on a monthly basis. Adjusted R2 is
reported in the last row and is expressed in percentage. t−statistics are based on Newey-West standard
errors.
Panel A: Network Factors + MKTRF
1 2 3 4 5 6
Constant -0.9421 -0.0576 0.2425 0.3174 0.5899 0.5642
(-1.55) (-0.22) (0.97) (1.36) (2.32) (2.02)
DIV ERSITY -0.9719 -0.7356 -0.7066 -0.6988 -0.5584 -0.5519
(-3.91) (-3.61) (-3.16) (-3.01) (-2.25) (-2.04)
SPARSITY 0.7785 0.9098 1.1412 1.1357 1.0241 1.4479
(7.11) (9.27) (4.49) (4.37) (6.00) (3.63)
MKTRF 1.0501 0.4087 0.1502 0.0880 -0.1426 -0.1090
(2.74) (2.16) (0.81) (0.48) (-0.76) (-0.50)
R2 73.55 45.79 51.60 53.79 33.40 31.55
Continued on next page
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Panel B: Network Factors + Customer-Segment
Constant -1.1454 0.9124 0.5515 0.6034 0.6523 0.6325
(-2.25) (3.93) (2.36) (2.75) (2.69) (2.30)
DIV ERSITY -0.9795 -1.0887 -0.8447 -0.8520 -0.8770 -0.8891
(-3.65) (-3.49) (-3.74) (-3.63) (-3.45) (-3.21)
SPARSITY 0.7888 0.7374 1.0587 1.0740 0.8849 1.1599
(6.93) (9.40) (4.34) (4.18) (4.48) (2.52)
MKTRF 1.1112 -0.5372 -0.1517 -0.1922 -0.2288 -0.2004
(3.36) (-1.67) (-0.74) (-0.93) (-1.20) (-0.89)
DIV ERSITYCS 0.2052 -0.8432 -0.2489 -0.2783 -0.4727 -0.4147
(0.56) (-1.42) (-0.96) (-1.09) (-2.70) (-2.04)
SPARSITYCS -1.4776 0.4103 0.1462 0.2511 0.3674 0.3718
(-5.24) (0.78) (0.47) (0.82) (1.26) (1.63)
R2 80.57 65.51 58.79 60.55 45.51 43.44
Continued on next page
68
Table 12 – continued from previous page
Panel C: Network Factors + FF5
Constant -0.6372 0.2426 0.1635 0.2926 0.6454 0.6749
(-1.19) (1.71) (0.57) (1.50) (2.18) (2.30)
DIV ERSITY -0.8292 -0.8658 -0.8096 -0.8258 -0.8948 -0.5277
(-3.54) (-3.29) (-2.66) (-2.74) (-2.57) (-3.49)
SPARSITY 0.8497 0.8711 0.9841 0.9791 0.7383 0.6300
(7.51) (8.45) (4.20) (3.94) (4.27) (2.01)
MKTRF 0.8495 0.1431 0.2444 0.1192 -0.2129 -0.2357
(2.29) (0.73) (1.18) (0.81) (-0.83) (-0.92)
SMB 0.5133 0.3403 0.3096 0.3064 0.3192 0.4060
(1.67) (2.94) (2.60) (2.59) (2.77) (3.28)
HML 0.4908 0.2827 0.2289 0.2138 0.1867 0.1793
(2.64) (2.00) (2.03) (1.87) (1.54) (1.45)
RMW -0.4496 -0.2342 -0.0841 0.0399 0.0919 0.2179
(-2.93) (-0.80) (-0.40) (0.27) (0.73) (2.38)
CMA 1.5507 0.8699 0.5224 0.3831 0.2340 0.1789
(3.95) (1.91) (2.03) (2.45) (1.35) (1.12)
R2 90.72 68.40 65.86 64.78 45.19 43.78
Continued on next page
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Panel D: Network Factors + HXZ
Constant -0.0551 0.2749 0.2281 0.3152 0.6590 0.6793
(-0.12) (1.82) (0.84) (1.42) (2.43) (2.47)
DIV ERSITY -0.9385 -0.8561 -0.7957 -0.7937 -0.8636 -0.6099
(-3.78) (-3.17) (-3.19) (-3.57) (-3.77) (-2.98)
SPARSITY 0.8214 0.7875 0.9353 0.9362 0.7154 0.5132
(7.94) (10.11) (5.52) (5.51) (6.27) (2.05)
MKTRF 0.2795 0.0600 0.1601 0.0880 -0.2291 -0.2381
(0.96) (0.21) (0.84) (0.53) (-1.01) (-0.99)
SIZE -0.3318 0.5159 0.4317 0.4102 0.3934 0.4601
(-1.34) (4.22) (2.98) (3.02) (3.12) (3.02)
ROE -0.5970 0.3085 0.2093 0.2301 0.2110 0.2465
(-3.06) (2.40) (1.79) (1.80) (1.51) (1.98)
INV 0.9609 0.1786 0.1750 0.1739 0.0993 0.1033
(3.24) (1.15) (1.51) (1.62) (0.90) (0.94)
R2 85.36 59.28 61.92 62.97 45.02 44.23
70
Table 13: Regressions of asset pricing factors
This table presents the results from regressing asset pricing factors on the two network-based factors;
diversity (DIV ERSITY ) and sparsity (SPARSITY ); and vice versa. I use the 5-factors associated
with Fama and French (2015) namely, MKTRF , SMB, HML, RMW , and CMA. I also report the
additional 3-factors related to Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2014) namely, SIZE, ROE, and INV . For Panel
A, I do regressions of asset pricing factor, say, MKTRF on the two network factors- (DIV ERSITY )
and (SPARSITY ). Panel B reports results from univariate single regressions of the two network factors
(acting as the dependent variables) on each asset pricing factor separately. The sample period is from
July 1997 to June 2013 at a monthly frequency. All factors are expressed as percentages. I report the
associated t−statistics in parentheses. The t-statistics are calculated using Newey-West standard errors
with 12 lags.
Panel A: Ind. vars- network factors. Dep. vars- other pricing factors.
Dependent variable→ MKTRF SMB HML RMW CMA SIZE ROE INV
Constant 0.7974 0.2185 -0.0519 -0.0016 0.1128 0.2269 -0.0757 0.1339
(2.72) (0.90) (-0.21) (-0.08) (0.76) (0.92) (-0.35) (0.90)
DIV ERSITY 0.4786 -0.0699 -0.4664 -0.4629 -0.3422 -0.1079 -0.3273 -0.2918
(3.55) (-0.65) (-3.04) (-4.43) (-3.33) (-1.06) (-3.54) (-2.78)
SPARSITY -0.0209 0.0903 -0.0457 -0.0025 0.0196 0.1258 0.1337 -0.0080
(-0.16) (0.86) (-0.61) (-0.02) (0.44) (1.15) (1.47) (-0.17)
Panel B: Ind. vars- other pricing factors. Dep. vars- network factors.
Independent variable→ MKTRF SMB HML RMW CMA SIZE ROE INV
Constant -0.8485 -0.7403 -0.6591 -0.6235 -0.5196 -0.7248 -0.6699 -0.5633
(-2.79) (-2.33) (-2.49) (-2.58) (-2.66) (-2.32) (-2.57) (-2.37)
DIV ERSITY 0.2065 -0.0647 -0.3972 -0.4130 -0.6228 -0.0914 -0.3221 -0.5708
(1.75) (-0.67) (-2.30) (-2.87) (-2.66) (-0.99) (-2.24) (-2.30)
Constant 0.8721 0.8045 0.8737 0.8526 0.8173 0.7750 0.7804 0.8584
(3.57) (3.31) (3.75) (3.48) (3.33) (3.15) (3.09) (3.59)
SPARSITY -0.0303 0.1575 -0.0542 0.0206 0.1081 0.2025 0.2737 0.0032
(-0.23) (1.22) (-0.34) (0.08) (0.52) (1.77) (1.26) (0.01)
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Additional Tables
for Boardroom Connections, Information Networks, and Asset
Prices
1 Cross-sectional Tests: Robustness
Table 1 presents firm-level results for diversity and sparsity beta-sorted portfolios excluding the
micro-cap stocks. Panel A presents results for diversity-sorted portfolios. Panel B reports results for
sparsity-sorted portfolios.
Table 2 Panel A presents firm-level results for diversity-beta sorted portfolios while controlling
for sparsity-beta. Table 2 Panel B presents firm-level results for sparsity-beta sorted portfolios while
controlling for diversity-beta. (5x5=) 25 portfolios are formed. Portfolios are collapsed along the sparsity-
beta dimension to form diversity-beta spread portfolios. Similarly, portfolios are collapsed along the
diversity-beta dimension to form sparsity-beta spread portfolios.
Table 3 presents firm-level results for diversity and sparsity beta-sorted portfolios when the networks
factors are calculated using 49-Fama-French industries. Panel A presents results for diversity-sorted
portfolios. Panel B reports results for sparsity-sorted portfolios.
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Table 1: One-way sorted firm portfolios- (excludes micro-cap stocks)
This table presents monthly average excess returns alphas for diversity beta-sorted (Panel A) portfolios
and sparsity beta-sorted (Panel B) firm level portfolios. I exclude micro-cap stocks, those having size less
than 20% NYSE breakpoint. Diversity and sparsity betas are estimated using past 60-months returns
data. For each firm, at the start of every month I sort firms into deciles based on their diversity (or
sparsity) betas and hold the portfolios for the next 12-months. Each month, within each decile, value-
weighted portfolios are formed using the market capitalization of all firms in that decile. In addition to
excess returns, the table also reports CAPM, FF3, FF-C, FF5 and HXZ alphas on these portfolios. All
return and alpha values are monthly and in percentages. The sample period for portfolio formation is
from July 1997 to June 2013. I report the associated t − statistics in parentheses. The t-statistics are
calculated using Newey-West standard errors with 12 lags.
Panel A: Firm Portfolios- Diversity beta-sorted portfolios
Returns CAPM FF3 FF − C FF5 HXZ
Decile 1 0.9398 0.4153 0.3362 0.3652 0.4892 0.4676
(1.82) (1.31) (1.11) (1.18) (1.81) (1.68)
Decile 2 0.7712 0.3584 0.2758 0.3113 0.2151 0.2383
(1.94) (1.61) (1.88) (1.80) (1.41) (1.26)
Decile 3 0.6711 0.2939 0.2215 0.2498 0.1442 0.1550
(1.87) (1.71) (2.10) (2.20) (1.39) (1.29)
Decile 4 0.5631 0.2221 0.1626 0.1697 0.0152 0.0086
(1.78) (1.46) (1.91) (1.98) (0.22) (0.09)
Decile 5 0.5256 0.1900 0.1540 0.1653 -0.0237 0.0194
(1.66) (1.51) (2.16) (2.33) (-0.53) (0.23)
Decile 6 0.5240 0.1896 0.1548 0.1447 -0.0044 0.0292
(1.62) (1.50) (2.17) (2.01) (-0.08) (0.36)
Decile 7 0.4461 0.1125 0.1136 0.1114 -0.0052 0.0039
(1.42) (1.11) (1.33) (1.26) (-0.08) (0.04)
Decile 8 0.2909 -0.0771 -0.0884 -0.1026 -0.2250 -0.2197
(0.78) (-0.80) (-1.28) (-1.50) (-3.06) (-2.72)
Decile 9 0.1971 -0.2253 -0.2431 -0.2271 -0.3101 -0.2977
(0.49) (-2.55) (-2.53) (-2.51) (-3.11) (-2.96)
Decile 10 0.1487 -0.4271 -0.3822 -0.3250 -0.1976 -0.1941
(0.27) (-1.81) (-2.35) (-1.99) (-1.08) (-0.94)
10− 1 -0.7911 -0.8424 -0.7183 -0.6901 -0.6867 -0.6617
(-2.09) (-2.05) (-2.25) (-2.14) (-2.02) (-1.96)
Continued on next page
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Panel B: Firm Portfolios- Sparsity beta-sorted portfolios
Returns CAPM FF3 FF − C FF5 HXZ
Decile 1 0.2851 -0.2934 -0.2604 -0.1568 -0.0128 0.0330
(0.50) (-1.26) (-1.29) (-0.80) (-0.06) (0.14)
Decile 2 0.2877 -0.1395 -0.2023 -0.1405 -0.2489 -0.1997
(0.70) (-0.95) (-1.82) (-1.32) (-2.26) (-1.73)
Decile 3 0.4516 0.0441 0.0065 0.0400 -0.0286 0.0116
(1.09) (0.38) (0.07) (0.41) (-0.28) (0.11)
Decile 4 0.4552 0.0831 0.0416 0.0649 -0.0466 -0.0397
(1.19) (0.69) (0.54) (0.86) (-0.56) (-0.33)
Decile 5 0.4679 0.1147 0.0258 0.0521 -0.1292 -0.1296
(1.28) (0.29) (0.22) (0.54) (-1.63) (-0.93)
Decile 6 0.5659 0.2318 0.1903 0.1674 0.0131 0.0024
(1.77) (1.84) (1.86) (1.53) (0.14) (0.02)
Decile 7 0.5012 0.1734 0.1165 0.0966 -0.0769 -0.0723
(1.65) (1.21) (1.33) (1.03) (-1.19) (-0.63)
Decile 8 0.6207 0.2712 0.2279 0.2031 0.0766 0.0817
(2.03) (2.40) (2.90) (2.51) (1.46) (0.94)
Decile 9 0.6025 0.1983 0.1827 0.1545 0.1411 0.1128
(1.69) (1.72) (1.79) (1.70) (1.68) (1.30)
Decile 10 0.8196 0.3218 0.3416 0.3047 0.5447 0.4434
(1.71) (1.65) (1.78) (1.66) (2.60) (2.03)
10− 1 0.5345 0.6151 0.6020 0.4616 0.5576 0.4104
(2.00) (2.41) (2.42) (1.98) (2.10) (1.85)
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Table 2: Double sorted firm portfolios
This table presents monthly average excess returns alphas for diversity beta-sorted (Panel A) portfolios
and sparsity beta-sorted (Panel B) firm level portfolios. Diversity and sparsity betas are estimated
using past 60-months returns data. At the start of every month I sort firms into five groups based
on their sparsity (diversity) betas. Then within each sparsity (diversity) portfolio I sort the firms into
five diversity (sparsity) sorted portfolios and hold the portfolios for the next 12-months. Each month,
within each decile, value-weighted portfolios are formed using the market capitalization of all firms in
that quintile. Then, to get the diversity (sparsity) sorted portfolios I collapse the portfolios along the
sparsity (diversity) dimension. In addition to excess returns, the table also reports CAPM, FF3, FF-C,
FF5 and HXZ alphas on these portfolios. The sample period for portfolio formation is from July 1997 to
June 2013. We report the associated t − statistics in parentheses. The t-statistics are calculated using
Newey-West standard errors with 12 lags.
Panel A: Firm Portfolios- Diversity beta-sorted portfolios
Returns CAPM FF3 FF − C FF5 HXZ
Quintile 1 0.9656 0.5000 0.3786 0.4188 0.3630 0.3796
(2.25) (1.85) (1.82) (1.85) (1.82) (1.73)
Quintile 2 0.6685 0.2954 0.2051 0.2351 0.0848 0.0958
(2.03) (1.81) (2.08) (2.30) (0.98) (0.94)
Quintile 3 0.5739 0.2183 0.1483 0.1603 -0.0245 0.0151
(1.72) (1.62) (2.05) (2.14) (-0.50) (0.19)
Quintile 4 0.4492 0.0813 0.0454 0.0479 -0.0699 -0.0575
(1.26) (0.94) (0.74) (0.78) (-1.41) (-0.74)
Quintile 5 0.2772 -0.2021 -0.2229 -0.2029 -0.1603 -0.1738
(0.59) (-1.78) (-2.55) (-2.38) (-1.74) (-1.98)
5− 1 -0.6884 -0.7021 -0.6015 -0.6217 -0.5233 -0.5534
(-2.20) (-2.04) (-2.36) (-2.31) (-2.14) (-2.05)
Continued on next page
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Table 2 – continued from previous page
Panel B: Firm Portfolios- Sparsity beta-sorted portfolios
Returns CAPM FF3 FF − C FF5 HXZ
Quintile 1 0.3437 -0.1548 -0.1942 -0.0942 -0.0937 -0.0370
(0.75) (-1.34) (-1.81) (-0.98) (-0.88) (-0.37)
Quintile 2 0.5315 0.1335 0.0597 0.1059 -0.0261 0.0051
(1.34) (1.05) (0.80) (1.41) (-0.37) (0.06)
Quintile 3 0.5725 0.2107 0.1317 0.1458 -0.0250 -0.0244
(1.69) (1.35) (1.70) (1.65) (-0.41) (-0.21)
Quintile 4 0.6432 0.2865 0.2044 0.1919 0.0321 0.0352
(2.05) (1.80) (2.08) (1.87) (0.48) (0.31)
Quintile 5 0.8437 0.4169 0.3528 0.3099 0.3059 0.2783
(2.20) (2.74) (2.75) (2.41) (2.09) (2.09)
5− 1 0.5000 0.5718 0.5470 0.4041 0.3995 0.3152
(2.53) (3.31) (3.49) (3.00) (2.26) (2.17)
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Table 3: One-way sorted firm portfolios- (factors using 49-FF industries)
This table presents monthly average excess returns alphas for diversity beta-sorted (Panel A) portfolios
and sparsity beta-sorted (Panel B) firm level portfolios. The network factors- diversity and sparsity-
are calculated using 49-Fama-French industries.. Diversity and sparsity betas are estimated using past
60-months returns data. For each firm, at the start of every month I sort firms into deciles based on their
diversity (or sparsity) betas and hold the portfolios for the next 12-months. Each month, within each
decile, value-weighted portfolios are formed using the market capitalization of all firms in that decile.
In addition to excess returns, the table also reports CAPM, FF3, FF-C, FF5 and HXZ alphas on these
portfolios. All return and alpha values are monthly and in percentages. The sample period for portfolio
formation is from July 1997 to June 2013. I report the associated t − statistics in parentheses. The
t-statistics are calculated using Newey-West standard errors with 12 lags.
Panel A: Firm Portfolios- Diversity beta-sorted portfolios
Returns CAPM FF3 FF − C FF5 HXZ
Decile 1 1.0345 0.5439 0.4741 0.4519 0.4288 0.5207
(2.20) (1.72) (1.69) (1.67) (1.65) (1.98)
Decile 2 0.7012 0.3344 0.2973 0.2761 0.0872 0.1832
(2.04) (1.65) (1.99) (1.70) (0.71) (1.34)
Decile 3 0.6986 0.3593 0.3046 0.3042 0.1986 0.2098
(2.14) (1.99) (2.74) (2.45) (2.14) (1.70)
Decile 4 0.5560 0.2379 0.2057 0.1877 0.0143 0.0412
(1.91) (1.56) (2.02) (1.81) (0.18) (0.40)
Decile 5 0.4786 0.1561 0.1205 0.1388 -0.0201 0.0038
(1.49) (1.08) (1.27) (1.48) (-0.27) (0.03)
Decile 6 0.5069 0.1537 0.0885 0.0893 -0.0721 -0.0847
(1.53) (1.00) (1.00) (1.04) (-0.94) (-0.84)
Decile 7 0.5134 0.1409 0.0965 0.1017 -0.0272 -0.0438
(1.47) (1.06) (1.10) (1.19) (-0.36) (-0.46)
Decile 8 0.2584 -0.1609 -0.2076 -0.1657 -0.2610 -0.2559
(0.58) (-0.98) (-1.80) (-1.38) (-1.89) (-1.67)
Decile 9 0.2851 -0.1540 -0.2197 -0.1819 -0.2421 -0.2498
(0.64) (-1.16) (-1.61) (-1.34) (-1.52) (-1.75)
Decile 10 0.1323 -0.4496 -0.4557 -0.3735 -0.2932 -0.2983
(0.23) (-1.93) (-2.47) (-2.05) (-1.63) (-1.64)
10− 1 -0.9022 -0.9935 -0.9298 -0.8253 -0.7219 -0.8189
(-2.13) (-2.27) (-2.61) (-2.41) (-1.94) (-2.46)
Continued on next page
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Panel B: Firm Portfolios- Sparsity beta-sorted portfolios
Returns CAPM FF3 FF − C FF5 HXZ
Decile 1 0.2704 -0.2710 -0.2292 -0.1468 -0.0819 0.0066
(0.54) (-1.32) (-1.27) (-0.86) (-0.43) (0.03)
Decile 2 0.2859 -0.1392 -0.1358 -0.1135 -0.2077 -0.1186
(0.69) (-1.71) (-1.71) (-1.43) (-2.64) (-1.31)
Decile 3 0.4228 0.0338 -0.0141 0.0108 -0.1122 0.0865
(1.08) (0.29) (-0.20) (0.16) (-1.64) (-1.02)
Decile 4 0.5654 0.2053 0.1178 0.1042 -0.0068 -0.0276
(1.61) (1.36) (1.59) (1.48) (-0.09) (-0.28)
Decile 5 0.4474 0.0934 0.0357 0.0623 -0.0448 -0.0638
(1.29) (0.78) (0.52) (0.88) (-0.71) (-0.53)
Decile 6 0.4699 0.1168 0.0936 0.0895 -0.0078 -0.0348
(1.44) (1.30) (1.07) (1.00) (-0.09) (-0.36)
Decile 7 0.4983 0.1686 0.1226 0.1150 -0.0491 -0.0544
(1.56) (1.22) (1.71) (1.52) (-0.96) (-0.61)
Decile 8 0.5478 0.1878 0.1735 0.1588 -0.0191 0.0424
(1.74) (1.30) (1.58) (1.43) (-0.28) (0.37)
Decile 9 0.6944 0.2884 0.2520 0.2340 0.1867 0.1971
(1.79) (2.32) (2.48) (2.32) (1.88) (1.91)
Decile 10 0.9409 0.4252 0.4504 0.4562 0.6993 0.6453
(1.88) (1.79) (2.38) (2.40) (3.39) (3.16)
10− 1 0.6704 0.6962 0.6796 0.6030 0.7812 0.6387
(2.45) (2.42) (2.51) (2.35) (2.65) (2.29)
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2 Price of Risk: Robustness
In this section, I do the robustness tests for the price of risk tests. Table 4 reports results for
the network factors using the factor mimicking portfolios constructed from the firm-level double-sorted
diversity- (sparsity-) beta portfolios. Table 5 reports results for the network factors constructed using
49-Fama-French industries and the factor mimicking portfolios constructed from the firm-level double-
sorted diversity- (sparsity-) beta sorted portfolios.
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Table 4: Fama and MacBeth tests for network factors (firm-level portfolios)
This table reports the estimated prices of risk for three asset pricing factors: MKTRF and two network-
based factors: diversity (DIV ERSITY ) and sparsity (SPARSITY ). Following Lewellen, Nagel, and
Shanken (2010), I consider six different test assets. Column (1) uses 20 portfolios sorted on our two
network factors: (DIV ERSITY ) and (SPARSITY ). Column (2) adds 25 double sorted size and book-
to-market portfolios. Column (3) adds 10 short-term reversal, 10 long-term reversal and 10 momentum
sorted portfolios. Column (4) adds 10 operating profitability and 10 investment sorted portfolios. Column
(5) adds 10 accruals, 10 cash flow, 10 dividend yield, 10 earnings-price ratio, 10 net issuance, and
10 residual variance sorted portfolios. All the portfolio data, except for network sorted and industry
portfolios, are from Kenneth Frenchs website. Panel B repeats all the tests with only two network
factors. Panel C consists of the two network factors with five Fama-French (2015) factors. Panel D
consists of the two network factors with four HXZ (2014) factors. The sample period is from July 1997
to June 2013 at a monthly frequency. All average excess returns and factors, hence the coefficients, are
on a monthly basis. R2 is reported in the last row and is expressed in percentage. t − statistics are
based on Newey-West standard errors.
Panel A: Network Factors + MKTRF
1 2 3 4 5
Constant 0.0560 0.0714 0.0139 0.1845 0.1664
(0.15) (0.24) (0.44) (0.65) (0.62)
DIV ERSITY -0.7074 -0.6684 -0.6713 -0.7108 -0.6773
(-2.47) (-2.49) (-2.46) (-2.59) (-2.39)
SPARSITY 0.5054 0.5870 0.6448 0.6503 0.6398
(2.32) (2.70) (2.37) (2.38) (2.49)
MKTRF 0.4338 0.4360 0.3486 0.2909 0.3004
(1.35) (1.88) (1.44) (1.34) (1.50)
R2 88.09 66.48 61.35 60.67 47.44
Panel B: Network Factors
Constant 0.7519 0.8052 0.7630 0.7496 0.7070
(5.41) (6.47) (6.22) (6.13) (5.94)
DIV ERSITY -0.6436 -0.5631 -0.5422 -0.5710 -0.4843
(-2.53) (-2.43) (-2.53) (-2.67) (-2.27)
SPARSITY 0.4234 0.4349 0.4082 0.4119 0.3699
(2.39) (2.65) (2.46) (2.44) (2.41)
R2 75.38 51.51 44.55 46.55 34.06
Continued on next page
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Panel C: Network Factors + FF5
Constant -1.1684 0.4065 0.1905 0.1928 0.2518
(-1.59) (2.85) (0.66) (0.78) (1.09)
DIV ERSITY -0.7240 -0.6852 -0.6229 -0.6394 -0.6245
(-2.48) (-2.39) (-2.32) (-2.34) (-2.22)
SPARSITY 0.4962 0.5332 0.5399 0.5330 0.4966
(2.33) (2.36) (2.07) (2.01) (2.01)
MKTRF -0.5847 0.0467 0.2475 0.2398 0.1807
(-0.85) (0.33) (1.13) (1.28) (1.02)
SMB 0.2596 0.3359 0.3499 0.3627 0.3979
(0.76) (3.06) (2.96) (3.02) (3.40)
HML -0.2231 0.1975 0.2616 0.2470 0.1878
(-0.80) (1.57) (2.03) (1.95) (1.43)
RMW -0.0477 0.2268 0.1059 0.1604 0.2112
(-0.23) (2.02) (0.77) (1.44) (2.07)
CMA -0.0034 0.1029 0.2456 0.2459 0.1804
(-0.02) (0.65) (1.94) (2.31) (1.55)
R2 90.34 74.30 70.76 71.05 58.18
Continued on next page
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Panel D: Network Factors + HXZ
Constant 0.0728 0.4557 0.1905 0.2562 0.3748
(0.16) (3.56) (0.66) (0.99) (1.72)
DIV ERSITY -0.7346 -0.6943 -0.6267 0.6407 -0.6194
(-2.43) (-2.33) (-2.22) (-2.26) (-2.20)
SPARSITY 0.4772 0.5081 0.4971 0.4936 0.4738
(2.39) (2.29) (2.09) (2.14) (2.13)
MKTRF 0.4322 -0.0036 0.2476 0.1793 0.0704
(0.95) (-0.02) (1.11) (0.86) (0.40)
SIZE 0.0164 0.4861 0.4480 0.4499 0.4487
(0.07) (2.29) (2.99) (3.01) (3.14)
ROE 0.7458 0.5575 0.2209 0.2466 0.2393
(1.67) (5.49) (1.92) (1.98) (2.15)
INV -0.2880 -0.0025 0.1322 0.1397 0.0914
(-1.07) (-0.02) (1.12) (1.27) (0.84)
R2 91.54 76.86 71.38 71.00 56.67
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Table 5: Fama and MacBeth tests for network factors (using 49-Fama-French industries)
This table reports the estimated prices of risk for three asset pricing factors: MKTRF and two network-
based factors: diversity (DIV ERSITY ) and sparsity (SPARSITY ). Following Lewellen, Nagel, and
Shanken (2010), I consider six different test assets. Column (1) uses 25 double sorted portfolios sorted
on our two network factors: (DIV ERSITY ) and (SPARSITY ). Column (2) adds 25 double sorted
size and book-to-market portfolios. Column (3) adds 10 short-term reversal, 10 long-term reversal and
10 momentum sorted portfolios. Column (4) adds 10 operating profitability and 10 investment sorted
portfolios. Column (5) adds 10 accruals, 10 cash flow, 10 dividend yield, 10 earnings-price ratio, and 10
net issuance sorted portfolios. All the portfolio data, except for network sorted and industry portfolios,
are from Kenneth Frenchs website. Panel B repeats all the tests with only two network factors. Panel
C consists of the two network factors with five Fama-French (2015) factors. Panel D consists of the two
network factors with four HXZ (2014) factors. The sample period is from July 1997 to June 2013 at a
monthly frequency. All average excess returns and factors, hence the coefficients, are on a monthly basis.
R2 is reported in the last row and is expressed in percentage. t − statistics are based on Newey-West
standard errors.
Panel A: Network Factors + MKTRF
1 2 3 4 5
Constant -0.1380 0.0805 0.1394 0.1802 0.1740
(-0.50) (0.32) (0.47) (0.67) (0.67)
DIV ERSITY -0.7272 -0.6511 -0.6136 -0.6408 -0.6057
(-2.50) (-2.48) (-2.34) (-2.45) (-2.32)
SPARSITY 0.5119 0.6238 0.6899 0.7089 0.6893
(2.71) (2.89) (2.79) (2.85) (2.95)
MKTRF 0.6577 0.4318 0.3530 0.3030 0.3010
(2.83) (2.47) (1.70) (1.61) (1.68)
R2 89.49 69.26 62.83 61.57 48.60
Panel B: Network Factors
Constant 0.8980 0.9297 0.8500 0.8446 0.7933
(6.81) (7.34) (7.72) (7.66) (7.23)
DIV ERSITY -0.5781 -0.4367 -0.3062 -0.3227 -0.2491
(-2.26) (-2.09) (-2.00) (-2.10) (-1.74)
SPARSITY 0.4408 0.5911 0.5584 0.5745 0.5596
(2.55) (2.85) (2.85) (2.89) (2.96)
R2 68.94 53.50 44.56 45.54 35.29
Continued on next page
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Panel C: Network Factors + FF5
Constant 0.6522 0.4039 0.1590 0.1537 0.2185
(2.80) (3.46) (0.53) (0.63) (0.90)
DIV ERSITY -0.7473 -0.6777 -0.6166 -0.6175 -0.5954
(-2.53) (-2.49) (-2.37) (-2.38) (-2.30)
SPARSITY 0.4898 0.5285 0.5354 0.5311 0.4719
(2.51) (2.74) (2.30) (2.21) (2.18)
MKTRF -0.2071 0.0640 0.2891 0.2872 0.2209
(-0.88) (0.36) (1.27) (1.55) (1.19)
SMB 0.8600 0.3407 0.3650 0.3790 0.4126
(4.24) (3.10) (3.13) (3.23) (3.03)
HML -0.0387 0.1621 0.2221 0.2146 0.1549
(-0.12) (1.24) (1.67) (1.64) (1.19)
RMW 0.4930 0.2774 0.1071 0.1529 0.2030
(2.03) (1.76) (0.73) (1.34) (2.03)
CMA 0.1070 -0.0009 0.2422 0.2519 0.1863
(0.98) (-0.01) (1.49) (2.05) (1.44)
R2 93.13 73.74 68.56 68.79 56.38
Continued on next page
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Panel D: Network Factors + HXZ
Constant 0.6562 0.4314 0.1753 0.2266 0.3192
(2.57) (3.82) (0.60) (0.85) (1.33)
DIV ERSITY -0.7319 -0.6833 -0.6234 -0.6300 -0.6122
(-2.46) (-2.48) (-2.38) (-2.41) (-2.38)
SPARSITY 0.4925 0.5216 0.5143 0.5144 0.4657
(2.75) (2.74) (2.36) (2.44) (2.47)
MKTRF -0.1327 0.0470 0.2763 0.2193 0.1325
(-0.47) (0.26) (1.22) (1.04) (0.71)
SIZE 0.5584 0.4308 0.4384 0.4447 0.4480
(1.44) (3.82) (2.96) (3.05) (3.19)
ROE 0.1729 0.3964 0.1420 0.1672 0.1732
(0.49) (3.60) (1.52) (1.65) (1.80)
INV -0.0195 0.0243 0.1347 0.1489 0.1039
(-0.15) (0.20) (1.25) (1.46) (0.99)
R2 91.87 74.45 68.60 68.20 54.81
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Table 6: Network factors’ post-formation betas for double-sorted industry portfolios
This table presents monthly average network factor loadings in each portfolio, for diversity beta-sorted
(Panel A) portfolios and sparsity beta-sorted (Panel B) industry level portfolios. I use 20 double-
sorted portfolios; 10 are diversity-sorted portfolios (controlling for sparsity) and other 10 are sparsity-
sorted portfolios (controlling for diversity). For each portfolio I run a time-series univariate regression
of portfolio’s excess returns on diversity (factor mimicking portfolio) and sparsity (factor mimicking
portfolio). The sample period from July 1997 to June 2013. I report the associated t − statistics in
parentheses. The t-statistics are calculated using Newey-West standard errors with 12 lags.
Diversity sorted Sparsity sorted
βD βS βD βS
Decile 1 -0.7063 0.0202 -0.1775 -0.5089
(-10.28) (0.37) (-1.63) (-6.07)
Decile 2 -0.5126 0.0163 -0.1135 -0.1032
(-7.09) (0.47) (-1.24) (-2.11)
Decile 3 -0.4344 0.0359 -0.2914 -0.0609
(-6.22) (1.06) (-4.58) (-1.86)
Decile 4 -0.3797 0.0343 -0.3483 -0.0064
(-4.72) (1.05) (-5.96) (-0.22)
Decile 5 -0.4137 -0.0121 -0.2063 0.0649
(-6.53) (-0.29) (-5.23) (1.72)
Decile 6 -0.1637 0.0759 -0.2511 0.0040
(-1.68) (1.80) (-3.06) (0.07)
Decile 7 0.0279 0.1263 -0.3252 0.0721
(0.23) (2.19) (-5.06) (1.86)
Decile 8 -0.2685 0.0459 -0.3181 0.1186
(-3.62) (1.56) (-5.56) (2.37)
Decile 9 -0.1411 0.0287 -0.3447 0.1247
(-2.16) (0.67) (-5.06) (2.16)
Decile 10 0.2937 0.0201 -0.17752 0.4910
(4.28) (0.37) (-1.63) (5.86)
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Appendix
for Boardroom Connections, Information Networks, and Asset
Prices
1 Network Model
In this section I derive the board network effects on the asset prices.
1.1 Model Setup
Time is discrete and indexed by t = 1, 2, .... The model builds on input-output sectoral
model of Long and Plosser (1983). There are four sectors in the economy- management capital
sector, durable goods sector, industry goods sector, and final or consumption goods sector.
Board is represented as a management capital producer in the model. Management capital
sector consists of n distinct management capital good producers. Each of them are uniquely
associated with a ‘base firm’ in the durable goods sector. Firms in the durable goods sector
buys management capital good, an intangible good, from the management capital producer
and uses it along with labor and tangible capital to produce the durable good. In addition,
each producer in the durable goods sector, and thus its uniquely linked management capital
producer, belongs to a particular industry. Firms in the industry goods sector aggregates the
durable goods produced by all producers in its industry into an industry good. All the different
industry goods produced by different industries is further aggregated into the final output that is
used for consumption in the economy. The representative agent in the economy has Epstein-Zin
(1991) preferences and consumes the output of the final goods sector.
1.2 Management Capital Sector
Consider a management capital producer i. It is connected with other producers in the
economy. It acquires management capital from other producers which, in addition to its own
management capital, defines its output. In the process, it also supplies other producers with
the management capital that it has; thus, its a two way network. Thus, the producer is a buyer
and seller of management capital simultaneously. However, all these producers are in different
sector as that of producer i. In a sense, we have inter-sectoral network linkages. Through these
linkages, producer i makes an investment to buy management capital from other producers
and then transforms it to produce its own management capital. This can be thought of as the
‘board’, say, using estimates or insights of other boards to come out with its own estimate or
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insight. Its input from producer j at time t is denoted as xij,t. Both i and j belong to different
sectors but the sector indexes are suppressed for notational simplicity. All inputs acquired from
other information good producers are combined into a single information variable given as:
Si,t =
[
n∑
j=1
wij,tx
1−1/ρ
ij,t
] 1
1−1/ρ
(1)
where i and j represent two different producers in the economy. ρ is a parameter that governs
the elasticity of substitution between management capital from different producers and wij,t is
the importance on, or the value of the input j. The weights are non-negative and sum to one;
wij,t ≥ 0 and
n∑
j=1
wij,t = 1
The input variable Si,t in Equation (1) is used as an input and transformed into a management
capital for producer i given as:
Xi,t = ξi,tS
η
i,t (2)
where η ∈ (0, 1) captures decreasing returns to scale to the management capital input. One
interpretation can be that with each increase in connection co-ordination difficulties may arise,
similar to a team-work setting, which will limit the optimal number of connections. Constant or
increasing returns to scale will results in buying ever increasing amounts of management capital
goods as input. This translates to having connections with all producers in the economy.
The fact that its not observed in the data further supports decreasing returns to scale.1 All
management capital goods are produced at time t and are used at time t as well. 2 ξi,t is the
productivity level of producer i. This can be interpreted as a shock that makes the management
capital good more relevant in the economy. Internet will be an example of such a shock although
its systematic in nature. It can also be interpreted as firm-level idiosyncratic shock when the
same firm produces both the management capital good and durable good. I start with describing
the optimization problem of the management capital producers.
The optimization problem of producer i is time-separable and hence, its sufficient to maxi-
1If we assume that management capital is a signal with some noise then having more and more signals will
decrease the variance. However, the decline in noise keeps falling with each additional signal.
2 This approach is similar to that used in Acemoglu, Carvalho, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2012). In other
words, the model assumes a depreciation rate of 100% for the information good. This can be justified using the
notion that new information has more impact than the old information.
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mize per-period profits. Producer i chooses which inputs to acquire to maximize profits, taking
both spot prices and input prices as given. This gives the following profit function for producer
i at time t.
max
xij,t, Si,t
ΠIi,t = pi,tξi,tS
η
i,t −
n∑
j=1
pj,txij,t
subject to Si,t =
[
n∑
j=1
wij,tx
1−1/ρ
ij,t
] 1
1−1/ρ
(3)
where pi,t is the price of the management capital good i. The Lagrangian for the above opti-
mization problem is:
L = pi,tξi,tSηi,t −
n∑
j=1
pj,txij,t + +λi,t
([
n∑
j=1
wij,tx
1−1/ρ
ij,t
] 1
1−1/ρ
− Ii,t
)
Differentiating w.r.t Si,t:
∂L
∂Si,t
= 0 ⇒ (pi,tξi,tηSη−1i,t ) + λi,t(0− 1) = 0
(pi,tξi,tηS
η−1
i,t ) = λi,t ⇒ Si,t =
[
ηpi,tξi,t
λi,t
] 1
1−η (4)
Differentiating w.r.t xij,t:
∂L
∂xij,t
= 0 ⇒ 0− pj,t + λi,t ρ
ρ− 1
ρ− 1
ρ
wij,tx
−1
ρ
ij,t
[
n∑
j=1
wij,tx
1−1/ρ
ij,t
] 1
1−1/ρ−1
= 0
pj,t = λi,twij,tx
−1
ρ
ij,tS
1
ρ
i,t ⇒ x
−1
ρ
ij,t =
pj,t
λi,twij,tS
1
ρ
i,t
⇒ xij,t =
λρi,tw
ρ
ij,tSi,t
pρj,t
(5)
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Substituting Equation (5) in Equation (1), we get,
Si,t =
[
n∑
j=1
wij,tx
1−1/ρ
ij,t
] 1
1−1/ρ
⇒ Si,t =
{
n∑
j=1
wij,t
[
λρi,tw
ρ
ij,tSi,t
pρj,t
]1−1/ρ} 1
1−1/ρ
Si,t =
[
n∑
j=1
wρij,tλ
ρ(1− 1
ρ
)
i,t S
1− 1
ρ
i,t p
1−ρ
j,t
] 1
1−1/ρ
⇒ Si,t =
[
n∑
j=1
wρij,tp
1−ρ
j,t
] 1
1−1/ρ
λρi,tSi,t
λ−ρi,t =
[
n∑
j=1
wρij,tp
1−ρ
j,t
] 1
1−1/ρ
⇒ λi,t =
[
n∑
j=1
wρij,tp
1−ρ
j,t
] 1
1−1/ρ−ρ
λi,t =
[
n∑
j=1
wρij,tp
1−ρ
j,t
] 1
1−ρ
(6)
When ρ = 1 we have a Cobb-Douglas aggregation of the information inputs. In this case,
λi,t and Si,t are given as:
λi,t =
∏n
j=1 p
wij,t
j,t∏n
j=1w
wij,t
ij,t
Si,t =
n∏
j=1
x
wij,t
ij,t
(7)
wij,t thus represents the marginal product of the information input and is also equal to
the elasticity of the input. The above two relations fully specifies the management capital
producer’s optimization conditions.
From Equation (4) for ρ = 1 we have;
xij,t =
λi,twij,tSi,t
pj,t
=
λi,twij,tS
1−η
i,t S
η
i,tξi,tξ
−1
i,t
pj,t
xij,t =
λi,twij,tηpi,tξi,tXi,tξ
−1
i,t
pj,tλi,t
=
ηwij,tpi,tXi,t
pj,t
pj,txij,t = ηwij,tpi,tXi,t
Summing on inputs from j for firm i; we have;
j=n∑
j=1
pj,txij,t = ηpi,tXi,t
j=n∑
j=1
wij,t = ηpi,tXi,t
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Substituting Equation (3) above;
pi,tXi,t −ΠIi,t = ηpi,tXi,t ⇒ ΠIi,t = (1− η)pi,tXi,t
Summing over i;
∑
i=1
ΠIi,t = (1− η)
∑
i=1
pi,tXi,t = (1− η)Im,t (8)
where Im,t =
∑
i=1 pi,tXi,t is the total value of all management capital produced in the industry
m, to which firm i belongs, at time t.
1.3 Durable Goods Producers
Each management capital producer i uses xi,t level of its management capital for its ‘base’
firm in the durable good sector at price pi,t. The ‘base’ firm combines the management capital
with labor Li,t and capital Ii,t
3 to produce a durable good as its output yi,t. The durable good
is then sold to the industry goods sector at price Pi,t. The output function for any durable good
producer i is given as:
yi,t = I
ϑ
i,tL
ς
i,tx
ϕ
i,t
(9)
where ϑ ∈ (0, 1), ς ∈ (0, 1), and ϕ ∈ (0, 1) captures decreasing returns to investment, labor and
management capital respectively and ϑ+ ς + ϕ ≤ 1. The optimization function for the durable
good producer i is given as:
max
Ii,t,Li,t,xi,t
ΠDt = Pi,tI
ϑ
i,tL
ς
i,tx
ϕ
i,t − rtIi,t − htLi,t − pi,txi,t (10)
where rt (return on investment) and ht (wage) are the factor prices for the investment and labor
inputs respectively. Differentiating w.r.t xi,t:
∂ΠDt
∂xi,t
= 0 ⇒ Pi,tIϑi,tLςi,txϕi,tx−1i,t ϕ− pi,t = 0
ϕPi,tyi,t
xi,t
= pi,t ⇒ Pi,tyi,t = pi,txi,t
ϕ
(11)
3All capital goods are produced and used at time t itself.
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Differentiating w.r.t Ii,t:
∂ΠDt
∂Ii,t
= 0 ⇒ Pi,tIϑi,tLςi,txϕi,tI−1i,t ϑ− rt = 0
ϑPi,tyi,t
Ii,t
= rt ⇒ rtIi,t = ϑPi,tyi,t = ϑ
ϕ
pi,txi,t
(12)
Differentiating w.r.t Li,t:
∂ΠDt
∂Li,t
= 0 ⇒ Pi,tIϑi,tLςi,txϕi,tL−1i,t ς − ht = 0
ςPi,tyi,t
Li,t
= ht ⇒ htLi,t = ςPi,tyi,t = ς
ϕ
pi,txi,t
(13)
From Equations (12) and (13) the optimal amount of investment and labor inputs for firm i
can be written as:
Ii,t =
ϑ
ϕrt
pi,txi,t and Li,t =
ς
ϕht
pi,txi,t
The optimal amount of the output for firm i:
yi,t = I
ϑ
i,tL
ς
i,tx
ϕ
i,t =
( ϑ
ϕrt
pi,txi,t
)ϑ( ς
ϕht
pi,txi,t
)ς
xϕi,t
yi,t =
( ϑ
ϕrt
)ϑ( ς
ϕht
)ς(
pi,t
)ϑ+ς
xϑ+ς+ϕi,t
yi,t =
( ϑ
ϕrt
)ϑ( ς
ϕht
)ς(
pi,t
)1−ϕ
xi,t
(14)
1.4 Industry Goods Sector
The industry goods sector aggregates the industry durables produced by the durable good
firms in the industry to produce the industry good Yt. The equation for Yt is:
Yt =
n∏
i=1
yαii,t (15)
where αi represents the share of the durable good i in the industry goods sector; αi > 0 and
∑n
i=1 αi =
1. The industry good is sold to the final goods sector at price Pt. The profit function for the
91
industry goods sector is then given as:
ΠInt = YtPt −
n∑
i=1
Pi,tyi,t =
n∏
i=1
yαii,tPt −
n∑
i=1
Pi,tyi,t
ΠInt = Pt
( ϑ
ϕrt
)ϑ( ς
ϕht
)ς n∏
i=1
(
p1−ϕi,t xi,t
)αi − n∑
i=1
pi,txi,t
ϕ
(16)
The industry goods sector maximizes this profit function by choosing the quantity of durables
goods xi,t. Thus, differentiating the above function w.r.t. xi,t gives:
∂ΠInt
∂xi,t
= 0 ⇒ Pt
( ϑ
ϕrt
)ϑ( ς
ϕht
)ς
x−1i,t αi
n∏
i=1
(
p1−ϕi,t xi,t
)αi − pi,t
ϕ
= 0
PtYtx−1i,t αi =
pi,t
ϕ
⇒ αi
xi,t
=
pi,t
PtYtϕ
pi,txi,t = PtYtϕαi
PtYtϕ
∑
i=1
αi =
∑
i=1
pi,txi,t ⇒ PtYtϕ =
∑
i=1
pi,txi,t
(17)
1.5 Final Goods Sector
The final goods sector aggregates the industry goods produced by the industry goods sector
to produce the final output Yt or the consumption good. The equation for Yt is:
Yt =
l∏
m=1
Yβmm,t (18)
where m indexes for different industries and there are l industries in the economy. βm represents
the share of the industry good m in the final goods sector; βm > 0 and
∑l
m=1 βm = 1. The
final output is sold to the consumers at price Pt. The profit function for the final goods sector
is then given as:
ΠFt = Yt Pt−
l∑
m=1
Pm,tYm,t = Pt
l∏
m=1
Yβmm,t −
l∑
m=1
Pm,tYm,t (19)
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The final goods producer maximizes this profit function by choosing the quantity of industry
goods Ym,t. Thus, differentiating the above function w.r.t. Ym,t gives:
∂ΠFt
∂Ym,t = 0 ⇒ Pt βmY
−1
m,t
l∏
m=1
Yβmm,t − Pm,t = 0
PtYt βm = Pm,tYm,t
PtYt
m=l∑
m=1
βm =
m=l∑
m=1
Pm,tYm,t ⇒ PtYt =
m=l∑
m=1
Pm,tYm,t
(20)
1.6 Representative Agent
There is a representative agent in the economy having Epstein-Zin preferences. Let U(Ct)
denote the utility derived from consuming Ct. The recursive value function for the agent then
becomes:
Ut(Ct) =
[
(1− ζ)C
1−γ
θ
t + ζ(EtU
1−γ
t+1 )
1
θ
] θ
1−γ
(21)
where,
ζ = time dicosunt factor; 0 < ζ < 1
γ = risk aversion paramater; γ ≥ 0
ψ = intertemporal elastcity of substituion (IES); ψ ≥ 0
θ =
1− γ
1− 1ψ
when ψ > 1 and γ > 1 then θ < 0 and the agent prefer early resolution of uncertainty. The
agent supplies capital and labor to the intermediate goods producers and consumes the output
of the final goods sector. The budget constraint for the agent is:
Pt Ct + (Qt −Dt)Zt+1 = rtIt + htLt +QtZt
where Qt is the aggregate cum-dividend value of all firms in the economy at time t, Zt is the
position or the ownership in the aggregate stock market at time t, and Dt is the aggregate
level dividends in the economy at time t. In the budget constraint, total expenditure on the
consumption goods and aggregate value of firms net dividends (left-hand side) must be equal
to the sum of gross return earned on capital, total wages earned, and shares’ value (right-hand
side).
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In each period, the agent choses how much to consume Ct and next period ownership in the
stock market Zt, in order to maximize the sum of all her future discounted utility. The agent
cannot store consumption goods from one period to next and therefore cannot save. There is
a risk-free asset in zero net supply and in equilibrium the household has a zero net position to
satisfy clearing conditions.
1.7 Market clearing
There are three sets of market clearing conditions in the economy. First, the consumption
good market clears:
Ct = Yt, ∀ t
which states that the total amount of goods consumed (left-hand side) is equal to the total
amount of the goods supplied by the final goods sector (right-hand side).
Second all asset markets clear;
Zt = 1, ∀ t
which states that the representative agent owns all firms. Hence, the agent is the representative
shareholder as well.
Finally, all management capital goods clear. Thus, for any management capital good
producer i:
Xi,t = xi,t +
n∑
j=1
xji,t
where xji,t is the management capital good belonging to firm i that is sold to or used by firm
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j. Using the above market clearing condition for any management capital producer, we have,
Xi,t = xi,t +
j=n∑
j=1
xji,t ⇒ pi,tXi,t = pi,txi,t + pi,t
j=n∑
j=1
xji,t
pi,txi,t = pi,tXi,t − pi,t
j=n∑
j=1
xji,t
Summing over all firms in the economy gives
i=n∑
i=1
pi,txi,t =
i=n∑
i=1
pi,tXi,t −
i=n∑
i=1
pi,t
j=n∑
j=1
xji,t =
i=n∑
i=1
pi,tXi,t −
i=n∑
i=1
j=n∑
j=1
pj,txij,t
i=n∑
i=1
pi,txi,t =
i=n∑
i=1
ΠIi,t =
m=l∑
m=1
ΠIm,t =
m=l∑
m=1
(1− η)Im,t = (1− η)It
(22)
where the last line of the above expression uses relation from Equation (8). From Equation (20)
and substituting Equation (17), we have, :
PtYt =
m=l∑
m=1
Pm,tYm,t = P1,tY1,t + P2,tY2,t + ... l terms for l industries
PtYt =
1
ϕ
∑
i=1
pi,txi,t +
1
ϕ
∑
j=1
pi,txi,t + ... l terms for l industries
PtYt =
1
ϕ
n∑
i=1
pi,txi,t =
(1− η)
ϕ
It
and,
Pm,tYm,t = PtYt βm = βm (1− η)
ϕ
It
Also from Equation (24), we know that, summing over firms within an industry m gives and
using Equation (17);
∑
i=1
pi,txi,t = Πm,t = (1− η)Im,t
Pm,tYm,t = 1
ϕ
∑
i=1
pi,txi,t =
(1− η)
ϕ
Im,t
Comparing the above two relations for Pm,tYm,t, we get
Im,t = βmIt
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where
∑m=l
m=1 βm = 1. Finally, from Equation (17), we have,
pi,txi,t = ϕαiPm,tYm,t = (1− η)βmαiIt
1.8 Price Normalization
From Equation (18), for any firm i in industry m, we have,
PtYtϕαi = pi,txi,t ⇒ Pt Yt
xi,t
=
1
ϕ
pi,t
αi
PtYt
∏
i=1
1
xi,t
αi
=
1
ϕ
∏
i=1
pi,t
αi
αi ⇒ Pt = 1
ϕ
∏
i=1
pi,t
αi
αi
Similarly, the aggregate price index Pt in the economy is given as:
Pt =
l∏
m=1
Pm,t
βm
βm
⇒ Pt = 1
ϕ
l∏
m=1
[∏
i=1
pi,t
αi
αi
]βm
∴ Pt =
1
ϕ
n∏
i=1
pi,t
αiβi
αiβi
where βi is the share of the industry good in the final good sector to which firm i belongs.
Prices are normalized such that the aggregate price index is set to 1 in each period t. Thus, we
have,
Pt =
1
ϕ
n∏
i=1
pi,t
αiβi
αiβi
= 1
n∏
i=1
pi,t
αiβi = ϕ
n∏
i=1
(αiβi)
αiβi
∴ α′β log pt = ϕα
′
β log(β
′
α)
(23)
where the last line takes logs and specifies the relation in matrix notation, and,
α = nx1 matrix of shares of durable goods producer in their respective industry goods sector.
β = nxn diagonal matrix such that each diagonal element of the matrix is equal to the share
of the industry good in the final goods sector to which firm i belongs. And the non-diagonal
elements of the matrix are zero.
pt = nx1 matrix of shares of prices of management capital producers in their respective
industry goods sector.
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1.9 Risk-Free Rate
The aggregate price index in the economy can be expressed in terms of durable goods prices
as:
Pt =
n∏
i=1
Pi,t
αiβi
αiβi
= 1
A bundle of durable goods given as:
(α1β1
P1,t
,
α2β2
P2,t
, ...,
αnβn
Pn,t
)
(24)
will have a price of 1, since,
i=n∑
i=1
αiβi
Pi,t
Pi,t =
i=n∑
i=1
αiβi =
m=l∑
m=1
βm
∑
i=1
αi,m =
m=l∑
m=1
βm = 1
The bundle defined in Equation (26) is a claim to the final output good used for consumption,
has a price of 1, and satisfies the first order condition in Equation (18). Hence, the risk-free
return is defined as the return on this bundle.
1.10 Solution
Consider the market clearing condition for management capital good Xim,t, we have,
Xim,t = xim,t +
n∑
j=1
xjl,im,t
Multiplying both sides by pim,t and substituting xjl,im,t from Equation (5) we have;
pim,tXim,t = pim,txim,t +
n∑
j=1
pim,t
λρjl,tw
ρ
jl,im,tSjl,t
pρim,t
pim,tXim,t = pim,txim,t +
n∑
j=1
pim,t
λρjl,tw
ρ
jl,im,tSjl,t
pρim,t
pim,tXim,t = pim,txim,t +
n∑
j=1
λρjl,tw
ρ
jl,im,tp
1−ρ
im,tS
1−η
jl,t S
η
jl,tξjl,tξ
−1
jl,t
pim,tXim,t = pim,txim,t +
n∑
j=1
λρjl,tw
ρ
jl,im,tp
1−ρ
im,tξ
−1
jl,tS
1−η
jl,t Xjl,t
(25)
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Substituting Sjl,t from Equation (4);
pim,tXim,t = pim,txim,t +
n∑
j=1
λρjl,tw
ρ
jl,im,tp
1−ρ
im,tξ
−1
jl,t
ηpjl,tξjl,t
λjl,t
Xjl,t
pim,tXim,t = pim,txim,t +
n∑
j=1
wρjl,im,tp
1−ρ
im,t
λ1−ρjl,t
pjl,tηXj,t
(26)
Substituting λjl,t from Equation (6);
pim,tXim,t = pim,txim,t +
n∑
j=1
wρjl,im,tp
1−ρ
im,t∑n
s=1w
ρ
jl,sk,tp
1−ρ
sk,t
pjl,tηXjl,t
pim,tXim,t = pim,txim,t + η
n∑
j=1
w˜jl,im,tpjl,tXjm,t
pim,tXim,t = (1− η)αi,mβmIt + η
n∑
j=1
w˜jl,im,tpjl,tXjl,t
pi,tXi,t = (1− η)αiβiIt + η
n∑
j=1
w˜ji,tpj,tXj,t
(27)
where the last line omits the industry subscripts and defines β at firm level, such that, βi
represents the share of industry good in the final goods sector. Also, the above equation uses
the relation in Equation (28) and w˜ji,t =
wρji,tp
1−ρ
i,t∑n
s=1 w
ρ
js,tp
1−ρ
s,t
. Using matrix representation, the above
equation can be written as:
−−→
PXt = (1− η)Itβα+ ηW˜ ′t
−−→
PXt
−−→
PXt[I − ηW˜ ′t ] = (1− η)Itβα
−−→
PXt = (1− η)Itβ
[
α
′
[I − ηW˜ ′t ]−1
]′
= It
[
δ
′
tβ
]′ (28)
where,
−−→
PXt = nx1 matrix of value of management capital of the n management capital producers in
the economy
W˜
′
t = nxn matrix whose (i, j) element is w˜ji,t
α = nx1 matrix of shares of durable goods producer in their respective industry goods sector.
β = nxn diagonal matrix such that each diagonal element of the matrix is equal to the share
of the industry good in the final goods sector to which firm i belongs. And the non-diagonal
elements of the matrix are zero.
δt = nx1 matrix and is equal to (1− η)
[
α
′
[I − ηW˜ ′t ]−1
]′
.
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Consider any firm i belonging to industry m:
pim,tXim,t = δi,tβmIt
Summing for all firms in the industry m,
∑
i=1
pim,tXim,t = βmIt
∑
i=1
δi,t ⇒ Im,t = βmIt
∑
i=1
δi,t (29)
Thus, for Im,t = βmIt we have
∑
i=1 δi,t = 1 for all firms within the industry. Hence, δim,t, for
each firm, represents the proportional value of the management capital goods in its industry.
When ρ = 1 the management capital shares are completely determined by the network weights;
δt = (1− η)α′ [I − ηW ′t ]−1
Management capital goods is measured by the total number of connections in the industry and
hence, δi,t represents the proportion of the total number of connections that the firms has within
the industry. Thus:
δi,tIm,t = pim,tXim,t (30)
From Equation (4) we have;
Sim,t =
[
ηpim,tξim,t
λim,t
] 1
1−η
S1−ηim,t =
ηpim,tξim,t
λim,t
λim,tSim,t
η
= ξim,tS
η
im,tpim,t
λim,tSim,t
η
= Xim,tpim,t
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Substituting the above relation into Equation (30) and then using Equation (4) gives;
δim,tIm,t = λim,tSim,t
η
δim,tIm,t = λim,t
η
[
ηpim,tξim,t
λim,t
] 1
1−η
δim,tIm,t = λ
1− 1
1−η
im,t p
1
1−η
im,tξ
1
1−η
im,tη
η
1−η
(δim,tβmIt)1−η = λ−ηim,tpim,tξim,tηη
(31)
For ρ = 1 we have:
λim,t =
∏n
j=1 p
wim,jl,t
jl,im,t∏n
j=1w
wim,jl,t
im,jl,t
Substituting back in Equation (37) and taking log on both sides, for any firm, we have,
(1− η) log δi,t + (1− η)βi + (1− η) log It = −η log λi,t + log pi,t + log ξi,t + η log η
(1− η) log δi,t + (1− η)βi + (1− η) log It = −η
n∑
j=1
wij,t log pj,t + η
n∑
j=1
wij,t logwij,t
+ log pi,t + log ξi,t + η log η
where βi represents the share of the industry goods in the final output to which the firm belongs.
For firms belonging to same industry βi is equal. Using matrix representation the above equation
can be written as:
(1− η) log δt + (1− η) log β + (1− η) log It1 = −ηW ′t log pt + η
−→S Nt + log pt + log ξt + 1η log η
where,
−→S Nt = nx1 matrix whose ith element is
∑n
j=1wij,t logwij,t
[I − ηWt] log pt = (1− η) log δt + (1− η) log β + (1− η) log It1− η−→S Nt − log ξt − 1η log η
log pt = [I − ηWt]−1
[
(1− η) log δt + (1− η) log β + (1− η) log It1− η−→S Nt − log ξt − 1η log η
]
α
′
β log pt =
[
α
′
[I − ηWt]−1
]
β
[
(1− η) log δt + (1− η) log β + (1− η) log It1− η−→S Nt − log ξt − 1η log η
]
ϕα
′
β log(β
′
α) = δ
′
tβ
[
(1− η) log δt + (1− η) log β + (1− η) log It1− η−→S Nt − log ξt − 1η log η
]
ϕα
′
β log(β
′
α) = (1− η)δ′tβ log δt + (1− η) log Itδ
′
tβ1− ηδ
′
tβ
−→S Nt − δ
′
tβ log ξt − η log ηδ
′
tβ1
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Consider
δ
′
tβ1 =
l∑
m=1
i∑
i=1
βmδim,t =
[
β1
∑
i=1
δi1,t + β2
∑
j=1
δj1,t + ...l terms for l industries
]
= (β1 + β2 + ...+ βl) = 1
Substituting above,
ϕα
′
β log(β
′
α) = (1− η)δ′tβ log δt + (1− η) log It − ηδ
′
tβ
−→S Nt − δ
′
tβ log ξt − η log η (32)
Consider
δ
′
tβ log δt =
m=l∑
m=1
∑
i=1
βmδim,t log δim,t = β1
∑
i=1
δi1,t log δi1,t + β2
∑
j=1
δj2,t log δj2,t + ...l terms for l industries
∑
i=1 δim,t log δim,t is computed for each industry using firms within the industry and then
summed using βm such that
∑l
m=1 βm = 1. I use Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to
calculate the value empirically,. Thus,
δ
′
tβ log δt = γ
1
1
∑
i=1
δi1,t log δi1,t + γ
1
2
∑
j=1
δj2,t log δj2,t + ...l terms for l industries
=
m=l∑
m=1
∑
i=1
γ1mδim,t log δim,t = DNt
where
∑l
m=1 γ
1
m = 1. Using similar arguments, we can show that,
δ
′
tβ
−→S Nt = γ21
∑
i=1
δi1,t log
−→S Ni1,t + γ22
∑
j=1
δj2,t log
−→S Nj2,t + ...l terms for l industries
= SNt
and,
δ
′
tβ log ξt = γ
3
1
∑
i=1
δi1,t log ξi1t + γ
3
2
∑
j=1
δj2,t log ξj2,t + ...l terms for l industries
= et
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Substituting the above relations in Equation (36), we have,
ϕα
′
β log(β
′
α) = (1− η)DNt + (1− η) log It − ηSNt − et − η log η
(1− η) log It = ϕα′β log(β′α)− (1− η)DNt + ηSNt + et + η log η[
log It − log It−1
]
= −
[
DNt −DNt−1
]
+
η
(1− η)
[
SNt − SNt−1
]
+
1
(1− η)
[
et − et−1
] (33)
where,
DNt = δ
′
tβ log δt is the board information network diversity factor,
SNt = δ
′
tβ
−→S Nt is the board information network sparsity factor,
et = δi,tβ log ξi,t is an average of firm productivity weighted by the producers’ management
capital share.
1.11 Additional Implications
The household inelastically supplies one unit of labor to all durable goods producers in the
economy. Thus,
n∑
i=1
Li,t = 1
which defines the market clearing condition for the labor market and the labor market is com-
petitive. From Equation (13), and summing for all firms in the economy;
ht
n∑
i=1
Li,t =
ς
ϕ
n∑
i=1
pi,txi,t =
ς
ϕ
n∑
i=1
(1− η)αiβiIt
ht = (1− η) ς
ϕ
l∑
m=1
βm
∑
i=1
αi,mIt = (1− η) ς
ϕ
It
ht − ht−1 = (1− η) ς
ϕ
(It − It−1)
Thus, changes in the aggregate level wages are proportional to the changes in the value of the
management capital goods in the economy. Similarly, for capital, we have,
rtIt − rt−1It−1 = (1− η)ϑ
ϕ
(It − It−1)
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Apart from these time-series implications there are some cross-sectional implications too. For
any durable good producer i the revenues of the firm at any time t, using Equations (11) and
(20), is given as:
Salei,t = Pi,tyi,t =
pi,txi,t
ϕ
=
(1− η)
ϕ
αiIt
Hence, the log sales growth is given as:
∆Salei,t+1 = logSalei,t+1 − logSalei,t = log It+1 − log It
Thus at any time t, the sales and the innovations in sales (sales growth) across firms contains
a common factor It and log It+1 − log It respectively. Similarly, for the investment levels and
the labor capital used by different firms at time t; we have;
Ii,t =
ϑ
ϕrt
pi,txi,t =
(1− η)ϑ
ϕrt
αiIt and Li,t = ς
ϕht
pi,txi,t =
(1− η)ς
ϕht
αiIt
Thus, the total value of all management capital produced in the economy It shows up as a
common factor in the investment and labor decisions of the firm according to the model.
1.12 Consumption Expenditure
The representative agent consumes the output of the final goods sector. Thus, the aggregate
consumption expenditure is given as:
ωt = PtYt =
(1− η)
ϕ
It
which is proportional to the total value of the management capital in the economy. Thus, total
consumption expenditure growth is equal to the total management capital growth.
log
( ωt
ωt−1
)
= log
( It
It−1
)
= log It − log It−1
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Also, the total consumption is equal to the consumption expenditure since, the aggregate price
index is set to 1.
ωt = PtYt = Yt = Ct
1.13 Stochastic Discount Factor
The equilibrium model specifies how innovations in network factors affect aggregate con-
sumption. However, a consumption claim in the model does not have leverage. I specify the
unlevered consumption claim, by putting more structure, as:
log Ct+1 − log Ct = ∆ct+1 = φDσDD,t+1 + φSσSS,t+1 + φeσee,t+1 + φzzt (34)
where,
σDD,t+1 = ∆DNt+1, σSS,t+1 = ∆SNt+1, σee,t+1 = ∆et+1, and zt+1 = ρzzt + σzz,t+1.
∆ct+1 represents the growth rate in the unlevered consumption claim. D,t+1, S,t+1, e,t+1, and
z,t+1 are uncorrelated i.i.d. standard normal variables that represent shocks or innovations in
the factors (including the two network factors). zt is the long-run risk factor based on Bansal
and Yaron (2004) which is interpreted as a persistent component of the expected consumption
growth. φD, φS , and φe represents the loadings on the factors and are given as:
φD = − 1
1− η , φS =
η
1− η , and φe =
1
1− η
where η is the returns to scale on the information good. I start by guessing that the log
wealth-consumption ratio is linear in the state variable zt.
wcit = µwc +Wgszt (35)
where µwc and Wgs are constants. I verify the above conjecture by evaluating the Euler equation
for the consumption claim of the agent j: Et[Mt+1Rt+1] = 1 where Mt+1 is agent’s stochastic
discount factor. This conjecture implies that the individual wealth-consumption ratio depends
only on aggregate objects.
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The beginning of period (or cum-dividend) total wealthWt that is not spent on consumption
Ct earns a gross return Rt+1 and leads to beginning of next period wealth Wt+1 . The return
on a claim to consumption, the total return wealth is:
Rt+1 =
Wt+1
Wt − Ct =
Ct+1
Ct
WCt+1
WCt − 1
where WCt is agent’s wealth-consumption ratio at time t. Using small letters to denote logs
the above relation becomes:
rt+1 = ∆ct+1 + wct+1 − log(WCt − 1)
Using Campbell (1991), the approximation around the long run average is:
−log(WCt − 1) = −log(ewct − 1)
≈ −log(eEwct − 1)− e
Ewct
eEwct − 1(wct − Ewct)
= −log(eµwc − 1)− e
µwc
eµwc − 1(wct − µwc)
=
[
− log(eµwc − 1)− e
µwc
eµwc − 1µwc
]
− e
µwc
eµwc − 1wct
This gives:
rt+1 = κ
c
0 + ∆ct+1 + wct+1 − κc1wct (36)
where the linearization constants κc0 and κ
c
1 are non-linear functions of the unconditional mean
of log wealth-consumption ratio µwc = E[wt − ct].
κc0 = −log(eµwc − 1)−
eµwc
eµwc − 1µwc
κc1 =
eµwc
eµwc − 1 > 1
The return on a claim to the consumption stream of the agent, R, satisfies the Euler
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equation under her stochastic discount factor. Using law of iterated expectations:
1 = Et[Mt+1Rt+1] = Et[E[Mt+1Rt+1]]
1 = Et[E[exp(logMt+1 + logRt+1)]] = Et[E[exp(mt+1 + rt+1)]]
1 = Et
[
exp
{
Et(mt+1 + rt+1) +
1
2
V(mt+1 + rt+1)
}] (37)
The last equality uses the cross-sectional normality of consumption share growth. Substituting
equation for wealth-consumption ratio from Equation (40) and consumption growth process
from Equation (39) in Equation (41):
rt+1 = κ
c
0 + φDσDD,t+1 + φSσSS,t+1 + φeσee,t+1
+φzzt + µwc +Wgszt+1 − κc1µwc − κc1Wgszt
= κc0 + φDσDD,t+1 + φSσSS,t+1 + φeσee,t+1
+φzzt + (1− κc1)µwc +Wgs(ρzzt + σzz,t+1 − κc1zt)
= rc0 +
[
φz −Wgs(κc1 − ρz)
]
zt +Wgsσzz,t+1
+φDσDD,t+1 + φSσSS,t+1 + φeσee,t+1
(38)
where rc0 = {κc0 + (1− κc1)µwc}; and is a constant since its a function of parameters.
Epstein and Zin (1989) show that the log real stochastic discount factor is:
mt+1 = θ log ζ − θ
ψ
∆cjt+1 + (θ − 1)rt+1
= θ log ζ − θ
ψ
{
φDσDD,t+1 + φSσSS,t+1 + φeσee,t+1 + φzzt
}
+(θ − 1)
{
{κc0 + (1− κc1)µwc}+
[
φz −Wgs(κc1 − ρz)
]
zt +Wgsσzz,t+1
+φDσDD,t+1 + φSσSS,t+1 + φeσee,t+1
}
We know that:
θ =
1− γ
1− 1ψ
−γ = (θ − 1)− θ
ψ
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Substituting in mt+1 and rearranging gives:
mt+1 = µs − γφDσDD,t+1 − γφSσSS,t+1 − γφeσee,t+1
+(θ − 1)Wgsσzz,t+1 +
[
− γφz − (θ − 1)Wgs(κc1 − ρz)
]
zt
= µs − λDσDD,t+1 − λSσSS,t+1 − λeσee,t+1 − λzσzz,t+1 + λzzt
(39)
where
µs =
{
θ log ζ + (θ − 1)[κc0 + (1− κc1)µwc]
}
is the unconditional mean of log SDF
λz =
[
− γφz − (θ − 1)Wgs(κc1 − ρz)
]
λz = −(θ − 1)Wgs
λD = γφD
λS = γφS
λe = γφe
λD and λD are the prices of risk for the diversity and the sparsity factors respectively. Thus
log SDF and the return on total wealth together yields:
rt+1 +mt+1 = (r
c
0 + µs) +
[
(1− γ)φz − θ(κc1 − ρz)Wgs
]
zt
+(1− γ)φDσDD,t+1 + (1− γ)φSσSS,t+1 + (1− γ)φeσee,t+1 + θWgsσzz,t+1
Using log-normal properties, we can take the expected value at time t and compute the Euler
Equation (42):
0 = µs + r
c
0 +
[
(1− γ)φz − θ(κc1 − ρz)Wgs
]
zt
+
1
2
(1− γ)2
[
φ2Dσ
2
D + φ
2
Sσ
2
S + φ
2
eσ
2
e
]
+
1
2
[
θWgsσz
]2 (40)
Using method of undetermined coefficients, Wgs is given as:
0 =
[
(1− γ)φz − θ(κc1 − ρz)Wgs
]
⇒ Wgs = (1− γ)φz
θ(κc1 − ρz)
(41)
If the IES, ψ, exceeds one, then Wgs < 0. Substituting, Wgs, κ
c
0, and, κ
c
1 in Equation (45)
defines a non-linear in one unknown (µwc) which can be solved for numerically, characterizing
107
the average log wealth-consumption ratio. Thus µwc solves:
0 = µs + r
c
0 +
1
2
(1− γ)2
[
φ2Dσ
2
D + φ
2
Sσ
2
S + φ
2
eσ
2
e
]
+
1
2
[
θWgsσz
]2
(42)
We can calculate the risk and betas of the return on total wealth by substituting Wgs into
Equations (43) and (44).
1.14 Asset Returns
Let the dividend growth process for any individual asset i be given as:
∆dit+1 = µ
i + φiDσDD,t+1 + φ
i
SσSS,t+1 + φ
i
eσee,t+1 + φ
i
zzt + χ
iσii,t+1 (43)
where i,t+1 is the idiosyncratic shock to dividend growth process of asset i. The market portfolio
dividend growth follows a similar process as the asset dividend growth process except that the
idiosyncratic terms are diversified away.
∆dMt+1 = µ
M + φMD σDD,t+1 + φ
M
S σSS,t+1 + φ
M
e σee,t+1 + φ
M
z zt (44)
For the price of the dividend claim, we guess and verify that the asset’s log price-dividend ratio
is affine in the state variable of the model:
pdit = µpdi +W
i
gszt (45)
Asset returns are approximated as:
rit+1 = ∆d
i
t+1 + κ
i
0 + κ
i
1pd
i
t+1 − pdit
where κi0 and κ
i
1 are constants and given by:
κi0 = log[1 + exp(µpdi)]− κi1µpdi
κi1 =
exp(µpdi)
1 + exp(µpdi)
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Plugging in dividend growth(∆dit+1) and price-dividend(pd
i
t) expressions, we get;
rit+1 = r
i
0 +
[
φiz −W igs(1− κi1ρiz)
]
zt + κ
i
1W
i
gsσzz,t+1
+φiDσDD,t+1 + φ
i
SσSS,t+1 + φ
i
eσee,t+1 + χ
iσii,t+1
(46)
where ri0 = µi + κ
i
0 + (κ
i
1 − 1)µpdi is a constant. Hence, innovations in returns is:
rit+1 − Et[rit+1] = κi1W igsσzz,t+1 + φiDσDD,t+1 + φiSσSS,t+1 + φieσee,t+1 + χiσii,t+1
The first term is the Bansal and Yaron (2004) long-run shock, the next three terms are the
aggregate shocks and the last term is the idiosyncratic shock. The log SDF and the return on
asset i together yields:
rit+1 +mt+1 = (r
i
0 + µs) +
[
(1− γ)φz − (θ − 1)(κc1 − ρz)Wgs −W igs(1− κi1ρiz)
]
zt
+(1− γ)φDσDD,t+1 + (1− γ)φSσSS,t+1 + (1− γ)φeσee,t+1 +
[
(θ − 1)Wgs + κi1W igs
]
σzz,t+1 + χ
iσii,t+1
which gives the Euler equation as:
0 = µs + r
i
0 +
[
(1− γ)φz − (θ − 1)(κc1 − ρz)Wgs −W igs(1− κi1ρiz)
]
zt
+
1
2
(1− γ)2
[
φ2Dσ
2
D + φ
2
Sσ
2
S + φ
2
eσ
2
e
]
+
1
2
[
(θ − 1)Wgs + κi1W igs
]2
+
1
2
(χiσi)
2
Using method of undetermined coefficients, W igs is given as:
0 =
[
(1− γ)φz − (θ − 1)(κc1 − ρz)Wgs −W igs(1− κi1ρiz)
]
⇒ W igs =
(1− γ)φiz
θ(κi1 − ρz)
If the IES, ψ, exceeds one, then W igs < 0. Substituting, W
i
gs, κ
i
0, and, κ
i
1 in Equation (51)
defines a non-linear in one unknown (µpdi) which can be solved for numerically. Thus µpdi
solves:
0 = µs + r
i
0 +
1
2
(1− γ)2
[
φ2Dσ
2
D + φ
2
Sσ
2
S + φ
2
eσ
2
e
]
+
1
2
[
(θ − 1)Wgs + κi1W igs
]2
+
1
2
(χiσi)
2
We can calculate the risk and betas of the return on individual asset by substituting W igs into
Equation (51).
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The equity risk premium on asset i is given as:
E[rit+1 − rft ] +
1
2
Vt[rit+1] = Cov[−mt+1 + Et(mt+1), rit+1 − Et(rit+1)]
= βiDλDσ
2
D + β
i
SλSσ
2
S + β
i
eλeσ
2
e + β
i
zλzσ
2
z
(47)
Along similar lines; the equity risk premium on the market portfolio is given by:
E[rMt+1 − rft ] +
1
2
Vt[rMt+1] = βMD λDσ2D + βMS λSσ2S + βMe λeσ2e + βMz λzσ2z (48)
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